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ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN'S RESPONSE

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ONE of the most acute observers among American churchmen has recently written that "in some respects the issue most freighted with possibilities of future trouble within the [World] Council [of Churches] is the 'anti-American' issue." He adds, "It is going to take great wisdom and patience if this division is not to grow more marked and if a chasm is not to be open right down through the middle of the new ecumencial body." It is reported by some of the American delegates to the Oslo conference that they were deeply shocked by the hostility toward America that they found in Europe and even at the conference. This hostility was especially pronounced among delegates from Asia and Africa. An American senator returned from Europe depressed by the misrepresentation of American motives that he found everywhere there. The individual American who travels abroad is likely to meet personally with such courtesy and friendliness that he may fail to realize the depth and extent of this anti-American feeling, even within the Church. There is within the American Church so much sincere good will toward the people in other lands, such a genuine desire to do what can be done to relieve suffering and to help in reconstruction abroad, that it would be easy for American churchmen to fail to understand why Americans collectively are now so unpopular. In this article I shall suggest some of the reasons for this situation.

I

Within the European Church there has been a long standing prejudice against American forms of Christianity. This is not the most im-

portant cause of anti-American feeling in the Church today, but it is well to begin with it because it does form the background for much else. It is true that our European friends do not take much trouble to find out about American Christianity, about American church life, and when individual Europeans come here they are often pleasantly surprised at some of the discoveries which they make. But the fact remains that there is a very common stereotype of American Christianity in the minds of Europeans. They think of it chiefly as a crude and foolishly optimistic type of social activism, with no religious or theological depth and with no respect for tradition. They think of it as sentimental or secular. They are aware that there is also what is to them an astonishing type of Fundamentalism here, and that there are many queer cults. Also, they know that there are scores of denominations and they exaggerate greatly the religious divisiveness of this denominational fragmentation. There are, of course, many who know that this stereotype is extremely unfair to American Christianity but it still remains a factor in the attitude of European Christians toward the American churches. When they learn of the much greater theological depth that has come in the American churches in recent years, of the very large area of religious unity in spite of denominationalism, and of the many signs of real vitality in American church life at points where the European Church is weak they are still surprised.

The feeling against America has its strongest roots today in a complex of interrelated factors, most of them having to do with our disproportionate economic and political power and wealth. Both Europe and Asia are caught between America and Russia quite obviously, and what Americans seldom realize is that it is difficult for people so situated to know whether to fear and resent more the power of Russia or the power of America. It is always very sobering to find thoughtful non-communistic Europeans who express a greater fear of America than of Russia. With the Christians in western Europe, with few exceptions, it is, on the surface, the other way around. The Russian threat is more immediate and more spectacular. Also, it is clear to anyone whose mind is not closed by Communist propaganda that American power is even at worst compatible with important areas of freedom, that American power, unlike Russian power, is subject to strong criticism at home and open to correction by public opinion. Indeed, most western Europeans are afraid that American power may

be withdrawn from Europe and that they may be left alone with Russia.

There is another side to all of this that should be fully recognized by Americans. The overwhelming fact today is that the economic recovery and perhaps the national independence of some of these countries depend upon decisions of the American Congress. However much Europeans may want those decisions to be favorable, this is a very humiliating condition in which to find themselves. Also, many Europeans fear that America will use its power to extend capitalism, to promote the interests of American corporations and to increase the conflict between East and West. Some of them look ahead and wonder if capitalism in America may not stumble into an economic crisis that will carry Europe into another abyss. To be so dependent on American power, on the wisdom of American decisions, to be told by many Americans that they will get more help if they abandon their socialist heresies, to be forever reminded of the appalling contrast between European and American standards of living, and at the same time to be uncertain as to what America will finally do in Europe — these things are enough to generate anti-American feeling. Is it any wonder that people in western Europe and even in Britain see themselves becoming economic colonies of the United States?

All of this puts America on a very difficult spot and I hope that many Europeans are able to see the American dilemma from our perspective. The basic dilemma is that American aid to Europe that is so necessary for European recovery must be given under definite conditions. And yet, to set conditions is to exercise control indirectly and for a time over the receiving countries. There is no way out of this dilemma for it is politically impossible to give aid without conditions that have to do with efficient use of the aid, and I believe that it would be irresponsible to do so. Secretary Marshall handled this dilemma with remarkable tact because he left the initiative so largely to Europe. When Mr. Clayton finally made some conditions explicit, he may have caused irritation but he did refrain from demanding adherence to American ideas of free enterprise. Everything now will depend upon the avoidance by Congress of the setting of humiliating conditions when aid for Europe is voted. Also, it is to be hoped that not many of our lawmakers will follow the example of Congressman Taber who, while in Athens, lectured the Greek Government on its

inefficiency. Among other things, he said, with the kind of boasting for which American tourists are famed, that in the United States "one cop can catch two bandits, while here (in Greece) they can't catch one bandit with six cops." (*The New York Times,* September 28, 1947.) This from a man who by accident of seniority is Chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives!

Caught as they are between Russia and America, Europeans quite naturally fear that they may be the battlefield in a war between the giants. This adds to their sense of having so little control over their destiny. However much they may desire to prevent the extension of Communism and Russian power, they often feel that there is a recklessness about the anti-Russian attitudes that have developed in this country, a recklessness that is not unrelated to the almost fanatical allegiance to capitalism that has been a noticeable characteristic of the American business community since the war. With this reactionary opposition to Communism there is now little sympathy in Europe.

These political and economic grounds for anti-American attitudes in Europe are combined with a distaste for what Europeans see of American culture. Or it is often assumed that there is no culture in the normative sense in America anyway. In a recent number of the *Christian News-Letter* Barbara Ward gave very forceful expression to this feeling about American culture. She lumped together American and Russian civilizations as the two great mass civilizations and over against them both Europe, as she thinks, must struggle to maintain the life of the spirit. She says about America and Russia:

> The resemblance is rooted in certain fundamental characteristics of the modern world which neither has escaped. They both suffer from giganticism. They both show unquestioning confidence in the scientist and the technocrat. They both accept a materialist conception of civilization. They both tend — one consciously, the other unconsciously — to exclude from life the personal, the spiritual and the mystical elements without which man's hold even on his essential humanity seems to grow feeble. (*Christian News-Letter,* July 9, 1947.)

This article seems to me to be much too wholesale an attack on America. It does not show much understanding of the great varieties within American culture or of the degree of protest within America to the very things that she criticizes from abroad. Yet hers is a highly significant voice and what she says is symptomatic of the way in which thoughtful Europeans often regard this country. The impact of the

American movies and the general effect of the behavior of American soldiers in Europe after the end of the war have had a great deal to do with this dislike of things American.

The American record in regard to race is everywhere known. This record, which is bad enough, is allowed to obscure the more favorable side of American life. In a large part of the world, our sins against interracial justice are played up against the background of better Russian racial policies and these are so emphasized as to obscure the darker side of Russian life. People in Asia and Africa are less sophisticated about Russian propaganda than Europeans and so it is there that this contrast between Russia and America in regard to race has its full effect.

[It would take another article to indicate the reasons for the disappointment in America on the part of thoughtful anti-Nazi Germans. The disastrous Morgenthau policy that was in considerable measure embodied in the Potsdam agreement and which only recently has been discarded, the refusal on the part of a large body of American people to believe that any Germans had escaped the National Socialist infection, the wooden way in which the de-Nazification process has been carried out, the discrepancy between promises and performance in regard to food, the licentiousness common among the occupying troops — these and other factors have created resentments against America that are somewhat different from those emphasized in this article.]

II

I have stated the problem very baldly and have not made the qualifications that should be made if we consider the different shades of opinion in various countries. Everywhere there are people who can see the American side of these issues as well as the European. Also, it should be said that when we are thinking of the central factor, America's power and resources which may now be used to help the European countries in their plans for reconstruction, anyone in Europe is likely to have a divided mind. He welcomes this American initiative at the same time that he resents the fact that his country is so dependent upon American initiative.

Within the Church itself this problem is less acute than it is among the nations. A common faith, a common loyalty, and a common repentance are more important in the Church than theological differ-

ences. Many ties of friendship that involve much mutual understanding on an individual basis make possible a better interpretation of Europe in American churches and of America in European churches. Moreover, in their handling of their gifts for European relief and reconstruction, the American churches have shown sensitivity and understanding. I do not think that it was only courtesy that caused European friends to give me that impression during my recent stay in Geneva. It was good that the Reconstruction Department of the World Council of Churches has been guided in the allocation of funds in each country by national reconstruction committees and that there has been very little objectionable interference with the Churches which have received aid. The policy of American Churches in having personal representatives in Geneva who come to know the leaders of the European Churches has been very fruitful. They are men who have truly identified themselves with European Christians.

But even though the relationships in the Church are far better than might be the case, we cannot assume that this will continue to be so. As Americans in large numbers visit Europe without the right preparation, and as attitudes crystallize around the official American policy during the next few years, the relations within the Church may not remain unaffected. Within the Church people are not insulated against waves of feeling in the nations, but they should be disciplined to guard against the most serious distortions that come from them. Christian community in an atmosphere of frankness and with imaginative understanding of the other nation's problem and with criticism of one's own nation's errors is possible in the Church.

III

What can American Christians do in this situation? There are no easy answers to that question but I believe that we should keep in mind the following considerations:

1. It is of the greatest importance that American Christians understand European criticisms of America and European feelings about America. They should not resent them but see that under existing conditions, they are only natural.

2. The frankest possible discussion between Americans and Europeans as individuals is needed. Europeans should be helped to see American dilemmas as much as Americans should be helped to see the reasons for European attitudes.

3. It is necessary to work for a policy on the part of the government and especially on the part of Congress that is considerate of the needs and of the dignity of other nations. We must expect a great deal of Congressional oratory and statements by political leaders which will rub salt into the wounds of Europe. But the essential point will be to prevent Congress from attaching humiliating conditions to any aid that it votes. Above all, it must not use such aid as an instrument for the expansion of our system of free enterprise. Though most of his statements about Europe have been fine, even Mr. Stassen seems to have fallen into that pit.

4. There is no longer any reason for a sharp conflict between American Christians and Christians from the continent of Europe over religious questions. Serious differences remain but we have a great deal more in common than before the recent war. American theology is more mature and European theology is more relevant to the social issues which are our common concern. There is a new social activism in the European Church and a new discrimination about the relationship between Christianity and social action in the American Church. The American experience of the "free Church" with strong lay support is important for the Europeans who have discovered the real limitations of state Churches and national Churches. It is interesting that Karl Barth, who is often regarded by Americans as most remote from them as a thinker, has recently let loose a blast on the subject of the Church, that is to the left of most American ideas concerning it. There is a chance of more fruitful interchange between the Churches of Europe and America than ever before. Two recent American books on Theology have had very warm receptions wherever they have been known in Europe. I refer to Reinhold Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man* and Theodore Wedel's *The Coming Great Church*. There has always been traffic enough the other way.

5. The criticisms about American racial attitudes need to be taken to heart. We know that they are deserved even though at times they may seem to be taken out of context and used to obscure much that is good in American institutions. The American Churches in their declarations are almost as emphatic on this subject as our critics abroad, though as yet not much has been done to give effect to these. Those who do not bear the brunt of our racial practices in their own lives can quickly become complacent and think about something else. Within the world Christian community racial discrimination and

segregation, because of the strong and clear voices of the younger Churches, seem more intolerable than they do to most white Americans who may agree intellectually that they are wrong. This fact has brought about a new situation for the American Church that may create among us a greater sense of urgency in regard to the race problem.

6. Americans should not allow their self-criticism to cancel their respect for the more favorable side of American life. I think that it is good to remember that two years in succession the Gallup Poll showed that seventy percent of Americans were "willing to go back to food rationing in order to send food to people in other countries." There is a very great fund of sensitive generosity among the American people that does not seek to use American power to lord it over anyone. There are all kinds of things in America and no facile generalizations should be allowed to obscure the America that has been and is the embodiment of an ideal and a hope. We have such a steady searchlight of criticism and self-criticism playing upon us that it is easy to overlook the moral health that remains in American life after the worst has been said. I often think that it is not those who are born Americans who can see the best in America, for natives are apt to be either conventional patriots who are only sentimentalist, or too familiar critics of American life who take for granted the good in it and hence hardly mention it. Those who do see the best in America are the men and women who come here in their maturity, often as refugees. As an example of the kind of witness that they can give I shall quote some words from Jacques Maritain who spent some years in America during the war. He wrote in 1943:

> There is one thing that America knows well, and that she teaches as a great and precious lesson to those who come in contact with her amazing adventure: that is the value and dignity of the man of common humanity, the value and dignity of the people. According to the popular phrase of the day, what we know as the *common man* is here neither servile nor arrogant. He has a feeling for the dignity of human existence and he exists in the collective consciousness of each one's worth. In forms so simply human that the pretentious and the pedantic are at pains to perceive it, we find there a spiritual conquest of immeasurable value. The mainspring of American civilization is this dignity of each one in daily existence, and it was in order to realize this more fully, not only on her own soil, but throughout the world, that America stepped out of her traditional isolation and faced war and that today she has set out for a new world. (*Christianity and Democracy,* pp. 93–94.)

As contacts between American Christians and Christians from

other continents multiply, especially in connection with the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam, it will be extremely important to anticipate difficulties and misunderstandings of the kind described in this article. During the war, when Christians were separated, it was easy to idealize one another. That was true of our attitude toward Christians in enemy nations who were known to be resisting their own governments as well as of our attitude toward Christians among our allies. There has been a tendency to seize upon the ecumenical movement as the one ray of hope in the world, and perhaps to exaggerate the degree of actual Christian fellowship within it. It will be possible for Amsterdam to become an occasion for disillusionment unless we understand and discount in advance some of the causes of tension among the Churches that will be represented at the first Assembly of the World Council. Love that is not easily provoked, humility, imagination, and patience will be needed on all sides. It is the strength of the ecumenical Church that within it, as is the case nowhere else, men are brought to see themselves under the divine judgment in the light of the divine mercy and they become able to drop their spiritual defensiveness in relation to one another. At the Oslo Conference an Indian delegate, who had to overcome in himself strong and self-righteous resentments against other national groups, finally reached the point where he could say: "Many delegations here who were humble enough to face the foolishness and the weakness of the shattering of their pride under the cross did achieve a community which will be their strength in the days to come as they, in their separate nations, face their political responsibilities." It can be so at Amsterdam.

HEILSGESCHICHTE AND THE BIBLE

A CRUX OF ECUMENICAL UNDERSTANDING

By AMOS N. WILDER

THE term *Heilsgeschichte* or "salvation-history" has appeared rather frequently in recent books on the Bible as well as in theological discussion. The ideas associated with the term are of considerable importance in themselves, for many find here an essential clue to the understanding of the unity of the Bible and the significance of the Gospel. An additional element of interest appears, moreover, when we note the cleavage which the conception has occasioned in scholarly circles, and particularly between European and American writers.

The chief impetus to the use of the term has come from Continental circles in connection with the revival of Biblical theology abroad. The Biblical interpretation and general outlook associated with the idea figure prominently today in the basic ecumenical studies now going on in preparation particularly for the Amsterdam meeting of the World Council of Churches. It is necessary for American church circles to come to terms with it if collaboration is to be fruitful.

I

The "salvation-history" in question refers first of all to the dealings of God with men in the whole story pictured in the Bible. The term calls attention to the connectedness and continuity of the various episodes of the divine action beginning with the creation and concluding with the new heaven and the new earth. This approach lays stress on the continuous saving action of God *in history,* particularly in that stream of history represented by the life of the People of God, both the old and the new Israel. It is in the actuality of the historical process, in concrete community life with all its struggles, experiences, crises, catastrophes, that God has found and finds opportunity to declare himself. But the term salvation-history is also applied to the Bible itself. The Bible is then characterized as the history of salvation. There may not appear to be anything particularly new at this point. Yet it does serve as a corrective of mistaken conceptions of Scripture. We have

here, for one thing, a protest against a rationalistic idea of the Bible or its religion. *Heilsgeschichte* lays the emphasis not on the ideas or teachings that can be found in the Bible, or that can be seen to emerge in its later sections, but upon the whole picture of God's way with men. It also serves as a corrective of too individualistic views of our religion. God is seen working in and through the social group, through Israel and the Church, but also through all men's social relationships.

It is not hard to see why negative reactions to such an emphasis will have arisen. First and foremost because it appears to confine God's care and redemptive activity chiefly to so limited a segment of history. Then because it appears to put a higher valuation upon the Old Testament than has been common in many liberal circles. Moreover, the whole scheme seems to take at face value the so-called mythological elements in the Bible, particularly the pictures of the beginning and end of the world, as well as the Biblical conceptions of the divine foreknowledge and providence. The whole approach seems "biblicist" and appears to pay little heed to the issues created for us by modern knowledge. In these objections, however, there is much misunderstanding of the *Heilsgeschichte* view. None of these objections are fatal except for those who speak from outside the central faith of the Christian church. It must, however, be admitted that there are some exponents of the thesis who prejudice it either by the conservatism of their critical position or by the theological presuppositions which they bring to the task.

The matter is clarified if we observe the various ways in which men have attempted to define the unity of the Bible. *Heilsgeschichte* sees that unity in "the drama of salvation." The Bible with its simple plot of "lost and found" has the intrinsic unity of a well-planned drama or novel. All the parts have their necessary place. On the other hand much of our modern theology, with its emphasis on the *development* of religious ideas in the Bible, fails to reach a satisfactory view of the unity of Scripture. After Jesus all is anti-climax! And it is not easy to fit all parts of the Old Testament into such an evolutionary pattern. Traditionalists, on the other hand, have defined the unity of the Bible by saying that Christ is its center: all that comes before points to and refers to him; just as all that follows springs from him. But this calls for an over-generous use of allegory in dealing with the Old Testament. The "back to tradition" movement among liberals sought a key to the unity of Scripture in the evangelical message of the Cross. The Old Testament was seen to fit into this pattern in that it provided the

setting and foreshadowings of the atonement. But this view, again, is too individualistic and fails to reckon with the community emphasis throughout the Bible. It is true, finally, that traditionalists have sometimes expressed the unity of the Bible in terms of the "plan of salvation." The term *Heilsgeschichte* itself was first used over a century ago in Biblical theology. Recent scholarship with its clarification of the Bible view of history and eschatology has given a great deal more significance to the conception.

Heilsgeschichte, then, concerns itself with what we may call the "plot" of the Bible, the world-story pictured there from Genesis on through the Gospels to the Book of Revelation. It thus identifies the over-all unity of the Bible, singling out for special attention the divine action and revelation in Israel, Christ and the Church. Seen in a larger framework, however, it includes all mankind and the cosmos itself. The history of the People of God is inextricably linked up with the history of the Gentiles and the story of creation. Some writers have made an ambiguous distinction between "sacred history" (i.e., the history of God's dealings with his elect or chosen instruments) and "secular history." The idea of salvation-history is not to be confused with this false distinction. The Bible in innumerable ways shows how the divine providence works among the nations outside of Israel, though it does center upon his crucial actions in Israel and the Church.[1]

II

In its larger sense, then, we have a theology of history, a way in which all human history and, indeed, cosmic history are seen as unified. It is highly significant that the Bible establishes its view of the unity of all reality in terms of actual concrete human process and experience rather than in terms of the physical cosmos. The latter must finally take second place in the order of reality. Modern man has allowed the visible universe to tyrannize over his outlook. As in the case of many primitive cultures, not to mention the earliest Greek philosophers and some later ones, nature has given modern religion a false center. But the Bible's emphasis on historical process also avoids the mistake of those types of humanism which refuse to look before, beyond and after the empirical human story.

For the contents of the picture as it appears in New Testament theology one could turn to Milton's *Paradise Lost.* There is, first, the divine plan and overruling. This is a way of expressing the coherence

of the plot. Man and the cosmos are created in the closest relation to each other. They are created through the Logos or Heavenly Man: in other words, through that human-personal side of God which is part of his eternal nature. All men thus partake of the divine image. There follows the Fall, and then the long process of restoration through Israel, Christ and the Church, leading on to the final world-renewal. The plot has the simplicity of a children's story, as do the most primitive Christian confessions with their parallelism of descent and ascent. It is a story of "departure and return," of "lost and found." It has an hour-glass pattern as many of Henry James's novels are said to have, and many of the world's greatest fables. It begins with all created beings, narrows down to mankind, then to one people and finally to one man alone. Then the story reverses itself through the one people, again, finally to take in all men and all created beings.

This is the world-story of salvation-history, significant in its concrete historical-community concern, yet having its origin and outcome and overruling direction in the invisible, recognized by faith and prophecy. No doubt the objective historian cannot so describe the course of events. Only faith can do it in this way. And faith must combine symbol ("myth") with history, must combine Genesis and Revelation with the historical books and the Gospels; and even these last include symbol. The whole plot has its center in Christ. This above all is a matter of faith. His cross is pitched at the navel of the earth. One creation comes to an end there and another begins. The cross, note, is the focus not only of Israel's sin, but of that of all men. It represents the redemption of the world and not of any "sacred" people alone. Pilate is as much concerned in the crucifixion as Caiaphas. And the resurrection leads on to the world-wide mission. For all men of all nations share in the divine image. Both Testaments have their various ways of signifying the participation of the Gentiles in the salvation-history.[2]

III

The present rather wide-spread use of the idea of salvation-history has led to a certain amount of misunderstanding and resistance, especially in this country. We may recognize here one aspect of the suspicion with which the current revival of Biblical theology has been faced. For some years now a considerable amount of Old and New Testament study has been directed toward constructive and synthetic

rather than analytic work in connection with the religion of the Bible. This has been suspect in some quarters, partly because it has appeared to be colored by what are thought of as neo-orthodox influences. The fact is, however, that scholars of quite various points of view have been ready to draw upon the line of thought we have been describing.

There are no doubt reasonable grounds for hesitation in what concerns various aspects of the recent Biblical theological revival. We are rightly on guard against any return to a wooden or dogmatic biblicism. The label of neo-orthodoxy, however, is often used by those who are unaware of the wide divergencies among those so depreciated. In the area of Biblical study neo-orthodoxy proper is only one influence among several in European work today. Much of the best New Testament theology now coming out of the Continent is definitely and discerningly critical of the dialectical or existential points of view. It is hardly too much to say that Anglo-Saxon scholarship, together with that of important circles in Scandinavia, France, and Switzerland, bids fair to have the upper hand over the dialectical movement in the ecumenical discussions now going on, at least so far as New Testament theology is concerned.[3] But this is not to say that all such scholarship is liberal in the sense that some would define the term. Unfortunately it sometimes appears that critics among us are not content with Biblical findings except where the leading conceptions of the Bible are set aside. For such men all views are neo-orthodox which propose any synoptic construction based on the results of criticism.

It is true that in this matter of *Heilsgeschichte* real issues present themselves having to do with the basic results of historical science. Much Continental and British work in this field rests on a historical criticism that is somewhat more cautious than in this country. American Biblical study has the merit in some quarters of being more clearly disassociated from dogmatic legacies or over-hasty ventures in synthesis. But it is often characterized by a negative carry-over from the days when it had to direct itself so largely against fundamentalism. It is still often marked by a "stance," not to say a deformation, acquired in the last generation. Like an old golfer these scholars cannot now change their swing. A new generation of North American Biblical scholarship will acknowledge the immense debt which it has owed to those who won the battle for scientific method but will be more disposed to do justice to a proper concern with the theological content of the Bible. It will also be better able to engage in a meeting with the

Biblical work abroad, whether as regards collaboration with it or criticism of it.

Progress in ecumenical understanding today depends much upon clarification of such issues as that of *Heilsgeschichte*. In particular the world-wide program in Biblical study undertaken by the Study Department of the World Council of Churches points directly to kindred topics: the world-view of the Bible, its degree of unity, the principles of interpretation (hermeneutics), the relation of the two Testaments, the relevance of the Bible to modern social and political questions. It is important that not only scholars but also ministers and laymen consider as sympathetically as possible the prevailing emphases in Biblical study abroad.

IV

We may conclude with a number of observations bearing on those aspects of the *Heilsgeschichte* view which are most likely to cause perplexity. For one thing we should bear in mind that there is nothing sacrosanct about the modern view of time. New conceptions of time turn up every day. And over the generations our sense of time modifies itself. We are just as likely to be partial in our view of it as the early Christians were. Five hundred years from now our view of time will seem strange. Buddhists and Confucianists, not to say Communists, have a different experience of time from ours. Any view of time and history is part of a culture-complex. This does not mean that the early Christian concept is condemned to sheer relativity unless we believe that their experience was no better and no worse than that of all others, but it may mean that we can learn something from them.

Again, history proper is made up of facts that are interpreted in some relation to each other and to a community. Both Vergil's *Aeneid* and our American history text-books present the experience of the past for their respective peoples in a way that conveys not only facts and events but assumptions and insights and values. True history is lived history. This is connected with the fact that real time is not clock time or calendar time. We have many sayings that reflect this: "A man is as old as he feels." "In those five minutes I lived a whole lifetime." "You're sixty before you know it." "One crowded hour of glorious life is worth an age without a name." Like the Bible, we really measure the life of the individual or the nation in terms of maturity, "coming

of age," seasons, harvest, crises and turning-points. Process has its laws and phases but not its chronometer.

A word may also be said with regard to the limited area of history which receives main attention in the *Heilsgeschichtliche* scheme. Our modern initiation into universal history and our reactions against various formulations of special revelation predispose us to a demurrer at this point. This is too large a matter to enter upon here. We have called attention to Dr. Cullmann's treatment of this aspect of the question. We shall only observe that the understanding of larger aspects of life often arises out of very particular and seemingly unimportant phases of it. A flood of light on a vast area of meaninglessness or relativity may be shed by a single experience. Many men will identify certain moments of revelation in their earlier life, or even a "center" of their lives, as governing all their days and as the "fountain light of all their seeing." Tragically enough, the revealing moment may come at the end and too late, as with Anna Karenina in Tolstoy's novel of that name. It is related to this that truth does not appear impartially and universally over the whole of history, or to all peoples at the same time.

This world-picture, in any case, illuminates the outlook of the early Christians. The objective historian, no doubt, cannot accept it. He will either narrate the past as a series of *faits divers,* or he will seek a universal principle of unity. Troeltsch sought one in terms of a value philosophy, but was unable therewith to do justice to the Christian outlook or to make that outlook commensurable with modern idealism. On the other hand, the Christian believer, brought up upon Genesis and the Apocalypse, formed from his earliest days by the meanings of Christmas and Easter celebrations, will have this world-story in his blood and in his heart. For him it may well be "lived history" both with respect to his community, the church, and the ratification of his own deepest revelations. It furnishes him with that sense of order and belonging in existence which make for sanity and peace. That it includes mythical elements which continually cry out for clarification, historical or theological, is self-evident. But why should men surrender the supreme symbols of poetry and religion so long as no better vehicles are found, and so long as they answer to the best experience of their forebears and themselves?

Objections to a *Heilsgeschichte* view of the type sketched above will be raised first of all by those modernists who are unable to retain even in a reinterpreted form the classic interpretations of the significance

of the person and work of Christ. It should furnish no fatal stumbling-block, however, in other circles. American scholars, among others, will have occasion, indeed, to criticize and amend it. (1) More justice needs to be done to the fragmentary way in which numerous New Testament writings contribute to the full picture, and to the variety or even the dissonance of the evidence. (2) The problem of the End of History as portrayed in terms of final judgment and new creation must be related in some satisfactory way to man's actual future on earth. Cullmann rightly rejects the Barthian transmutation of eschatology into an ever-contemporary crisis, but this leaves us with a real future on our hands that calls for clarification. (3) The question of a natural revelation cannot be escaped in connection with salvation-history. The Gentiles are included in the plan, and bear the image of God and have a light and a vocation vouchsafed to them. This is made clear against all over-simple dogmas of an exclusive "sacred history" or exclusive revelation. But this matter needs to be clarified further. (4) The Bible's angelology and demonology, along with its conception of the cosmic principalities and powers, are an inseparable part of the whole history of salvation. We cannot but feel that they stand for essential factors in the total situation. But here as with other figures in the *dramatis personae* of the world-story we would wish to see a more earnest attempt at critical reinterpretation. That story is a true story but like all true stories it can be falsified by insensitive repetition or by incurious acquiescence.

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1. See the third part, "Heilsgeschichte und allgemeines Weltgeschehen" of Oscar Cullmann's *Christus und die Zeit,* Zurich, 1946.
2. Besides the section of Cullmann's book cited above, see here W. Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments,* Band 2, Leipzig, 1935, pp. 88–91.
3. Cullmann frequently goes out of his way to register dissent at various points from Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Brunner and Bultmann, among others. Yet he presents a "salvation-history" view which has very great constructive validity. Post-war New Testament publications abroad by Jean Hering, Eduard Schweitzer and Ethelbert Stauffer and others point in the same direction.

SOUTH INDIA AND THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION: A PERSPECTIVE

By E. R. HARDY, JR.

THE recently consummated union of three Churches, or parts of Churches, in South India stands out as an important event in the church history of our time. By influence and example, as well as through official and personal contacts, the action of the South Indian Christians involved affects or will affect the whole of the Christian world. Their union may therefore properly be discussed not only as an Indian event but as a matter of legitimate interest to all who are concerned for the true peace and unity of the people of God. We may find in it both inspiration and warning, and it is in the broadest possible context that I hope to discuss it here, although focusing upon its significance for the Anglican Churches.

I

The territory comprised in the area of the new Church of South India includes the region where Indian Christianity was first planted by unknown Syrian Christians (symbolically expressed in the legend of St. Thomas). In modern times St. Francis Xavier worked in one part of South India, and the heroic pioneers of the eighteen-century Danish-Halle Mission in another. Where the Indian Church is oldest and strongest it is also most conspicuously divided. An example and sign of this is the way that successive influences from outside have broken up the oldest of Indian Churches, that of the so-called Syrian or Malabar Christians. There are somewhere around a million of them, half of whom remain in the union with Rome which dates from the period of Portuguese domination, while among those who rejected this union in 1653 some look for fellowship to the Syrian Jacobites and some to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The leaven planted by Anglican Evangelical missionaries in the early nineteenth century produced the further separation of the Mar Thoma Church in the 1870's. There are also some smaller groups besides these four major ones. Modern missions have introduced the principal denominations of the Western world. These divisions are the gift of a divided Church to India; they

have been crossed by a growing spirit of evangelistic co-operation and Christian fellowship, and forty years ago the movement for organic union found conspicuous expression in the organization of the South India United Church, a union of churches founded upon the missionary work of Congregationalists and Presbyterians.

In recent years there have been mass movements towards Christianity in various parts of South India. These have been especially extensive in the state of Hyderabad and adjoining territories, and have been largely responsible for a large growth in the Anglican Diocese of Dornakal and the Methodist Hyderabad District. The Diocese of Dornakal, under its able Indian Bishop, V. S. Azariah, with its scores of native clergy, its beautiful Cathedral in Indo-Saracenic style and its interesting experiments in indigenous development of the Anglican liturgical services, has stood as an example of the naturalization of Christianity in India.

It should be mentioned, as part of the picture, that the missionary work of the Church of England has introduced in India as elsewhere the divergent traditions which exist within its fellowship at home. In contrast with the system used by most American Churches, the Church of England carries on its missionary work through independent Societies, voluntary in support and largely in organization. Although for three generations the Archbishop of Canterbury has been concerned in their co-ordination and guidance, this voluntary system has sometimes led to the danger of isolated presentation of one or another aspect of the Anglican tradition in foreign parts. In South India, and especially in Dornakal, the chief influence has been that of the Church Missionary Society, the great agency of Evangelical Anglicanism. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel is represented in some parts of the area; specifically Anglo-Catholic organizations are not represented in the four dioceses of South India, although Anglo-Catholic influence is important in the adjoining Dioceses of Colombo (Ceylon) and Bombay.

II

Such was the ecclesiastical grouping within which the Scheme of Union was proposed in 1919 and worked out during the 1920's. This was an important decade in the history of the ecumenical movement, and South India evidently both contributed to and gained from the discussions of those years. The statement drawn up by thirty-one In-

dian ministers at Tranquebar in 1919 (the two visitors were Sherwood Eddy and an Englishman, neither of them missionaries in this area) called for the preservation in the united Church of the congregational, presbyterian, and episcopal elements, as all being scriptural, and proposed as a basis of Union —

1. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as containing all things necessary for salvation.
2. The Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed.
3. The two Sacraments ordained by Christ Himself—Baptism and the Lord's Supper.
4. The historic Episcopate, locally adapted.[1]

This is the "Lambeth Quadrilateral" which has been in circulation as a basis for such discussions since its first formulation by the Rev. W. R. Huntington (of Worcester, and later of Grace Church, New York) some eighty years ago, and its endorsement by the Chicago General Convention of 1886 and the Lambeth Conference of 1888. The "Appeal to All Christian People" of the 1920 Lambeth Conference brought it forward again, along with an earnest reaffirmation of the conviction that God wills the fellowship of his people in one visible society. It has obviously been in the background of the discussions of the Faith and Order Conferences. The South India statement about the place of episcopal, presbyterian, and congregational principles in the united Church may be considered a kind of corollary to the Quadrilateral; it was taken up in the Report on the Ministry received by the Lausanne Conference of 1927, with the further statement:

We therefore recognize that these several elements must all, under conditions which require further study, have an appropriate place in the order of life of a reunited Church, and that each separate communion, recalling the abundant blessing of God vouchsafed to its ministry in the past, should gladly bring to the common life of the united Church its own spiritual treasures.[2]

In 1930 the Scheme, as it then stood, came before the Lambeth Conference for discussion. The Methodists of South India had joined in the negotiations since 1925, while the Mar Thoma Church had dropped out. (It would have been significant if it could have remained in, and thus given this movement the character of a bridging on Indian soil of the schisms of the early Church as well as of the post-Reformation divisions.) The three bodies involved might be considered as a central block in the Christian world of South India, whose common quality could best be described as Evangelical churchmanship. The

specific principles of Baptists, the confessional definiteness of Lutherans, and the well-known positions of Roman Catholics and the ancient Eastern Churches left them to one side. Each of the three negotiating bodies had a different formal relation to its founding Churches at home. The Methodists concerned were under the jurisdiction of the Wesleyan Methodist Conference (after the English Methodist union of 1932, of the Methodist Church) in England; the South India United Church (S.I.U.C.) was an independent body with close relations with English Congregationalists and Scottish Presbyterians; while the Anglican element comprised four Dioceses of the Church of India, Burma, and Ceylon (C.I.B.C.), which achieved its ecclesiastical autonomy in 1929. Nevertheless it retained close ties with England, and its Bishops shared in the fellowship of the Lambeth Conference. (This meeting of the Anglican Episcopate has great prestige with no formal authority. It is not a court or synod, and in fact its only basis of existence is the personal invitation of the Archbishop of Canterbury to the active Bishops of the Anglican Churches. Its actions possess no binding force unless they are adopted by the legislative bodies of the individual Anglican Churches.)

Attention in Anglican circles in 1930 was mainly directed to the proposal for the unification of the ministry in South India. Ordination in the united Church was to be episcopal, but all existing ministers were to be recognized as presbyters, and for thirty years, at least, ministers who might come from the respective mother or sister Churches to South India were to be received as such. During the anticipated process of growing together procedure was to be further guided by a proviso which has become famous in this discussion as "the Pledge." The uniting Churches

> pledge themselves and fully trust each other that the united Church will at all times be careful not to allow any over-riding of conscience either by Church authorities or by majorities, and that it will not in any of its administrative acts knowingly transgress the long-established traditions of any of the Churches from which it has been formed. Neither forms of worship or ritual, nor a ministry, to which they have not been accustomed or to which they conscientiously object, will be imposed upon any congregation; and no arrangements with regard to these matters will knowingly be made, either generally or in particular cases, which would either offend the conscientious convictions of persons directly concerned, or which would hinder the development of complete unity within the united Church, or imperil its progress towards union with other Churches.[3]

To the Anglican mind — I can vouch for myself as a specimen — this

statement naturally means that former Anglican congregations would continue to be served by the ministry of bishops, priests, and deacons of the episcopal succession. It was so interpreted by the Lambeth Conference Committee on Unity, and on this basis the Conference joined in expressing general approval of the Scheme and a desire that it might go forward. Although the united Church would obviously not be a part of the Anglican Communion but "a distinct Province of the Universal Church" it would have "a very real intercommunion" with the Anglican Churches.[4]

III

In the words of Bishop Palmer, formerly of Bombay, one of the chief Anglican supporters of the South India Scheme, what was proposed in South India was a union "between Catholic and Protestant persons and ideas."[5] This was in itself a bold project, since nothing of the sort has ever been deliberately achieved, although such a combination may be said to have arisen out of historical developments within the Churches of England and Sweden and elsewhere. (In South India, or anywhere else, church union by absorption, or by general acceptance of the distinctive principles of some one of the uniting bodies, is always possible. But the most urgent practical and the deepest theological reasons for unity have never been felt to justify that procedure.)

As the time for its actualization came nearer, the Scheme was subjected to criticism from all sides. One may discount those who merely denounced it, such as a vigorous Indian writer who alleged notorious Romanizing and modernist tendencies in Anglicanism, and proposed the slogan, "Let us give a deep burial to Episcopacy never to rise again." A Congregational missionary presented a serious criticism from the Congregational point of view. His idea was that the general "feel" of the proposed Church, with its Bishops and Synods, its Creeds and Committees, was definitely Anglican, the kind of system Anglicans were used to living under and administering, and that congregational principles, already modified by the acceptance of synodical government in the S.I.U.C., needed further protection. (I must admit to some sympathy with him on this point; parts of the Scheme are painfully reminiscent of the daily life of Anglican Churches in which the Bishop is declared to be a Father in God but actually forced to be a harassed administrator, more at home in the office than at the altar.) The exclusive right of the clergy to administer the sacraments must be modified, since "Congregationalists believe in a ministry. But they have no room

for priests." For similar reasons the bishops should not have the position of a separate order, and the extent to which the new Church was to be bound to the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds must be reduced.[6]

Most of these criticisms appear to have affected the later development of the Scheme, which reached its seventh edition in 1941. The Creeds are accepted "as witnessing to and safeguarding" the faith in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of which the Scriptures are the supreme standard, with a footnote stating that the uniting Churches "do not intend . . . to demand the assent of individuals to every word and phrase in them, or to exclude reasonable liberty of interpretation, or to assert that those Creeds are a complete expression of the Christian faith" (p. 5). The Holy Communion will normally be administered by presbyters, although "the only indispensable conditions for the ministration of the grace of God in the Church are the unchangeable promise of God Himself and the gathering together of God's elect people in the power of the Holy Ghost" (p. 6). Presbyters are normally to join in the consecration of bishops. The Synod of the Church, composed of the bishops and clerical and lay delegates, will normally sit and vote as a unit; on important matters of faith and order the bishops will sit separately and may refuse to submit a proposition, which may however be passed over their veto by a three-quarters vote of the Synod supported by two-thirds of the Diocesan Councils (pp. 68–69). One may express a doubt whether the Church would ever differ with its appointed leaders so strongly as to go through this elaborate process to overrule them. (In its early days the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America provided rather similarly for overruling of its House of Bishops by a four-fifths vote of the Deputies, but never made use of this provision.) However, the proposal represents an effort to satisfy both those for whom part of the episcopal principle is the separate position of bishops as the interpreters of the Church's faith and order, and those for whom the congregational principle makes it impossible to accept the existence of any separate order within the Body of Christ.

As the Scheme thus developed it aroused a definite alarm among a considerable section of Anglicans. It seemed to them that the creeds, sacraments, and episcopate were accepted with attached provisos which deprived the historic words of their historic significance; if the C.I.B.C. accepted the Scheme and the rest of the Anglican Churches approved it, would this mean that the Anglican formularies were now definitely interpreted in a non-Catholic sense? A considerable literature

of controversy arose; a striking contribution to it is Mr. T. S. Eliot's pamphlet, *Reunion by Destruction,* which trenchantly advances the argument just summarized. The monastic orders, several of them represented in India or South Africa, took the lead in opposition to the South India principles; their leaders, with other societies and individuals, have organized the Council for the Defence of Church Principles, which issues pamphlets and a magazine, *Faith and Unity,* on the South India Union and related questions. Even official Anglican comments have been more cautious, or have raised doubts and queries. Archbishop Temple and his successor Dr. Fisher, in statements to the Convocation of Canterbury, clarified their views of the relations between the Church of England and the united Church. In speaking of "very real intercommunion" the Lambeth Conference of 1930 used a technical term in a non-technical sense; the Church of England is not in communion with the united Church nor committed to interpret Anglican standards by the South India formularies, and the ordained, confirmed, or baptized members of the Church of South India will possess only the rights which the various Anglican Provinces respectively extend to similarly placed individuals outside of their Communion.[7] Even such staunch supporters as Bishop Palmer disliked the potential overriding of bishops in the Synod.[8] The final approval of the Scheme by the C.I.B.C. in 1945 was accompanied by serious recommendations for revision, and the Committee of Theologians, to whom the Archbishop referred the Scheme for specific comment on future possible relations, nearly all agreed that some changes in it were essential if the united Church was to be fully recognized by the Anglican Churches.[9]

One sometimes feels that there has been much more heated discussion of the South India Scheme elsewhere than there has been in India. However, as the last stages of approval by the Indian bodies involved were passed in 1945–1947 several important questions were raised there. In June 1945 the bishops of the C.I.B.C., in a series of resolutions, offered several criticisms and in particular declared their adherence to the 1930 Lambeth interpretation of the "Pledge." Contrariwise some Councils of the S.I.U.C. insisted that the interpretation adopted by the Joint Committee of the negotiating Churches in 1934 be made a part of the Scheme in the future. This interpretation was to the effect that either episcopal or non-episcopal ministers were eligible to serve any congregation of the united Church that might desire them. The

discussion led into various ramifications, which suggest to the onlooker that in church affairs as in love it is probably better to make no explanations. In January 1947 the Synod of the C.I.B.C., meeting for the first and last time at Madras, voted on acceptance of the Scheme (that is, permission for its four southern Dioceses to proceed with it), with the 1934 interpretation added. The necessary resolution was passed by the following vote: bishops 7–6, clergy 30–22, laity 33–7. The minority included some who were not definitely opposed to the Scheme, but wished at least to wait until it had been discussed in its altered form at the Lambeth Conference now being planned for 1948.[10]

With the hearty approval of certainly a great majority of those directly concerned the Church of South India was inaugurated on September 27th, 1947 and its first nine new bishops consecrated. Two groups have at the last moment decided to remain outside: one of the Councils of the S.I.U.C. having voted in favor by a bare majority, continues as it is; and a movement of opposition arose during 1947 among the laity in the Nandyal District of the Diocese of Dornakal. Its organization, the S.P.G. Telugu Orthodox Christian Union, claims to speak for 20,000 who wish to remain in the Anglican Communion. On July 16 the bishop ruled out of order in the Nandyal Church Council a resolution disapproving of the union, and the lay delegates of four out of eight Deaneries walked out in protest.[11] This circumstance suggests the use in favor of the union of methods which many of its supporters consider to be among the dangers of episcopacy; it probably also reflects the effect of the loss of the unique personality of Bishop Azariah. The future relation of this group to the C.I.B.C. and to the S.P.G. in England remains to be determined.

IV

What fruit is to be gathered for the universal Church from the somewhat stormy progress of the South Indian union? It is scarcely possible for an American to discuss the extent to which the Church of South India is really "the Indian expression of the spirit, the thought and the life of the Church Universal."[12] There are some indications that the Indians involved might have approached each other in a more generous spirit, with less insistence either on the rights of the episcopate or on the counter-rights of the congregation. Dr. A. J. Appasamy, one of the few distinctively Indian theologians, suggested in a book on the subject

that the Indians might feel at home with an episcopate of devout ascetics rather than of efficient executives. In similar vein a priest of the Diocese of Calcutta, in a plea for more Indian bishops, wrote recently: "Not outstanding administrative ability and learning but holiness of life, a deep humility and pastoral zeal are the qualities which are indispensable to those who would occupy the episcopal office to the glory of God and salvation of souls."[13] Now that the Church of South India exists one may look for significant developments in its life and work.

In some ways it may be said that the Christians of South India have been obliged to pioneer in their effort towards working out principles of union with insufficient support from the rest of Christendom. We have recognized in recent years the great importance of the doctrine of the Church as a subject of theological study and ecumenical discussion; but our Indian brethren have in effect been called on to act in the matter before a common mind has been established. Symbolic of this stage of our ecumenical discourse is the fact that the Edinburgh Conference of 1937 was obliged to end its proceedings with a half-drafted report on Ministry and Sacraments, and that both the study program of the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches and the theological work of Faith and Order largely center upon the topic of the Church. Somewhat to the surprise of those who represented a more individualistic approach to evangelism, the Madras Conference of 1938 found its discussions also revolving around the life and work of the Church. With a richer and deeper understanding of the reality of the Church some of the difficulties which the South India Scheme labored to overcome may turn out to be irrelevant, or some of the heroic sacrifices which it hesitated to call for may turn out to be easy. In the Scheme as formulated there is something of the air of fastening together existing systems at the edges, in spite of a genuine desire to penetrate through organization to the goal of genuine union in Christ. May I suggest as a speculation that it might be interesting to experiment with bridging the gap between episcopal and non-episcopal Churches along principles the reverse of those propounded in South India and in other proposals (for England, the United States, Iran, etc.) which have moved along similar lines? The general line of the South Indian Scheme is that non-episcopalians accept the administrative episcopate while episcopalians abandon the right to insist on its necessity for the spiritual life of the Church. One might try the reverse idea and suggest the universal adoption of episcopacy as a source of spiritual commission (to

the laity by Confirmation and to the clergy by Ordination) without tying it up with any administrative scheme at all. This seems to be the idea behind the Archbishop of Canterbury's Cambridge sermon of last year and the plan which has been put forward for mutual ordination between the Church of England in Canada and the United Church of Canada.

It may be that church history and theology, which have so often served the interests of controversy, still have important contributions to make in our progress towards unity. One is glad to note in this connection that the literature inspired by the discussion of the South India Scheme, even that devoted originally to its controversial aspects, has included really valuable contributions to the subjects involved. Particularly Anglican theology on the Church has been enriched by the contributions in which the South India movement has been one of the stimulating factors — one may mention the work of Broomfield, *Revelation and Reunion,* Herbert, *The Form of the Church,* and (in large part) of the authors of the symposium edited by Bishop Kirk, *The Apostolic Ministry,* as well as the more general works of Thornton, *Common Life in the Body of Christ,* Wedel, *The Coming Great Church,* and Pittenger, *His Body the Church.* Both historical and theological study has been given to the subject of Christian initiation which may lead to a fuller understanding of Confirmation.

There are two ultimate questions to ask about the South India reunion: first, is it the will of God for the South Indian Christians involved? Second, has it contributed to the cause of Christian Unity at large? The first is mainly a matter of conscience for those directly involved, for whom the answer certainly seems to be in the affirmative — subject to the proviso that the enthusiasm of leaders has not in fact forced the consciences of minorities. The answer to the second is more complex. The Church of South India has undertaken the important task of uniting in one fellowship the Catholic and Evangelical traditions — a necessary ecumenical task unless we contemplate the final defeat of one party by the other, which is unlikely, or the permanent division of Christendom into opposing camps, which is undesirable. The present writer shares enough of the objections which have been raised so that he could not find his own home in a Church organized on the South India principles. He would consider that the general adoption would be the destruction of the Catholic elements which the Anglican Churches have so far preserved. There are some inside and

outside his own Church who would like to see this happen, but he trusts this is not a widespread desire.[14] Nevertheless any blame for the weaknesses of the South India union does not lie with the South Indians, but with the weakness of all of us in faith and love. With regrets that no more can conscientiously be said, all Anglicans can join heartily in the recent statement of the Bishops of England and Wales:

> We wish to assure the Bishops and the ordained and lay members of our Communion who in September will be going forth to form with others the South India Church, of our prayers and continued fellowship in Christ. It is our most earnest hope that God will use them and their fellow members in the South India Church to set forward the gospel with prayer and to help the people of India to grow in unity; and that he will guide their venture of faith to the day when there will be full communion between the South India Church and ourselves.[15]

One may hope, also, to apply here as elsewhere the noble words of Cardinal Mercier, *so la vérité a ses droits, la charité a ses devoirs.*

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7. *The Scheme for Church Union in South India: A Statement . . . by His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury,* Westminster, 1945.
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10. *Church Union News and Views,* March 1947, pp. 24–27. In the last number of this magazine, the organ of the Joint Committee and the South India union movement, one of those concerned wrote: "We have been out-manoeuvred in a matter where there should have been no place for manoeuvring. . . . No authoritative Anglican body is likely again to approve of an ambiguous statement at a crucial point in a Scheme of Union, if the local Church involved in the Scheme is in danger of being confronted at the last moment with an ultimatum demanding that the ambiguity be removed, on one side only." (Letter from E. F. Synge, June 1947, pp. 49–50.)
11. *Faith and Unity,* September, 1947, pp. 146–8.
12. *Lambeth, 1930,* p. 51, quoting from *Scheme of Union,* pp. 3, etc.
13. M. C. Chakravarty, "Leadership in the Church of India," in *East and West Review,* October 1945, pp. 114–116.
14. One crucial point which I have noted elsewhere ("The New Ordinations in South India," in *The Living Church,* October 5, 1947, pp. 17–18) is whether the presbyters to be ordained in South India will continue the Catholic and historic Christian priesthood as the Anglican Churches have retained it.
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A PRAYER FOR THE CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA

ALMIGHTY and everlasting God, Who alone art the author of unity, peace and concord, we thank Thee for the Churches in this our land and for Thy grace in choosing us to be members and ministers in Thy Church. We bless Thee for our fellowship, and for our rich inheritance. We praise Thee for Thy messengers from other lands who brought the Gospel of Thy Kingdom to this land, and for those who have faithfully proclaimed it to succeeding generations, and for all who have prayed and laboured for the union of Churches, especially in South India. Thou hast heard the prayers of Thy people and blessed the labours of Thy servants, and hast brought us to this day for the glory of Thy Name. In obedience to Thy will and led by Thy Spirit, as we accept one another as fellow ministers, do Thou strengthen the bonds between us and unite us and make us one body, Thyself, O Christ, being its Head. Make us all of one heart and of one soul, united in one holy bond of truth and peace, of faith and charity. Grant that this Church may ever be zealous in commending Thy glorious Gospel to the millions in this land, that India may find in Thee the goal of all her seeking and the fulfillment of her noblest aspirations. Hasten the time, O God, when throughout the world there shall be one flock, one Shepherd, and in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord. Amen.

Used in the *Service for the Inauguration of Union,* in St. George's Cathedral, Madras, September 27th, 1947.

THE RENEWED "LAMBETH CONVERSATIONS"

By NATHANIEL MICKLEM

I

IN 1920 the Lambeth Conference, which is an assembly of all the Bishops of the Anglican communion, sent out an "Appeal to All Christian People." Acknowledging "all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ and have been baptized into the name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ, which is His Body," they pleaded for a serious and devoted attempt to restore the outward and visible unity of the Church. Reunion, they suggested, might be achieved upon four basic principles: the "whole-hearted acceptance" of (1) the Scriptures as the record of revelation, the "rule and ultimate standard" of faith; (2) the Nicene Creed as "the sufficient statement of the Christian faith," and that creed or "the Apostles Creed" as the baptismal confession of belief; (3) the two sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Communion, and (4) a ministry universally recognized and authorized. "May we not reasonably claim," they continued, "that the Episcopate is the one means of providing such a ministry?" Thus, in brief, they proposed reunion on the basis of Scripture, classical creeds, sacraments and episcopate.

The bishops who put out this Appeal had in mind Eastern and Roman Christianity as well as the Churches for which in this paper I shall use the English term "Nonconformist," meaning the Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian and Congregational, all of which refuse to conform to the "Established" Anglican Church. I am here concerned, however, only with the relations between the Anglican Church in England and the English Nonconformist Churches.

The result of this Appeal was a series of "Conversations." So far as the immediate object of reunion was concerned, it might be said that they came to nothing or petered out. It would be far from the truth to suggest that they achieved nothing; they led to better understanding, to a clarification of the issues, to a fuller understanding of the difficulties; but when they stopped, reunion between the churches seemed — at least to many Nonconformists — remoter than when they began.

These Conversations have now begun again after the interval and experiences of the war. Those who are participating in them belong to a younger generation, and they face a situation very different from that of 1920. Rightly and inevitably these Conversations at this stage must be private; but it is important that Christians everywhere should understand their background, their setting and their aim.

II

Both Anglicanism and Nonconformity have changed in England since 1920. I surmise that if the Anglican bishops today were to propose reunion upon the basis of the four points enumerated above, the response from Nonconformity would be warmer and more promising than it was at first. No doubt much elucidation would be necessary. In what sense, it would be asked, are the Scriptures to be understood as "the rule and ultimate standard" of faith, and in what sense are the traditional creeds to be taken as "the sufficient statement" of the Christian faith? But discussion here would range across the denominations rather than divide them. A certain number of Nonconformists, but probably fewer than in 1920, tend towards a Quaker view of the sacraments, and episcopacy is not quite such a bugbear to the Nonconformists as it was in days when they connected it with prelacy. Moreover, Methodists, Baptists and Congregationalists now have officials (called superintendents or moderators) who might very well be described as "a kind of bishops" of their own.

But, if the Anglican Church has never formally gone back on the terms of its Appeal, the proposal is in fact qualified by two new considerations. First, a large, well-organized and by no means reticent section of the Anglican clergy is not willing to recognize a mere acceptance of "the historic episcopate" as satisfactory for reunion; it insists that its own interpretation of episcopacy must be accepted too. The Anglican Church, as such, requires of its members and clergy no theory about the episcopate; but there are those who regard not only the Church as part of the Gospel, but the episcopate, understood in their sense, as part of the Gospel also. It is not enough, they say, to accept bishops: the full Gospel about them must be accepted too. Since, moreover, this section is wont to threaten disruption if its scruples are not respected and followed, the bishops have to take more than their own opinions into consideration. The situation has been clarified, and perhaps worsened, by the publication of the book entitled *The Apostolic*

Ministry, a work of vast but, as I should submit, largely irrelevant learning, which is designed to prove — but in fact assumes — that the Apostles were the plenipotentiaries of our Lord, that unlike other plenipotentiaries they had the right and the duty to appoint their successors, and that the Anglican and Roman bishops who claim rival jurisdiction over England, are in fact these successors. It is to be regretted that the Nonconformist Churches, in the main, pay far too little attention to the deep religious concern for continuity, for unity, for sound doctrine in the Church, which are the religious grounds for the insistence of many upon episcopacy. But Nonconformity will not be attracted to such considerations by so hazardous and temerarious a theory.

The second new consideration is the establishment in South India of a United Church out of elements which include both Anglican and Nonconformist Churches. While this notable experiment may prove in the end greatly to have furthered the cause of reunion, it has for the moment technically set it back in England. For the Anglican Church has decided that the Anglican dioceses which enter into the new Church in South India thereby cease to be a part of the world-wide Anglican communion. They will not bring into the Anglican communion those who join with them, as, for instance, the United Church in Canada as a whole is linked with world-Methodism, world-Presbyterianism and world-Congregationalism. This consideration has re-set the reunion question here, for if we were to have reunion in England, it would not be by absorption of the Nonconformist Churches into the Anglican Church; it would be by the formation of a new united Church, which would be deemed by the Anglicans no longer to belong to world-Anglicanism. This is a prospect which Anglicans are, not unnaturally, unwilling to contemplate; for English Anglicanism is, as the present Archbishop of Canterbury said in a notable sermon before the University of Cambridge (Nov. 3, 1946), "the nodal point of that Communion." The Anglican Church in England, he said, "by the nature of the case can only move along with its fellow Churches in every part of the world." In other words, the Anglican Church at the moment does not desire a reunited Church in England. This does not mean, however, that it it not, in the persons of its leaders, deeply concerned about reunion. Reunion must be sought, however, along lines which would not prejudice the responsibility of English Anglicans for Anglicanism all over the world.

The situation, therefore, is quite different from what it was when the Lambeth Appeal was made in 1920, and those now engaged in the Conversations, as I understand the matter, are not attempting to find a constitution for a reunited Church such as would embody all the varying principles and emphases of the divided Churches. A reunited Church in England is not now regarded as an immediate objective.

III

What, then, is proposed instead? It was here that the Archbishop in the sermon to which reference has been made, and which was, in fact, the starting point of the new Conversations, offered a fresh suggestion. There are no theological barriers that reach to heaven, he said, except perhaps in reference to the theology of the ministry; but there are barriers of habit and differences in the idiom of worship which make union, though not friendliness, hard to achieve. Yet, while we remain disunited as at present, the circulation in the Body of Christ is grievously impeded. A federation of the Churches he deems insufficient to restore the circulation; a new united Church seems out of the question at the moment:

> What we need is that, while the folds remain distinct, there should be a movement towards a free and unfettered exchange of life in worship and sacrament between them as there is already of prayer and thought and Christian fellowship — in short that they should grow towards that full communion with one another, which already in their separation they have in Christ.

The Archbishop then went on to speak of the relation of the Church of England to the "Old Catholics" on the Continent of Europe and the relations it desires with the Orthodox Churches and the Churches of Finland and Sweden. With the "Old Catholics" the Church of England has a kind of Concordat. The two communions remain wholly separate; they are not identical in thought or practice or tradition, but they recognize one another as sister Churches; they acknowledge each others' ministries, and members of each may take the Communion in the churches of the other. A similar relationship with these other Churches is desired. The Archbishop's proposal, as I understand it, is that there should for the moment be no talk of an immediate reuniting of the Churches in England: this, please God, will come one day; but we shall move towards that goal not by seeking it directly but by envisaging and entering upon a process whereby it might ultimately come to pass. Why should there not, as a first step, be that sort of rela-

tion between the Anglicans in England and the Nonconformists as subsists between the Anglicans and the "Old Catholics"? Or, to put much the same thing in another way, why should not the Anglican Church be related to the Nonconformist Churches much as the Nonconformist Churches are related to one another?

IV

The Archbishop assumes that agreement might well be reached upon "the essential principles" of the Church, the Scriptures, the Creeds, the Sacraments and even the Ministry so far as the Ministry be regarded (in the words of the Lausanne Report) as "a gift of God through Christ to His Church, essential to its being and well-being, perpetually authorized and made effective through Christ and His Spirit." But for Anglicans the ministry means, or at least includes, the episcopate. A Concordat (if that is the right term) might well be reached between the Church of England and the Nonconformist Churches if the latter would accept episcopacy. What would this mean, and what are the chances that it would find acceptance with the Nonconformist Churches?

It seems plain that there are two things the Archbishop does not mean: (1) Methodists and Baptists have their superintendents, Congregationalists their moderators: the office of superintendent is not unknown to Presbyterianism. These officers certainly exercise an office of oversight; they might quite reasonably be called "bishops," as they are in the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Archbishop does not mean that. He means an episcopacy in "the Apostolical Succession" as Anglicans have come to understand that phrase. (2) The Anglo-Catholic party, or a large part of it, insists that not only episcopacy but an acceptance of its theory of episcopacy is a necessary basis for reunion. But the Archbishop, as his sermon indicates, makes no claim or suggestion that the Nonconformists and their projected "bishops" should accept any particular theory of episcopacy. He claims only that their bishops should be persons whom all Anglicans would have to recognize as bishops, because they had been ordained or consecrated by bishops who stand in the succession which Anglicans believe themselves to preserve. These new bishops would be no more Anglican bishops than are the bishops of the "Old Catholic" Church or the bishops of the Orthodox Churches, but they would, in the Anglican sense, be truly and indisputably bishops. Granted this, we should have, not, indeed,

the United Church in England, but the United Churches in England, fraternally related to one another, with full intercommunion established between them and full mutual recognition, with the abolition not of our divisions but of their scandal.

V

This may be deemed an entirely new suggestion. Some of the old difficulties are by-passed, and a fresh consideration of our mutual relations becomes possible. But is it a hopeful suggestion, is it likely to be accepted as pointing to a solution of our perplexities, is it consonant with the principles and ethos of the Nonconformist Churches?

It is much too early to answer these questions yet. No one could suppose that such a proposal could be immediately adopted, nor have any of the communions concerned really been consulted about it. But the suggestion has not been rejected off-hand. Its further consideration I take to be the business of those participating in the renewed Conversations. First of all we must see whether in fact we do agree already upon fundamentals other than the episcopate. Then we must consider exactly what an acceptance of "episcopacy" would mean, and beyond that. I should judge that the Archbishop has been much interested in proposals now before the United Church and the Anglican Church in Canada, whereby individual ministers of either Church might be formally given a wider commission and admitted to the ministry of the other. By such steps it seems to be thought, or hoped, that the Churches might gradually grow together and thus come to full intercommunion with a final acceptance of episcopacy as the gift of Anglicanism to the other Churches.

It is important to note that the Conversations are not between the Anglican Church in England and the Free Church Federal Council, which officially represents all the Free or Nonconformist Churches, but between the Anglican Church and the Nonconformist Churches severally. It is quite possible that some of the Nonconformist Churches might find the Archbishop's proposal more alluring than others do, and that some might be able to take further steps than others toward the goal.

Thus, while amongst the Nonconformist Churches there is a common "ethos," while they share many habits of thought and worship, and there is much interchange between them, yet in respect of reunion they stand in very different positions. Methodism did not

come out of the Established Church on any principles of churchmanship, nor because of any dispute about the nature of episcopacy; it came out because, as the Established Church then was, there was no room within it for a burning, evangelical movement such as the Methodism of the day. The older churches of "Orthodox Dissent," on the other hand, the Baptists, the Presbyterian and the Congregational, standing in the main in the tradition of the Reformed Churches of the Genevan order, have differed from Anglicanism precisely in respect of the principles of churchmanship. Amongst these the Baptists are probably more conscious of a duty to maintain their peculiar witness in separation than the other Churches, while the Presbyterian Church of England and the Congregationalists are at the moment negotiating with a view to their possible union in one church.

What in the providence of God will come of these Conversations it is impossible to predict. It may well be that something quite other than the implementing of the original proposal will be their issue. The difficulties in the way are appalling; they are sentimental as well as theological, for old wounds are not healed easily. But, so far as can be seen at present, all the negotiating churches through their representatives are determined to walk together so far as they can. Much will depend upon the concern or lack of concern in the ordinary church member. A longing for reunion is still confined to the relatively few; many are accustomed at the same time to express disgust at the intransigence of the "parsons" who keep us separate by their wrangles and also to be quite unwilling to contemplate any changes so far as they personally are concerned. Only an upsurging of the Spirit will lead us into union, and under what conditions we might then unite, no man can foresee.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE CHURCHES

By EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT

I

THERE is no need to advocate, claim, or defend religious liberty to the readers of this journal. If there is one axiom of which we can be sure in a time when many axioms have been disputed or denied, it is that, for those whose affiliation is with the free churches, religion without freedom is religion without meaning.

Our whole understanding of the Christian enterprise begins here. Whether we think of religion as a purely personal experience or a broad social fact it is our historic conviction that it is rooted in liberty, and lives, thrives and brings forth its fruits in free soil. Unmediated by institution, priest, or sacrament a man's approach to God is an inherently personal affair. This was the great word of the Reformation, and those who have been nurtured in that vital tradition have not yet found reason for its repudiation. When Roger Williams as a lad of fourteen saw a Protestant being burned at the stake on Smithfield Green he suffered the shock that first formulated for him the principle that the civil magistrate should have no jurisdiction over church affairs and that finally led him to his daring democratic experiment at Providence Plantations. Today this same tradition stands resolute against those who would make state and politician, or church and prelate the medium of the divine Grace.

The fact that the principle of religious liberty is axiomatic for us and is explicit in the organic law of our land influences the way we deal with it. On the one hand we tend to ignore it, assuming perhaps that since it is both traditional and legal, it need not bother us unduly. On the other hand we are likely to think of it within partial perspectives or in connection with isolated episodes. We remind ourselves, for example, of the current situation in Italy. The *Atlantic Monthly* of June, 1947, says (p. 15) that the Christian Democratic party which "is practically operated by the Vatican," "consider themselves the logical candidates to carry out the reconstruction of their country." This suggests to us the problem of religious liberty, and its immediate relevance

thereto is indicated by the fact that the Christian Democratic party "pushed through by a majority of only five votes an article which curtails freedom of worship to an extent hitherto unknown in modern constitutions." Sensitive to the problem of religious liberty the *Atlantic* comments: "The test of a year's government has demonstrated the Christian Democrats to be incompetent except in machine politics, inert, and unexpectedly corrupt in high places"; "its real nature . . . is feudal, moralizing, and paternalistic."

We read such responsible reporting and forthwith sharpen our vigilance against similar intimations at home. The transportation of New Jersey's parochial school children in public school buses arouses us; feeding the children of parish schools in Wisconsin out of the public treasury and the continuance of "the President's personal representative" at the Vatican evoke our protest. This is necessary if we are not to invite by our indifference the formation, within our borders, of a Christian Democratic party, American style, that might seek results similar to those already achieved abroad.

II

But should our concern for religious freedom stop with this sort of thing? We call ourselves "free churches." Has anything happened in the last fifty years that calls for a broadening of the perspectives within which we see the freedom which our forebears have bequeathed to us? To put it more broadly: Is not religious liberty an arc in the total circumference of liberty that cannot be understood or preserved unless the integrity of the entire circle of freedom is protected? We have not always seen it thus. Absolute liberty is, of course, chaos; so we have had to think of liberty within the relativities of law. This restrictive necessity has led some to try to separate the religious life from the total life and consequently to separate religious liberty from total liberty; that is, from that measure of freedom in all the aspects of man's experience which is the most conducive to the fullness of life, both individual and social.

The world of our day has seen new emphases given to the forces that deny liberty. Four hundred years ago democracy was furiously aware of itself and both state and church felt its insistent pressure. Today, democracy is on the defensive in the West. It has suffered the misfortune that overtakes every great idea that must create institutions for its protection. Such institutions often become ends in themselves and thus

the experience that gave rise to the original idea is easily forgotten. It is in the until-recently-undemocratic areas of the earth that democracy is today bold and self-assertive. Here it has not yet hardened into institutional patterns — political and social. With us, however, some of our democratic and libertarian patterns tend to deny the very experience of democracy. Poll-tax, Jim Crow, and even our pseudo two-party political system operate to debilitate the true democratic experience. More than this, the liberties of men are sometimes carelessly handled. What has happened to the Atlantic Charter? It was solemnly promulgated as the promise of new freedom for all people. Whither flown are the Four Freedoms so lately hatched? Do we take seriously the liberties of men? Are they our most precious possessions or are they pawns in a desperate and unpredictable game?

The effect of this on religious liberty is easily discerned. Russia, crowding into the Western orbit, provides for religious liberty in her constitution; but it is something to which Roger Williams would never have given that designation. The Vatican, losing ground in her European homelands, presses for political advantage on the North American continent, but in the structure of her giant institution, she has no place for what the free churches call liberty. In the devastated and impoverished areas of Europe and Asia there are millions of broken spirits who are interested only in the liberty to survive physically. Political and religious freedom are a mockery to the starving. Beyond this there is an over-all movement in the direction of collectivism within the traditional democratic countries. We do not think this is necessarily the negation of freedom; on the contrary it may paradoxically give democracy more spacious breathing room. What is certain, however, is that we must rethink religious liberty within the context of this generation, so that it can be made to contribute to the maximum of freedom and security whether within an increasingly collectivist and united order or, if need be, within a decentralized and fragmented world. This is part of the problem of the free churches. Rome poses her totalitarianism against Russia's; the democratic socialism of England respectfully asks questions of the Established Church. We in the United States are not yet at the point where the issue is acute, but we cannot claim for ourselves indefinite deferment. The meaning of the Reformation and Roger Williams needs a reinterpretation out of which can come a more pragmatic and integrated understanding of religious liberty as related to the churches for our times.

III

This is not the place for such an ambitious expository effort. All we can hope to do is to suggest two guiding principles which may help us find the range within which we can clearly see all of the problem. The first may be stated thus: Religious liberty is not an end in itself but is one of the means by which the maximum of human freedom is to be approached. The second principle says: Liberty cannot be fragmented or compartmentalized; the shackles that impede man's free movement in any particular area encumber him everywhere.

On June 5th last, Secretary Marshall told a Harvard audience that the purpose of our foreign policy should be "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social *conditions in which free institutions can exist.*" The importance of this pronouncement in the political sphere is very great. Its use in this context is for the purpose of pointing up the first of the principles we have just stated. For the Secretary of State, social and political conditions are not the end of foreign policy but the means through which "free institutions can exist." Had it been pertinent to his Harvard speech he would perhaps have added an even more important purpose: *free institutions must exist in order that free individuals may exist.* A free church in a free society is something greatly to be desired but it can only properly be achieved and defended if it makes possible free individuals. This is another way of saying that religious liberty is a means to the development of free persons. It does not claim that religious liberty has no intrinsic, substantive value of its own; but that it will fail of its ultimate invention if it does not encourage the emergence of conditions in which free institutions and free men can exist.

This, it will be seen at once, is more than an assertion that religious liberty should be guaranteed by government because we have become accustomed to living that way. It is more indeed than what was contemplated in our organic law with reference to establishments of religion and the exercise of our several freedoms. It puts our ultimate concern for liberty beyond establishments, institutions, or civil rights and rests it in the free person. It is our failure to keep before us the ultimate end for which religious liberty is a means that has resulted in some of our irresponsibility in dealing with the immediate specific issues that involve and dramatize the problem. We have risen to beat off the adversary of religious liberty that has suddenly threatened us and we have been satisfied when he has withdrawn to lick his wounds.

Or we have shot off resounding resolutions to prove we are vigilant sentinels, and not infrequently they have fallen on too narrow a target. We believe in democracy in which free institutions — one of which must be a free church — can exist, but all this must subserve the purpose of creating free spirits. If we should some day be convinced that free spirits are to be nurtured best by a fettered church (as some vigorously argue) this first principle (religious liberty a means, not an end) would force us to accept the judgment and share in the process so long as the end was attained.

IV

This brings us to our second principle: Liberty cannot be fragmented or compartmentalized; the shackles that impede man's free movement in any particular area, encumber him everywhere. The *essence* of liberty is indivisible; the *experience* of liberty is progressive and partial. By the former is meant that freedom does not "spring full-panoplied from the brow of Jove": it comes to us as we develop the capacity for its use. By the latter is meant that within the limits of mortal life as we know it, absolute freedom is impossible. At the same time, however, we must remember that while our experience of liberty is of necessity subject to quantitative and qualitative limitations, we are not able to suffer the impairment of liberty in one area of experience and keep it, at the same time, inviolate in another.

Brief reference to the experience of the German Reich under the late Herr Hitler is instructive on this point. Freedom, unqualified and millennial was the announced aim of the Führer. In order to achieve this however, he had to contract the liberties of his people. Political liberty was first destroyed in the Reichstag, then followed freedom in the trades union movement, the freedom of the educational system, the freedom of industry, press, radio and art, and freedom in matters of personal habits. Finally the freedom of religion was taken away. The partial limitations on freedom were finally made total, and by making them complete Hitler gave despotism a logical aspect. These despotic measures had a time sequence, to be sure, but it is important for us to remember that whether German churchmen were aware of it at the time, the moment *political* liberty was curbed they lost something of their *religious* liberty. Anti-Semitism was an obscene and inhuman expression of a total denial of religious liberty that fell gently on all other religious bodies at the time it fell furiously on the Jews. The end of the liberties of the Roman Catholic and the State and Confessional

Churches was signalled the moment that trade unions were proscribed and the press and radio were put in bondage; and the seizure of the German universities struck just as certainly at the freedom of religion as at education. Karl Barth, learned professor of religion, had to flee to Switzerland. He was free, neither as churchman nor as scholar under a denial of freedom that was sooner or later to be plenary in its pressure on all the organized aspects of human life.

It would have been quite impossible for religion to have retained its liberty so long as the universities were fettered; nor could industry have remained free while labor was in prison. Nor, we venture to say, could education and the agencies of communication have stayed free so long as the churches were in chains.

It is this fact of the indivisibility of freedom or, to state it otherwise, the mutuality of our liberties, that must be made the significant new element in our understanding of and concern for religious liberty today. It has been thrust upon us by the modern world; it is something beyond the foresight of the Reformers of three hundred years ago. Unless we see our problem within the perspective supplied by that fact, we shall be in danger of short-sighted excursions in the protection of this the greatest and most precious elements in our heritage.

V

This has a very practical relation to the way in which we are to maintain our religious liberties. Remember the threat that comes from the desperate impatience of a world starving to death and that cares for nothing save food and shelter. Recall also the presence of a westward-moving culture that is officially anti-religious; and the shift toward collectivism of one sort or another within societies traditionally democratic. How shall we preserve religious liberty in the face of these liabilities? By isolating it from the totality of the experience of freedom and asking for special concessions in support of which we fashion arguments about the divine and eternal nature of the institutions of religion?

Let us be warned against such a narrow vision. We shall by no means abate our watchfulness to detect any abrogation of religious liberty or the effort to subvert any of the laws that are its present safeguard. But this is a negative mood; it is the police mind and it serves only slightly, if at all, the extension of all human liberties, or — as it has been already put — the creation of free citizens. In simple terms this means that *if the churches are to retain their liberties they must be equally or more*

concerned that all the other components of society shall be as free as their rights within a democratic society allow.

Specifically this asserts that the churches must fight for a free press, a free labor movement, a free economy, a free educational system, a free ballot as well as a free church. Let us be reminded of the experience of Germany again. Without pressing the parallel too closely we still can say that the churches nowhere will long remain free if education is seduced by the state and turned over to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army or to the guiding suggestions of the American Legion. Nor will the churches remain free — except in the most academic way — if the rights of men to organize their hands, their brains, or their capital are denied by an act of hysteria or of Congress. Nor will the liberty of the churches last very long beyond the corruption or the cancellation of the right of any qualified citizen to vote, or the attempt of committees on un-Americanism to limit the civil rights we properly cherish.

If we take this seriously, as we must, we will see to it that churches are girded as never before for the coming struggle to keep democracy a vital force in the world. We will contend for freedom against tyranny wherever the two are joined. The sacred right of a man to work as he chooses will be defended as vigorously as his right to worship as he wants. The status of a citizen before the law or in the voting booth — no matter what his color or his creed — will be as sacred to the churchman as his status before the Eternal God. The opportunity for all to learn the truth and the freedom to advance one's intellectual and vocational competence shall be as much on the hearts of the church as on the minds of the National Educational Association. We are bound together in the bundle of liberties and we shall not exalt one to the exclusion of another without imperilling all.

VI

To summarize: The principle of religious liberty needs no defense; it needs reinterpretation and reapplication. Circumstances in our modern world demand that we see the problem in fresh perspectives. Two principles emerge for our guidance: first, that religious liberty is a means to an end, not an end in itself; second, that while the experience of liberty is partial, its essence is indivisible and we cannot have free churches if other social institutions are not also free. This means that the churches must enter into the struggle for securing and preserving the liberty that is allowed all institutions within the framework of de-

mocracy, to the end that men shall become free citizens. Only thus will the churches protect the liberty within which they can live and work.

It may be observed, in conclusion, that this approach to the problem appears to loosen the hold by which we have hitherto held this precious thing. Will we be able to take a stout grip on other liberties without feeling religious liberty slip from slack hands? Perhaps; but there is strong New Testament support for making the effort. Familiar words can be paraphrased to point the moral: "He that findeth his liberty shall lose it; and he that loseth his liberty for my sake shall find it" (Matthew 10:39). It might be argued that we have lost something of our freedom in Christ by some of the ways through which we have sought to insulate ourselves from each other and from the dynamic currents of the world's life. It might further be argued that the demands of the emerging Ecumenical Movement throw an unexpected emphasis on the need for our thinking less of the sovereignty of the units of Christendom and the protection of their liberties than on the universality of the Body of Christ and its integration. Subtly, perhaps, but in a very real way, we may have allowed our concern for religious freedom to be a specious validation for sectarianism. Once more, we have not yet had the daring to face up to the fact that the fight for religious liberty may yet demand that the churches break the bonds that have chained them to war, nationalism, and imperialistic capitalism. Such matters cannot be discussed here, but they might provide engaging and fruitful study elsewhere.

This much can with certainty be said: Since religious liberty is a means to the creation of free spirits, we must not allow it to deflect us from the purpose it must ultimately serve. We may even go beyond that: What can we say of ourselves if we are not willing, for Christ's sake and the sake of his brethren who today are bound in the fetters of tyranny, desperation, poverty, discrimination, confusion, ignorance or sin, to forfeit something of our own freedom? By all means let us remember: "For freedom did Christ set us free: Stand fast therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage" (Galatians 5:1). But let us not forget that Christ, in order to set us free "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant" (Philippians 2:7). Somewhere within that paradox the mind of modern Christendom must move, and if it does, it will most certainly rediscover the meaning and value of religious liberty and be able, we predict, to create political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist and in which free spirits can live.

A SIXTH CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIAN STRATEGY

A CRITIQUE OF JOHN C. BENNETT'S *CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND SOCIAL POLICY*

By PETER A. BERTOCCI

I WISH to call attention to one of the crucial theses in Professor John C. Bennett's masterly book. There is so much to agree with in this book that I have suspected more than once that my difficulties were no more than word-deep. But the problem of Christian strategy is so important that even a misplaced emphasis warrants discussion, let alone a possible misstatement of an essential element in Christian strategy.

I

Professor Bennett moves to his own conception of Christian strategy through a careful critique of four other constructions. In the Roman Catholic espousal of an authoritative system of Christian social ethics, articulated in definite, obligatory, normative patterns of social organization, Professor Bennett finds only an alluring promise of guidance in the solution of complex social problems. Any position which thus seeks to lay down one specific mode of action as authoritative for all conscientious Christians simply overrides these important facts: (a) that all moral questions are intertwined with non-moral technical problems of finding means adequate to ends; and (b) that equally sensitive Christians will be unable to agree that certain goals will be realized by a specific set of means, a particular economic system, for example.

This rejection of the Roman Catholic strategy does not mean that Professor Bennett approves of "the total or partial withdrawal of the individual Christian or a limited Christian group or sect from those aspects of life which create special problems for the Christian conscience" (p. 41). This second strategy, well-illustrated by the Quakers and Mennonites,

> promises holiness to a limited group at the cost of evasion of one's responsibility as a member of the larger community. Such holiness is itself illusory, for there is real participation in the sins of the larger community that is overlooked. Chris-

tians who withdraw from the world are guilty of sins of omission that involve responsibility for evils not prevented (pp. 45, 46).

Nor, to change the order of treatment in the book, can we approve a fourth strategy

based upon the assumption that Christian ethics are so distant from social policy that they are irrelevant to the problems of public life and that there must be two independent moral standards, one for personal relations . . . the other for the state and the world of nations (pp. 51, 52).

For while this strategy is aware of the profound difficulties in relating Christian ethics and social policy, it evidently does not realize that "it is fatal to allow the standards by which the institutions of society are to be judged and the standards which the Christian acknowledges for his own life to fly apart" (p. 57).

In view of these criticisms, one might have expected Professor Bennett to favor the "third" strategy of identifying Christianity "with particular social programs or institutions or movements" (p. 46). But he sees this strategy as a "constant temptation of liberal Protestantism" (p. 47), and says:

Those who follow this strategy fail to take seriously the kind of neutral issues which I have discussed — technical questions, problems involving the prediction of human behavior, and the weighing of two competing alternatives when both have real claims upon us (p. 46). . . . It is all too easy for idealistic Christians to think that their solution of a social problem is the only solution, be it for example, pacificism, prohibition, or socialism.

We thus see that, in Professor Bennett's thought, a Christian, on the one hand, must not absolutize one pattern or solution of a complex social problem or at any time identify Christian ethics with it. On the other hand, he cannot withdraw into comparative isolation or give up the personal responsibility for social salvation. It is emphatically clear in this book that Professor Bennett believes that the sensitive Christian individual and the Church should be consecrated in the determination to realize the will of God in social organization. There must be no shirking, not even of the burden felt when in following the more promising of alternatives we are also forced to promote some evil. "All the various distortions of the gospel that find in it only an other-worldly or only an individualistic message should be criticized" (p. 106). And he adds that every Christian must seek "those goals that represent the demands of Christian love upon our generation." There is no doubt of

this basic imperative in his writing, especially when one reads the acute analyses of many issues now facing the Christian.

What troubles me, however, is another imperative or emphasis which actually dominates this one, an emphasis which seems to me is incoherent and would weaken the Christian endeavor both in theory and practice.

II

This emphasis has already been implicit in what has been said, but it comes out clearly in the statement of Professor Bennett's "fifth" strategy. The fifth strategy, he says, "rejects the absolute identification of the Christian ethic with the particular policies which the individual believes he should support." All social programs with which Christianity has been identified "without significant qualification" (p. 51) are to be rejected in view of the intellectual and practical difficulties any such identification involves. "But deeper than all of them [these difficulties] is the recognition that Christianity transcends every social institution and every program that includes both goals and methods" (p. 51).

Further explaining this rejection of any solution as *"the* Christian solution," Professor Bennett makes three points: First: "This reserve is an expression of the transcendent character of the Christian ideal which keeps every human program and every human institution under judgment." Second: "This reserve is also a consequence of the Christian belief in the universality and persistence of sin." And third: "This reserve is also dictated by regard for the elements of what we may call technical autonomy in most social judgments" (p. 59). With this background Professor Bennett formulates the fifth strategy: *"This fifth strategy is one that emphasizes the relevance together with the transcendence of the Christian ethic and which takes account of the universality and persistence of sin and the elements of technical autonomy in social policies"* (p. 59).

This principle and these reserves underscore the transcendence of the Christian ethic as a balance for and warning against absolute relevance. It is clear that Professor Bennett intends not transcendence alone and not relevance alone but a tense balance between them. Thus, men must be devoted to the transcendent ideal even as they use it both as an inspiring goal and as a standard of criticism for all means of reaching it. "Christian teaching about God's transcending of all human purposes and programs should prepare the Christian to avoid the

tendency to make absolute even the best that he plans or achieves." And, he adds, "This aspect of the Christian faith should prevent the Christian from regarding any social system, now or in the future, as beyond criticism" (p. 66).

But in thus voicing a needed warning against allowing "a curious quirk of the human mind to become easily credulous concerning the ideal character of some social system" (p. 66) to develop into a principle of strategy, is Professor Bennett not courting another human weakness which is even more serious? May not one take the moral nerve out of Christian action by repeating to himself, as he should on this formula: "God's ways are not my ways; his thoughts are not my thoughts. Therefore even the very best I know is inadequate here"? Surely the sincere Christian, faced by a complex situation (in which even God could not do everything) does not find his earnestness invigorated by such counsel. Ought he not, as a Christian, to do the best *he* knows, in every situation, to strain out every bit of the good derivable therefrom? After all, the relevance of the Christian ideal to his situation is the relevance *he* sees at that point, the choice he must make is based on *his* conception for the meaning of the ideal in that situation. How does he gain, and how does Christian thought gain, by the conviction which he is now supposed to have, that this cup, bitter as it is, and yet the only one he can conscientiously drink, is not the cup that God would have him drink *in this situation!* Theoretically every Christian will see disvalues, if he has any moral insight at all, issuing from almost every choice he makes. For every present good, if traced far enough, probably has bad results as a product of the imperfections in the lives of others or in the situations which develop. Nevertheless, a given solution may be better than any other in *this* social complex. What else can he reasonably do but become a practical absolutist, while remaining a theoretical relativist (to use Karl Groos' terms)? To do anything else is to allow a supposed best to become the worst enemy of the better in that situation. Rather must he act and suffer with the consequences, even as he enjoys the good and prays for greater insight as he confronts the new issues in developing situations. Surely, to say that the Christian ethic *never* has complete relevance to *any* human program is to cut every program, now and forever, from its possible cosmic mooring, — and there will be many, perhaps more logical than others, who will wonder whether Christian ethics has any real relevance to any human predicament! We may have absolutized and ex-

onerated Christian principle, but only at the price of tempting isolation, and desolation!

III

At this point one might well reply: But has not Professor Bennett taken account of such criticism when he, with Dr. J. H. Oldham, urges different degrees of assurance in universal ethical principles on the one hand, and, on the other, in concrete programs of action ("middle axioms") which attempt to define the application of the universal principles in a given historical situation and are therefore not binding for all time? Does he not say that Christians must move from a guiding principle, about which there can be no disagreement among Christians, through a middle axiom which as a substantial consensus behind it as it relates Christian principle to a concrete reality, to an even more specific program about which there would be even less consensus among Christians? Surely, in this progressing from the Christian principle to the specific method there is no suggestion of isolation. "Christians," he specifically says, "must move from one to three or to some equivalent of three, but as they do so the degree of authority that can be claimed in the name of Christian ethics becomes weaker with each step" (p. 79).

Exactly! What we are here reading is that Christian ethics is unimpeachable in transcendent principle, but that the closer the Christian gets to the situation which confronts the individual the less can he be sure that he is being a good Christian! Again we have saved the purity of the principle, but not the confidence in our ability, or God's ability through us, to enact it in the best possible manner in *that* situation. Yet, we are told, our sense of sin and imperfection will goad us on to improvement. Improvement to what? To another means which, when we are realistic, we can be *antecedently sure* is not the best means in that situation, though it is the best that *we* know! In seeking to save the principle and energize the man, haven't we actually moved both principle and man into an area of intolerable conflict?

IV

As one ponders this predicament, he begins to wonder whether a real source of the difficulty is not a root-metaphor which easily gets control of our picture-thinking minds and of our speech. In saying that the Christian ethic is not to be identified with *any* social program, are we

unconsciously assuming, in Platonic fashion, that somewhere there is laid up a pattern of Christian social perfection, yes, of perfect principles, perfect middle axioms, and perfect final means, which condemn every human conception? Or, changing the metaphor into the dialect of the Christian Personalist, are we assuming that in God's mind there are general purposes of which we can be surer than we can of the specific programs he would have in mind for their realization? I cite these analogies only to underscore the mechanical model-copy upon which transcendence-relevance seems to depend.

But is this the real situation? Is Christian social ethics the statement of principles whose specific connections with any particular situation must always be doubtfully relevant? Of course it is true that systems which man has idolized have come to be seen for their imperfections, but must we resort to transcendence to balance imperfection? Must we therefore loosen the connections between general ends, middle axioms, and more specific means? To be sure, in the knowledge of an omniscient Judge there would be a best end, a best set of middle axioms, and in every situation a best way of implementing both the system and the ends. However, since we are not omniscient and sinless, we could never entertain that Judge's perspective. If this were the whole story, we should simply have to make the best of the transcendence-relevance solution.

But let us remember that in the Christian outlook God is not only the Judge but the suffering Servant. And let us remember that the *best for man* cannot in fact be considered an *abstract* perfect imposed once and for all, as it were, from within God's being *upon* man's nature as the eternal pattern for his development and his condemnation! If the word "perfect" is to have any content in regard to man, it must specify some condition possible to *his* nature in *his* total and immediate predicament. There can be no human obligation to the perfect *for God's nature,* but only to the perfect *for human beings.*

To repeat, given man's nature, whatever it is, and God's knowledge of that nature and the problems by which it is confronted, we may suppose that God would know what would be best in that total situation with regard to ends and means. But finite man cannot have such a perspective and therefore this "ideal" best can only be, for him, an idle supposition, interesting but *not* relevant. The very best that man can discover, in the light of all he knows, can be the only meaningful object

of loyalty; and it will be the best *for both man and God* in that situation.

Had we, then, better change the metaphor? If history, including man, represents an evolutionary development, which means that God is working out his will with whatever aid he can get from man at every stage, then the picture changes from that of an artist, with his eye fixed on a perfect model which will tolerate no intermediaries, to that of a doctor, with a knowledge of the perfect health his patient might have had, who now labors lovingly to make the most of every bit of strength his ailing patient has left. His task day by day is to nurse his patient back to the best health now available. The healing God is more than a step ahead of us, but he works *with* us!

Whatever the age-long goal in his mind, every man and every generation, and God in every man and in every generation, are confronted with the task of discovering the elements in man and in his total situation which will bring the greatest value to fruition.

No goal, however, will have concrete meaning apart from the system(s) through which it is to be realized. Thus, the delicate balance is not between transcendence and relevance, but between ends and means which are *inextricable in prospect* in concrete situations even if they are less so in retrospect. Ends become ideals worthy of immediate devotion only as they become implemented with some means by which they are to be realized. This is not to say that God's doing and loving begins and ends in the situation confronting men, but it does mean that in the actual situation confronting men — a situation which he would have wished otherwise had men willed their best leads — he works with them for the best possible *they* can now see in that situation; it means that he accepts his cross in a situation which is worse than it might have been, and struggles in that situation both within the scene, through human energies dedicated to him, and behind the human scene in ways we know not. He never forsakes us and the changing best *for us,* even though we forsake the paths along which he could do more for and with us. The more conscious we are of the history of civilization and of the definitions of means and ends, let alone their execution, the more we realize at any moment in history that we must be careful about the inclusiveness of every formulation. But from this truth we must not conclude that at any given stage of history every system and any system man can devise is less than the best or what God

wills *in that situation*. We must not be so careful about the sin of idolatrizing that we fall into the sin of not appreciating the good made available here and now in this situation through the grace of God.

Again, if God is working in history, in what way would he have us act here and now, what is the best possible end and the best possible means *now?* It will be the best possible end only as it takes into account the fallibility as well as the ability of man; it must not be something which his fallibility will never allow him to realize; it must exceed his present grasp but not his ultimate reach. The ideal is not for men as they will be when they are better than they are; it is one at which they can work now as they seek to find their moorings to each other and to God. Thus, rather than expressing the problem in terms of transcendence-relevance, would it not be better to phrase it in terms of increasing relevance and pervasiveness to the possibilities in man-God-nature, in every stage of history?

V

I have been critical of Professor Bennett's statement of the principle of Christian strategy. As was said earlier, I find so much consistent with my emphasis in Professor Bennett's book that I have wondered whether the difference was more than verbal. For when Professor Bennett implements his general principle by five ways in which Christian faith and ethics should guide us, he states as a fourth way:

> *The Christian ethic guides us in determining the goals which represent the purpose of God for our time.* These are not absolute and all-inclusive goals but the next step that our own generation must take. The Kingdom of God in its fullness lies beyond our best achievements in the world but God does have purposes for us that can be realized. . . . The moral criticism of the means now used makes the search for an order in which better means will be possible all the more imperative (pp. 76, 77).

Taken by itself, without the lingering suggestion of transcendence, this fourth way comes much nearer the strategy suggested above. But another imperative must be added.

I should like now to suggest an interpretation and a principle of Christian strategy that also follows from the realization of the persistence of sin and "technical autonomy," and one which takes account of the temptation to "slur over the real nature of our decision and to make them appear better than they are" (p. 76), without forcing us into the psychological and theoretical difficulty encountered by a doc-

trine of transcendence-relevance. This *sixth* principle of strategy, in view of the errancy of man's ways and the difficulties of truth-finding, *includes* a method of procedure suited to the improvement of the human predicament now and forever. *The Christian ethic is one which, in view of the universality and persistence of sin and the elements of technical autonomy, renders obligatory the best possible ends and means in each historical situation, after they have had the fullest possible consideration and discussion by the human beings involved in their realization.* The Christian respect for human personality binds it to the *method of freedom* from arbitrary compulsion in the selection of means and ends for human action. The Christian must not only protect freedom *as if it were one among other values,* but must insist that freedom be used in the selection of all other ends and means. The humility which comes before all other humilities, as the very expression of his humility before the Father of all men, is that which recognizes that no man, no church, no institution is good enough or wise enough to govern another personality without his freely given consent.

Professor Bennett is certainly conscious of the importance of freedom, for his second way of implementing his principle reads: *"The Christian may find guidance in making social decisions from the self-criticism that is encouraged by Christian humility"* (pp. 65, 66). But he is so convinced that Christian ideals must not be identified with any method or social system, that he overlooks the fact that even granting the transcendence-relevance thesis, there can be no better system, in a world-view in which all men stand as free individuals even before God, than the system which will not impose on men decisions affecting their lives and destinies which they have had no opportunity to criticize and re-create.

The *ideal of democratic method* has always rooted, it seems to me, not only in the conviction that men are reasonable enough and good enough to find the best ways of conducting their lives, but also in the conviction that no man or group is reasonable enough or wise enough to legislate for others without being informed by them of what they considered best. Accordingly, every responsible Christian should consecrate himself to thinking out the problems facing him and his fellowmen, and should then actively sponsor in personal and social action those movements and ideals which seem to him best — but never without absolute regard for the similar responsibilities of others. He realizes, in other words, that there are conscientious believers and conscien-

tious objectors who are trying to be loyal to their conception of the available good. For him no respect for The Truth must stand in the way of respect for truth-seekers, no matter how much they disagree with him, *and* as long as they too adhere to the principle of free expression. The willingness of some conscientious men to take advantage of the method of freedom, even though they will not uphold that method for their opponents once they get into power, creates one of the most delicate problems of practical ethics; but the supreme value of the method is not destroyed, as their very opportunity to gain power should prove to them.

I am aware that this insistence upon co-operative democratic procedure as the presupposition of all other theoretical and practical steps must be worked out in various ways in different places, that differences in education, in economic and in social predicaments, will always influence the further steps persons and institutions will take to work out this method. Still only by respect for this method can the total wealth of individual and social experience be brought to bear upon the problems confronting men. But in each situation there will be the best for that Christian to support, once he has related his conscience to the corporate conclusion. This method validates itself, since it does not foreclose on any one conclusion prior to allowing a check of other relevant suggestions; and the method is strengthened by the conviction that God is in the hearts and minds of men in the midst of their wickedness, seeking to persuade them of his love for *all* men and of their responsibility for the God-responsive, self-creative growth of other men. What other method can possibly give more concrete meaning to Christian love in the human situation?

Even as I plead for a fuller recognition of the Christian responsibility for freedom as *the* prerequisite to the selection of all ends and means, I am aware that this principle would not find approval among those Christians who, with the conviction that they already possess the basic truths which God has provided for men, consider the freedom of which I speak a false and impious freedom, and sponsor only the freedom which comes from the already acquired knowledge of God's will as vouchsafed them. I am thus divided at a crucial point from these of my brethren who so absolutize a particular interpretation of the Christian message that they cannot *in principle* consistently absolutize freedom of critical discussion as I do. Here is one of those terrible moral situations which every moral agent confronts, a disagreement

fraught with serious practical consequences for both sides. Is the solution in the direction of considering that the method of freedom too, like all other human methods, falls short of a transcendent Christian ethic? Would this throw any light on the practical problem which would still confront us? Or must we simply face the fact that human disagreements, sometimes with the most conscientious and purest of motives, create situations which cause little but suffering and loss of value both for God and man? However, rather than making this possibility a ground of fomenting ill-will and hastening days of tragedy, let every Christian, in the very spirit of the freedom he champions, go on doing his level best to insure the greatest measure of freedom for all, in the hope that the course of events will provide opportunities for common growth and never allow this issue to be the one upon which too many other values depend.

DR. BENNETT'S COMMENT

Professor Bertocci's article is prompted by his recognition of a real danger in the position that I have defended in my book. The danger is that if Christians cannot assume that the social programs which they support are without significant qualification "Christian programs," they will lose incentive for action. The difference between Professor Bertocci and myself is that he believes that we can remove this danger by asserting the possibility of such "Christian programs," while I believe that that danger is inherent in our situation, that we must learn to live with it and to counteract it as best we can from day to day. Personally I should like nothing better than to be able to agree with Professor Bertocci because I wish that we could choose between less ambiguous alternatives, that we could find an altogether clear and Christian way forward.

Take, for example, the most fateful problem that we face today as Christians in America: the problem of discovering the right policy in relation to the Soviet Union. If Professor Bertocci's reasoning were correct it would be possible for me to convince myself that there is decisive Christian guidance in answering the questions on which a sound policy must be based, such questions as the following: What is the real purpose behind Russian policy? By what methods can we best help to protect people from Communism as a form of political tyranny without strengthening all those reactionary forces that oppose Com-

munism as a threat to their privileges? Is it not enough to state these questions in order to show that our decisions must be based upon answers to questions concerning which we have no sure Christian guidance?

Professor Bertocci may admit this difficulty because there is an ambiguity in his discussion that leaves room for such an admission. My impression is that he really wants to show that there is a Christian program that is objectively valid for all Christians, for this assumption seems to control most of his thought; but his argument does not really lead to that conclusion. Instead it leads to the conclusion that the individual Christian should pursue as a Christian duty the best policy that he can find. With that I fully agree. It is our Christian duty to seek to discover what is the best next step and to take that step; but that does not guarantee the objective validity of the judgments by which we decide for it. Other Christians may make quite different decisions. Professor Bertocci seems to admit this when he emphasizes the need of respecting the consciences of those who differ from us. I fully agree that the Christian, as a Christian, "ought to do the best *he* knows in every situation." Professor Bertocci adds: "After all, the relevance of the Christian ideal to his situation is the relevance *he* sees at that point." But suppose that Professor Bertocci tried to show just what guidance there is in Christian ethics for those who do as a matter of fact come to different judgments on technical and other neutral issues, he would be forced to distinguish, as I have tried to do, between the Christian elements that go into the making of decisions and those more precarious elements about which there is no Christian certainty. In my book it was my intention to put together the kind of guidance that churches can give to their members. It is extremely important that the authority of Christ not be given to all the answers that Christians come to when they struggle sincerely for light on the perplexing questions which they face every day.

I have no objection to the statement of what Professor Bertocci calls a "sixth strategy" in the italicized sentence which summarizes it. But immediately after, it seems to me that he gives the case away by arguing that there is a universally applicable "method of freedom" that is the real source of the Christian criteria for action. He says: "The Christian must not only protect freedom *as if it were one among other values,* but insist that freedom be used in the selection of all other means and ends." By freedom he means chiefly freedom "from arbitrary compul-

sion." This is an impossible simplification of the ethical problem. The Christian, moved by love, must be concerned about order and justice as well as about freedom. As Professor Heimann has pointed out in his book on *Freedom and Order,* order is the basic value without which there cannot be freedom and yet freedom is the higher value without which the human spirit cannot live. We can also say that no system of order can be tolerated for long that does not show itself favorable to justice. Today in all of the hard questions that Christians must face around the world, the real difficulty is to know how to relate order and justice and freedom. Each situation may call for a different emphasis. To cut through all of these puzzling issues and give absolute Christian sanction to a "method of freedom" without regard to the effect upon the other values that also have a true claim upon us is to make Christian ethics truly irrelevant where decisions are hardest.

I have before me an analysis published in *The Christian News Letter* of the alternatives that a Chinese Christian confronts. He may oppose the Communists by strengthening the Nationalist party including its reactionary wing. He may "steer a non-party or third party course" which may make it easier to maintain his personal integrity, but he would put himself into a minority which is almost powerless. He may co-operate with the Communists hoping that it may be possible to counteract the elements in Communism that he must reject as a Christian. As a matter of fact the most honest and sensitive Christians are found among those who choose each alternative. Certainly it would be difficult to say with full assurance how best to serve order and freedom and justice in that situation! It is important that no one of these groups become sure that its choice is the only Christian choice. It is equally important that all of them be kept under central Christian guidance within the Church. I have attempted in my presentation of the strategy that Professor Bertocci has criticized to outline the nature of that central Christian guidance.

PROFESSOR BERTOCCI'S REJOINDER

Professor Bennett's reply advances the discussion and serves to sharpen the issue before us. One further comment needs to be made for the sake of clarity.

The words "method of freedom" are my short-hand for what is included *within* the "sixth strategy," calling for "the fullest possible con-

sideration and discussion [of all ends and means] by the human beings involved in their realization." In other words, I regard loyalty to the best possible ends-and-means for the creative growth of Christian personality and absolute end, and the *method* of freedom I regard as the only means of realizing ends *satisfactory* to the Christian conscience. We may be unclear about the nature of other ends and means, of other parts of a Christian program, but the growth of personality at its most significant points so depends on the method of freedom that this method becomes a corollary of the full meaning of respect for personality. I do not regard this insistence on the absoluteness of freedom as an oversimplification *of defining strategy*. This point calls for more discussion than is here possible, but it would seem to me that the Christian, moved by love, must not simply, as Professor Bennett says, be concerned about order and justice as well as about freedom, but must be concerned about the development of that type of order and that type of justice which will include and not exclude the greatest degree of freedom. Any order without freedom cannot be for the Christian an adequate ideal, and any freedom without respect for the growth of personality cannot have his ungrudging support. I am not saying that historically the Christian may not have to suffer with less, and for less, but I am saying that this part of his total goal is fixed; for, as Professor Bennett says, freedom is "the higher value without which the human spirit cannot live." I can think of terrible situations in which, in order to guarantee future freedom the Christian may take his spiritual life in his hands and sanction its suspension; but of all the values which he is willing to forego for any period and in any degree, this is the one about which he would be most reluctant. Here, I realize, is a critical point in ethical theory, but it remains my present conviction that in our search for the most pervasive Christian programs (a search whose outcome I cannot foretell) we have in the method of freedom a fixed point of orientation in the further discovery and realization of values. This position, I now take it, is not only not emphasized enough by Professor Bennett, but is disavowed as such, and the method of freedom would rather take its place among "those more precarious elements about which there is no Christian certainty."

THE CONFLICT OF NATURE AND SPIRIT

ILLUSTRATED ESPECIALLY IN THOMAS MANN'S *MAGIC MOUNTAIN*

By FREDERIC H. YOUNG

THE conflict between "Nature" and "Spirit" in human life is richly exemplified in the works of Thomas Mann, and it is accordingly a rewarding task to bring under analysis the striking points of contact and divergence between Mann and Christianity with regard to human tragedy as it springs from this ordeal. Both Mann and Christian faith have penetrating insight into the spiritual dynamics of tragic experience, and it is important to discover the relation between the two. In pursuit of this theme, I will refer mainly to Mann's great novel, *The Magic Mountain,* though cognate ideas will be taken from his *Essays* as well. The purpose of this paper does not require book-reviewing or literary criticism as such; nevertheless, it will be helpful to have before us in brief what has aptly been distinguished as the "external" plot of *The Magic Mountain.*

I

Hans Castorp, the "hero" of the novel, is a young German engineer who, as the story opens, is en route from his home city of Hamburg to the spa at Davos-Platz high among the Swiss Alps in the Canton of the Grisons, where he intends to remain for three weeks for purposes of "health." Instead of staying for three weeks, his visit lasts for seven years! Within this seven-year period the main body of the novel moves. How Hans came to extend and re-extend his stay; his relations to other characters at the Berghof such as to Joachim, his soldier-cousin; to Settembrini, the witty Italian and intellectual champion of liberalism in all aspects; to Hofrat Behrens, versatile and unique director of the Berghof; to Dr. Krokowski, psychiatrist of the spa, whose weird personality befits his dubious researches into the occult and ambiguous phenomena on the margins of his profession; to Frau Chauchat, the enigmatic, sensuous Russian lady with whom Hans indulged in a

singularly strange love affair; to Mynheer Peeperkorn, the Dutch merchant from Java, truly a titanic personality; to Naptha, the ex-Jew and now Jesuit priest — complex, mordant, revolutionary, apocalyptic and violent in spirit; to Frau Stöhr, Ellen Brand the medium and many other secondary characters — all this is recounted with exhaustive detail and with one master motif throughout; that is, the impact of the numerous streams of influence in this little mountain-world of disease upon Hans who, though quite mediocre and unimportant as an individual, is representative of average humanity at large, beaten upon in its pilgrimage through history by forces it cannot comprehend any better than poor and confused Hans. This representative character is revealed explicitly in the second section of the second Chapter, thus:

> A man lives not only his personal life, as an individual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of his epoch and his contemporaries. He may regard the general, impersonal foundations of his existence as definitely settled and taken for granted, and be as far from assuming a critical attitude toward them as our good Hans Castorp really was; yet it is quite conceivable that he may none the less be vaguely conscious of the deficiences of his epoch and find them prejudicial to his own moral well-being. . . .

With this passage in mind and the foregoing sketch of the external plot we are prepared to pass to the "internal" plot of *The Magic Mountain*. This is much more important both in itself and in its bearing on our study; for Mann has succeeded in that most difficult of novelistic types wherein the characters really live as concrete individualities, and yet their vitality is associated throughout with their role as representative carriers of ideological currents and cultural complexes which are tremendous and intense in the extreme.

Constructed in epic dimensions and presented with an orchestral richness of symbolic meanings, *The Magic Mountain* is a prose symphony of theme and sub-themes, of symbolism and sub-symbolisms. It is undoubtedly the mightiest and most spiritually significant "culture novel" of this century. Critics of distinction have not hesitated to use superlatives regarding it. Slochower sees it as "the last great statement of the vacillating liberalism of the German middle class." Weigand understands it as the supreme *Bildungsroman* of the world's literature"; and one can hardly deny the designation after reading both the novel and his brilliant study of it.

Consider the vast range of symbolic meanings in this work. Without giving an exhaustive list of them by any means, surely the follow-

ing should be noted. It is a symbol of Thomas Mann's own spiritual history; a symbol of the twilight period of the German bourgeoisie as it had existed for a hundred years prior to 1914; a symbol of the profound conflict between eighteenth-century Enlightenment and nineteenth-century Romanticism; a symbol of Germany as the "middle land" tragically situated geographically and spiritually between the irrational-sensuous East as incarnated in Russia, and the rational-critical West as embodied in France and Italy; a symbol of the German spirit's agonizing effort to "synthesize" reverence for life with aggressive exploitation of it, responsibility with mad adventurousness, health with disease, love of life with love of death, will-to-power with will-to-beauty and peace; and finally, it is an universal, metaphysical symbol of the polarity that runs the entire gamut between Nature and Spirit on every level of human existence, creating an ambiguity of experience that gives rise to the tragedy inherent in man's bifocal life.

Within the limited scope of this paper, it is now my specific task to isolate the aspect of human tragedy involved in the conflict of Nature and Spirit as expressed in this novel and in a few of Mann's essays, and interpret the same in connection with the Christian faith. Preliminary to this treatment should be the realization that, with the Faustean type of thought which Mann inherited from Goethe, there are blended contributory insights from Novalis, Herder, Schelling, Heine, Schiller Dostoevski, Nietzsche, Wagner, and Freud. It would not be too difficult to uncover the deposit of these figures in Mann's philosophy, existing as they do like so many determinate strata in a geological formation. Although such a tracing is irrelevant to the immediate subject, it should be borne in mind that all Mann's literary pieces are a fusion of the main streams of German cultural thought from Goethe until World War I. In this fact resides the power of Mann's works as a comprehensive and sensitive image of Germany's spiritual Odyssey for the past century and a half.

The topics to be further considered in this study are: (1) tragedy in the aspect of disease; (2) tragedy as sin; and (3) reflections on the foregoing as related to Christian thought.

II

Hans Castorp is the central character in a world of sickness and disease. Mann, however, like Dostoevski, is fascinated not only by the physical aspects, but by the spiritual implications of disease and de-

cadence. In the obscure depths of his being Hans makes a compact with the realm of disease, as Faust had made a pact through Mephisto with life. But there is a profound difference in method as well as in motive in the two stories; for not only does Hans choose to linger on in the world of disease whereas Faust chose life, but Hans arrives at his decision semi-consciously, with groping confusion, while Faust arrived at his choice with brilliant self-consciousness of what he was doing. This reversal both in choice and method of choice is symbolic of the decadence of the German middle class since Goethe.

Hans' pact with the abnormal atmosphere of Davos Spa is spiritually and practically a metaphysical, that is, an ultimate decision in his life. Its roots reach back into the whole past of his family for several generations, while for him, individually and specifically, it will mean a seven years' residence at the Swiss spa; which, most important of all, will give him, as he dimly understands and craves, an opportunity for an unconventional, even illicit, exploration of thought, love, disease, and death. Such an exploration would have been impossible for him even to imagine in the "Flatlands" below, with its everlasting watchwords of "Duty," "Service," and "Work." In short he is to become an amateur in the most dangerous art known to man — the are of transmuting "life" into "experience," *leben* into *erleben*. The odor of Faust clings about all this, but, as we have noted, in reverse. Faust left his study for "life"; Hans leaves "life" for this mountain retreat. Faust is brilliant and clear in his venture; Hans is mediocre and ambiguous.

In reality Hans is a very ambiguous character, though I see no ambiguity in Mann's delineation of him. Obviously Hans is no representative of Mann. The only point in common seems to be that Mann passed through a groping period in his own spiritual history like Hans; but Hans never crystallized, whereas Mann grew to create a Hans. No man who remained in confusion could have created a confused character like Hans! It is a sound apprehension to see in Hans a concentrated symbol of German middle-classdom just prior to 1914 — and for this very reason he is mediocre. He lacks the "high Promethean mood" of Faust and so, in his very mediocrity he is the all the more appropriate image of German deterioration since Goethe.

As the novel proceeds, Mann tries to protect his hero from too destructive an absorption with the romantic involutions of disease and the irresponsibility incident to detachment from "real" life, by the person and influence of Settembrini, the Italian humanist and apostle

of "Enlightenment." Against apocalyptic violence of spirit of Naptha the Jesuit, Hans finds a helpful foil in Settembrini's calm and yet fiery confidence in the power of human reason. The Italian humanist is likewise a foil to Peeperkorn, the massive incarnation of extreme Dionysian romanticism. In sum, Settembrini represents the "Apollonian" stress on reason; Peeperkorn, the romantic's pact with feeling and Faustean ego; Naptha, though far too complex to be captured in any one phrase, certainly stands at least for an unstable blend of Roman Catholic imperialism with revolutionary socialism; while Hans — in this, how German! — attempts to synthesize health and disease, life and death, reason and feeling, or, to put the latter in other words, Apollo and Dionysus, Enlightenment and Romanticism.

In the working out of the destinies of these four characters, who represent the major cultural complexes and conflicts of Europe even to our own day, lies the evidence that the novel deserves place among the masterworks of tragedy in the literature of the Western world. Settembrini, for all his dream of world-embracing humanism and democracy, is vague and cannot tell Hans any definite direction to follow in trying to realize democracy; Naptha, in a duel with Settembrini, perversely shoots himself instead of shooting his adversary; Peeperkorn slips out in the night to finish life at his own hands; Joachim, gentle, disciplined soldier and cousin to Hans, commits virtual suicide through his insistence on returning to the Army when he knows full well that it will aggravate his illness to an end in early death; and Hans' own end, for all its honest effort to attain a balance between his more extreme colleagues, is in a sense the most tragic of all, for he lands in utter futility. He leaves the Berghof to fight for the Fatherland in 1914, believing that he is fighting for *Kultur*. The last we see of him he is singing *Der Lindenbaum* while killing people in Flanders, — all the while actually not knowing why and for what he is fighting. Nietzschean will-to-power, with its blend of the cults of beauty and cruelty, here turns upon itself and the author himself speaks of it as though he were parting with a dear friend. Mann wrote, in his later period, concerning *The Magic Mountain:*

> It is a book of the philosophic renunciation of much that I once loved, of many a dangerous sympathy, enchantment, and seduction to which the soul of Europe has been and is still prone. . . . It is a book of leave-taking and pedagogical self-discipline.

A confession which reveals an element of tragedy in Mann's own inner life!

III

As we come now to consider sin as a contributive factor to human tragedy, it is difficult to determine whether Mann's theory of sin is more predominantly optimistic or pessimistic; for it figures both as a constructive conception and as a tragic dilemma. However the effects of man's Promethean-Faustian temper of spirit have so persistently and often led to tragedy, as Mann himself recognizes, that one seems justified on the whole to discourse upon it under the aspect of tragedy.

In his *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man,* Thomas Mann writes:

> There is sin in the meaning of the Church and sin in the meaning of humanism, humanity, science, and the emancipation of man. In any case sin is doubt; an inclination towards the forbidden, an impulse to go adventuring, to lose oneself, to yield oneself . . . it is what tempts and seduces . . . Only philistines will hasten to call this impulse immoral; that it is sinful, nobody would deny.

What is Mann telling us in this compact and teasing passage? For an adequate comprehension of this thought it will prove clarifying if we recollect Henry James, Sr., with his terse summary of the varying kinds — not merely the degrees — of evil. As James phrases it (in substance) we *suffer* physical evil; we COMMIT moral evil; we ARE spiritual evil. (Cited in Grattan, *The Three Jameses: A Family of Minds,* Longmans, Green & Co. 1932, p. 77.) Without venturing on an interpretation of James himself, it suffices our purpose that his concept of the distinction between moral and spiritual evil is particularly pertinent to Mann at this point. Mann has shown the tension between the moral and spiritual orders in the quotation at issue. The relation between the two orders contains a tremendous paradox. Briefly stated, the paradox is this: what is spiritually evil — the "inclination toward the forbidden," the "impulse to go adventuring" — is often morally noble in man; while morality as the accepted traditional and conventional mode of human actions is often spiritually evil. Moral good may lead to spiritual evil; spiritual evil may lead to moral good. Closely related as the two are, their relation is one of dialectical tension; they are never, even at best, identical. The New Testament and the history of antinomianism alike bear witness to the depth of this tormenting paradox. As a result, "there is sin in the meaning of the Church and sin in the meaning of humanism. . . ." Humanistically considered it is morally ennobling for man to seek knowledge and experience beyond his limitations as given at any specified time or epoch; theologi-

cally it is spiritually evil for man to want to become so godlike that he becomes confused over his status as, after all, a creature's. It is one of the most delicate ironies and tragedies of all, that when man, however mistakenly, strives to become a god within himself he is spiritually in the greatest danger! That man's greatest sin is possible when he is striving in what he imagines to be a godward direction — surely, this is the deepest of all mysteries of the spirit of man. It has been part of the Church's mission to remind man of his creaturehood, and to show that the falsest of all gods is the illusion that man, individually or collectively, himself may become god or gods — and on his own initiative. And yet the element of tension is present even in the first chapter of Genesis, where man is held to strict subordination to God on the one side, and yet described as destined to be lord of creation on the other. The danger is never far away!

It is apparent that Mann understands the spiritual origin of sin in terms of the biblical Myth of the Fall. In that myth, man is depicted as risking his entire destiny because of his will-to-know, to investigate the forbidden, to explore the unexperienced, to master and appropriate the surrounding creation to his own ego. As opposed to God's will, it was sin; but for man himself, to aspire for lordship was an ethical attitude; and ever since Adam, man's yearning to be himself the measure of all things has been his chief glory. This has forged a great link of continuity between pre- and post-Adamic man; for after all, man *before* the "Fall," had the passion in Adam to know and the passion itself is therefore not a consequence *of* the Fall. Accordingly, sin as the spiritual passion for godhood by transcending barrier after barrier of human limitations, becomes the very backbone of "morality" for Adamic-Promethean-Faustian man. From the angle of man's self-assertion and self-reliance, this is the one long, identical tradition of spiritual evil and moral greatness.

What are we to think of this doctrine of man's spiritual dilemma and tragedy as a compound of spiritual sin and ethical greatness? What position should Christians take toward a teaching which would seem to "plunge us into sin, to lose oneself, even to abandon oneself to perdition rather than follow the straight and narrow path of certified virtue," as Mann himself puts it? As a humanist, Mann has attempted to resolve the dilemma by a synthesis of Promethean will-to-power with pantheistic union to the World All-soul -- a solution which ought to have consideration in its own context. He has made a notable

effort to reconcile in a living, vital union in the human spirit the spiritual principle of self-determination with that of obedience.

The persistence of this paradox in the world's literature is testimony to the depth and continuity of this profound battle in man's spirit. The author of *Job* solves this spiritual antinomy by administering a rebuke to Job for trying to take the measure of the justice, or injustice, of God, since that would imply an equality with God if not superiority! God remains veiled at the end of *Job* as simply I AM THAT I AM: he remains veiled centuries later in Pascal's *Pensées* as the *Deus absconditus,* or as *The Invisible King* in H. G. Wells.

Is there any solution for this spiritual dilemma? As for Humanism — well, Mann has done his humanistic best and he deserves high credit for forcing his readers to a fresh consideration of the antinomy, irony, and tragedy in the conflict between the Deific and Faustic images in man's being. He compels us to face the fact that in science, art, philosophy and in religion itself, man *is* taking the measure of all things that he uses, believes in, enjoys, or worships; and this ego-predicament involves man's deepest spiritual dangers. On the one hand, we all profit by the labors of innovating spirits who again and again have dared to overstep the "forbidden" in thought, word, and deed. On the other hand, this problem of spiritual adjustment between God's will and man's is something, in all honesty, that can never be perfectly solved in this existence. Certainly it will never be solved at all by armchair dialectics because the spiritual limits between God's purpose and man's aspirations, in the delicate realm of knowledge and amid the vast dynamics of cultural processes, have never been *exactly* revealed by God. In the nature of the case they can never be *exactly* defined by man because of the finitude of creaturehood with which he is entangled. So the drama must go on — who is man, that he should say "must"? — with man taking the perilous risks of balancing his Christian faith with advancing knowledge and existential decisions, accompanied all the while by a haunting "metaphysical uneasiness," as Richard Kroner expresses it. Must we make an absolute choice, assuming that to be possible, between Adam-Prometheus-Faust and Christ? Such a question brings us to the Christian position itself.

It seems to me, along with my most sincere yet subjective Christian conviction, that, in a "synthesis" of Humanism and Christian orthodoxy, we do find a solution which is philosophically acceptable. Once we accept in faith and insight the assumption by God's initiative of the

Deus-homo in Christ, it offers us spiritual protection against the illusion of man's rise toward divinity as Divinity itself, and at the same time guarantees all the freedom — that complex, ambiguous concept! — and responsibility we need for the advancement and projection of man's spiritual urge to lordship. But in spiritual logic, *homo-deus* can never displace *Deus-homo.*

That man needs spiritual protection against the evils that his Faustian spirit have brought upon him, is obvious enough from any reading of our contemporary agony. Einstein's formula $E = mc^2$ (with E representing energy in ergs; m, mass in grams; and c, the speed of light in centimeters per second), has been interpreted by Dean Gauss of Princeton University to mean that "every pound of any kind of matter contains as much energy as is given off by the explosion of fourteen million tons of TNT." Faced with the real possibility of man's destruction of himself and even of his planet, science and Humanism have taken over apocalyptic prophecy in our age and have produced a lurid eschatology of their own. This is contemporary evidence of the social and spiritual peril to man on his way to knowledge; evidence enough to turn Faust and all strict Humanists pale!

Though it is impossible here to amplify further, the study of Mann poses such fundamental issues as that of the artist-genius as *homo Dei;* the relations between art and religion in the philosophical sense; the possibility of a synthesis of art and religion as ways to God, or, in theological terms, a *rapprochement* between Humanism and Christian Orthodoxy in its classical and neo-orthodox forms. Another theme begging for consideration is the relation between Mann's general methodology and philosophy, as implied in his major writings, and Christian thought.

As a concluding reflection it would seem apropos to revert to *The Magic Mountain* in its role of a sustained allegory of man's spiritual travail in Western history. Is not Germany's struggle, artistically individuated in Hans Castrop, a pregnant symbol of the perennial struggle implicit in all the past and future of man's historic destiny? Germany's spiritual ordeal from Goethe until this moment should teach other nations much if they have eyes to see and ears to hear. This viewpoint I maintained substantially in a review of Viereck's *Metapolitics: from the Romantics to Hitler* for the *New York Times Book Review* soon after our entrance into World War II. Faustian man of human spirit and human initiative on the one side, and Christian man of God's

Spirit and Divine initiative on the other side need to understand each other as never before. Man's historical destiny, and for Christians his eternal destiny also, lies, not merely in the issue of Caesar versus Christ — the problem of authority, — but even more profoundly in that of Faust versus Christ — the problem of spirit.

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THE SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE CHURCH IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By FRANTIŠEK BEDNÁŘ

SINCE the defeat of Germany in 1945, the face of Europe is entirely changed. A group of small nations in Central Europe, after regaining political independence, has come into the so-called "zone of Russian influence." This new alignment is creating great interest in the world. What reasons lie behind it?

The political alliance of Central Europe and some states in the Balkans with U.S.S.R. is a necessity dictated by their geographical situation; it also has some historical justification, as a continuation of the former policy of the respective nations. The spirit of German Nazism is not dead, and the Eastern nations must reckon on the possibility of a new attack. As a Slavonic nation, Russia had a great influence on the Balkans before the Soviet regime. Seventy years ago the Balkan Slavonic peoples were freed from Turkey by Russia. The new co-operation means therefore a return to the old policy, or its development.

But besides these changes in the political structure of Central Europe, there are other changes of even deeper importance. Europe is witnessing the dissolution of many principles which have been of great value but which have proved inadequate to provide a satisfying life for all citizens. As regards social, economic and spiritual conditions, one can speak of a European labyrinth, the way out from which is not easily to be found. Material needs and general improverishment being felt most painfully, one has begun to seek for new systems of economics, industry and social life. And at this kind of work U.S.S.R., because of her own undeniable progress, has a great advantage in influencing the reconstruction plans of many countries. This fact has brought them to an even closer co-operation with their new ally since the last war.

But U.S.S.R. is not the old Russian Empire of the Czars. It is a Communist state, and facing its dynamism one has to have in mind the implications. In the tension between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. one sees a conflict rather between ideologies than between empires. Communism seems to affect the very fundamentals of the life of nations, and the traditional rights and freedoms of Christian civilization which are of

essential importance for every human being. One has to ask, therefore, whether and how far political co-operation with U.S.S.R. influences or allows any spiritual independence to the so-called "satellite" states of Central Europe. How does the Soviet treat the countries which have Western civilization and traditions?

I

It is two years since the defeat of Germany, a period long enough to enable a clear judgement. The waves of revolutionary movement of 1945 are going down and after them one experiences struggles in solving particular problems of economics, social and cultural life, the tasks of reconstruction of the nations. One of the fundamental principles of human freedom is liberty of religion. On the one hand, Russia has officially a Communist ideology, and Marxism is opposed to the Christian faith. On the other hand, there is a reconciliation of state and church in U.S.S.R. What is the position of the Christian Churches in the zones of Russian influence?

This question concerns Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. The religious structure of these countries differs. Poland is a traditionally Roman Catholic nation. Czechoslovakia, though having a Roman Catholic majority, has been stigmatized as a heretic country: John Hus is recognized, even by Roman Catholics, as one of the greatest personalities of their history; and a strong tradition of the Czech Reformation, chiefly that of the Unitas Fratrum, has influenced the spiritual life of the nation, even under the Roman Catholic surface. Hungary has a great and influential Protestant (Presbyterian and Lutheran) minority, the present President of the Republic and the Prime Minister belonging to the Presbyterian Church. The Balkan States represent different autonomous sections of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The influence of U.S.S.R. may be recognized more or less in all these states. It is evident above all in international policy. But the social and economic structure of these nations has also been changed remarkably, of course not always and not only by the example of Russian Communist ideals. But as regards the Churches, the situation is far from uniform. In Hungary, relations of church and state have not changed very much, but in Yugoslavia, a separation of church and state has been effected — a change of historic importance. In Czechoslovakia, relationships have been restored to those existing before Munich 1938.

The differing policies towards the church of states within the zone of Russian influence show that these are not dictated by the ideology of U.S.S.R.: if that were so, the relations would be the same in all the countries. The attitude of the Communist parties to the churches varies remarkably. U.S.S.R. evidently does not give any advice to the Communists as to how the question should be solved. What factors influence the decision? One has to consider the attitude of the churches in decisive hours of their nation's history, and their attitude to the spiritual, social and political problems of the country, in order to understand why certain changes happen. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the church was identified with the dynasty which protected refugees from Russia after 1917 and which had no good relations with the Soviets before 1939. A separation of church and state thus became one of the consequences of the political revolution.

II

After the liberation, Czechoslovakia also had to decide about the relations of church and state. It was a matter of high importance for both of them.

During the Occupation, when the German authorities were interfering with the autonomy of the Churches, Protestants had been preparing their members for a separation of church and state: they came to a full understanding of the matter. Financial contributions were increased in such a way that there was a hope that the church would be able to meet her needs and to exist without state support. When the Republic was restored, the situation was changed. No separation of church and state, but their peaceful co-operation, was declared to be a necessity of the whole historical evolution of the nation and of the present situation. What has led the government and the nation to this policy?

First of all, there has been no interference of U.S.S.R. in this problem, the solution of which has been left entirely in the hands of the Republic. Thanks to the wise and far-seeing policy of President Beneš, very good relations with U.S.S.R. existed before Munich, and U.S.S.R. has promised solemnly to respect the freedom of Czechoslovakia as regards internal policy. Responding to the will of the nation, the new Republic of Czechoslovakia represents a democracy, with full emphasis on human freedoms, including that of religion.

The people of Czechoslovakia have been influenced by the humani-

tarian philosophy of T. G. Masaryk, one of the greatest Christians of these last years, whose words: "Not Caesar but Jesus is the meaning of our history," are often quoted. It is understood that the churches must enjoy their unrestricted freedom because of their important mission to put principles of absolute value before the nation and state. Their services to the nation during the war have not been forgotten. They did not co-operate with the Germans, nor did they, though persecuted for their attitude, join any anti-Russian propaganda. Since the liberation of the country, this fact has been acknowledged also by the Communist party; all political parties, including the Communists (who represent about 40 percent of the population), resolved to preserve all the traditional rights of the churches. Many Communists belong to the church: about 90 percent of the population are enrolled in the registers of different denominations, and since 1945 there has been no significant change as regards the number of church members.

What is the essential feature of the independence of a church? It is the liberty of proclaiming and obeying the absoluteness of God's law under all conditions. The most important factor is therefore not a freedom granted by law, though one cannot deny the importance of this. Even under satisfactory legal conditions, the problem remains whether the churches may keep their spiritual independence of other ideologies and of the state. It means more than freedom of worship, organization and instruction: its first condition is freedom of self-expression in the public life and the ability to influence this by leadership and by criticism of public defects, dangerous trends, actions and currents of thought, from the Christian point of view, freedom to present principles of absolute value. This fundamental right of the churches can be restricted not only by a negative attitude of the state towards the church and by direct oppression of Christian activity and witness, but also by a positive, friendly relation of the state with the church, in case the church is being favored by the state in order to keep it silent when one should hear its words of warning or of clear spiritual leadership. This right of self-expression has been fully granted to all denominations in Czechoslovakia.

III

The legal situation of the religious organizations is as follows. In Czechoslovakia there is no established church. The denominations are divided into two groups, one of them representing the churches

which are recognized as churches by the state, the other, including the so-called Free Churches. The state-recognized churches enjoy special privileges and special support from the Republic: their records of births, marriages and deaths have public validity, their children receive religious instruction in the state schools and some regular financial support is given to them. As regards creed, organization, autonomy and protection of their divine services, all churches, the free churches as well as those which are recognized by the state, enjoy the same freedom. What about their spiritual independence?

Since 1945, great changes have taken place in the Republic. The Germans had to leave the country and the problem arose by what method this should be done. Big industry, banks and commerce had to be nationalized and the nation had to face the effects of this on its economy and on labor morale. The new Republic has a strong social concern, and the question was as to what principles should predominate. The reconstruction of the state requires gigantic efforts which cannot be achieved without clear spiritual guidance. All classes of the people have been alike concerned about needs of a material character and have shared the desire to overtake these needs. The nation stood at the crossroads between the need of daily bread and of security in material things and the vision of higher aims. The plans for reconstruction were radical. But even the Communists were asking themselves whether one can achieve high aims by mere organization, without a spiritual foundation. Everyone was looking for the forces which might bring the nation to a new spiritual life and to a rebirth of values which seemed to be lost, — and the churches could not be left out of this consideration.

When freedom was restored to the churches, there was therefore more than a desire to restore old, pre-Munich rights, orders and privileges; one felt the necessity of recognizing significant factors in the public life which would represent principles of absolute validity. The recent occupation of the country by Germans and the challenge of Nazi ideology have given the nation grave warning that those principles of life on which the existence of the nation rested and which ought to predominate, had been shaken. The Germans did not recognize the absoluteness of truth, justice, freedom, humanity, or any rights. Nationalism, brutality, supermen and hate were the dominant forces of their system. After the liberation, the nation could not forget that it was the churches which had kept all those principles which were able

to save the people from dissolution during the occupation. And it was evident that their mission was not ended with the regaining of the freedom of the nation. President Beneš very often calls the attention of the citizens to the necessity for spiritual rebirth and for return to the "absoluteness." A good many other leaders of the nation, belonging politically to the extreme left as well as to the right, declare that it must be the task of the churches to help the nation to recover spiritually. And, since any work of the Christian Church must be based on an entire freedom, this freedom has become a matter of fact, a necessity about which there has been no dispute.

IV

The experience of the churches during these last two years is of great historical importance. Whereas there were great changes in the sphere of economics and social life, and all factors were closely scrutinized to see whether and how far they might be of use in the new conditions, to see whether they might serve the new ideals and whether their ideology did not contradict the aims of the new Republic, there has not been the least attempt at such examination as regards the churches, nor has there been any question of interfering with their structure, creed and life. Not one person of political authority or influence has dared to approach the churches with instructions or advice as to what they should do and where are the limits of their activity, what and how they should preach or teach or how they should behave — though this happened very often during the German occupation. The churches have full, unrestricted liberty to express their own views about all matters and the state does not interfere with their attitude. They have full autonomy, are allowed to form new, interdenominational organizations: there is a Council of Churches in Czechoslovakia. Their press, which was stopped by the Germans, has been restored. They are unhindered in their international relations, irrespective of the nationality of their friends and visitors, and there is not the least hindrance to inviting visits from fellow-believers from any country of the world, though one knows that the Protestants have their friends chiefly in the Anglo-Saxon nations. Students of divinity are allowed to attend Western universities and very often get some support from the government, to cover a good part of their expenses. The churches are allowed to receive any Christian or other publication from any foreign

country. The theological seminaries are maintained by the state and the authorities do not ask to what school of theology the professors belong, or about their political views.

In 1947 scores of pastors, divinity students and members of Christian youth organizations went from Czechoslovakia to Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and England in order to attend conferences of the churches and religious organizations. They all received passports, although due to the financial situation of the country, the total number must be restricted. Not one of the travellers or visitors received any advice as to how he should speak or what ideology he should represent. The government is not afraid that such visits may import any "reactionary" ideas into the Republic.

This fact of an unrestricted and general freedom has remarkable results. The churches have found that the political alliance of Czechoslovakia with the U.S.S.R. does not affect or endanger their life or liberties. There is no reason on the basis of their experience, to deny that this kind of political co-operation with the Soviets has proved reconcilable with their own interests and with the principles for which they stand and which they were able to defend during the German occupation.

V

A quite different question is that of the Marxist ideology. Does the alliance with Russia not mean an acceptance of this? And do the churches not make some compromise in this respect?

It is no secret that the whole nation of Czechoslovakia stands loyally and sincerely for the political alliance with U.S.S.R. But, on the other hand, it is no secret that the majority of the nation does not agree with Marxism and that it does not accept it. One must make a very clear distinction between these two factors. Many citizens of Czechoslovakia go still further. They agree with the economic measures and aims of Communism; their conception of democracy is of a synthesis of the human rights and freedoms of the West and the social and economic program of the East. And yet, as regards the Communist ideology, they do not accept Marxism.

The daily press reflects this situation. The economic measures of the government are in many ways radical, but they have the approval of the majority of the nation. As regards the Communist party, there is a good deal of criticism. And at the same time their opponents declare

sincerely that they stand wholeheartedly for the political alliance with Russia.

In general, the Communist party accepts this situation. One often hears clear statements by its leader (who is at the same time Prime Minister) that Czechoslovakia will remain a democratic and independent country. Even the Communists cannot free themselves of the strong democratic traditions of their country. There is therefore, as regards the churches, no reason for complaint against the attitude of the Communist party. It was even said, at a conference of the Communists in 1945, that the party does not object if some members regard the ultimate aims of Communism as fruits of Christian love and brotherhood, and that the struggle with the church (*Kulturkampf*) belongs to the past. There are no attacks on the churches in the "red" press, such as were common before Munich, and there is no argument about the principles of the Christian faith. And yet one feels that, as regards some individual Communists, the old conflict of the two ideologies has not been forgotten. This is true chiefly of the intellectual "super-Marxists," who remain "orthodox." Their attitude is not one of open conflict with the Church, but they try to avoid any mention of God or Jesus Christ. What has the church to do under such conditions?

One illustration may serve to suggest the solution of the problem. One of the most delightful books for children is *The Fireflies,* by Pastor Jan Karafiat, a Presbyterian minister. This story, of a definitely Christian character marked by the spirit of obedience to God and of conscience of sin, has passed through seventy-four Czech editions and has been translated into fourteen languages. A Russian translation was published in 1947, by a University professor, a convinced Communist. The foreword was written by a Communist Minister of State; it was a warm tribute to the book, to its author and also to the Czech Brethren Church, which every member of the Church could accept only with gratitude and satisfaction. But the translator transgressed the usual limits of such work: he avoided all allusions to God, to prayer and preaching and, instead, he put in sentences voicing general moral principles. The Christian churches were more than concerned at this kind of "translation" of a religious book. The present writer therefore sent a review to a weekly of secular character and proved by several quotations that the translation obscured the spirit of the book. The result was that, some days after the review was published, the further circulation of the Russian translation was stopped by order of the

Minister of Public Education. The Communist papers did not oppose this decision and did not comment on the matter: they simply accepted the view that this kind of translation does not correspond with the traditions and laws of the nation. This case shows that the political party cannot be held responsible for every action of its members.

VI

Up to now, religious instruction is given in the schools and those who teach it are paid by the state. The new school reform which is under discussion does not reduce the hours of religious instruction but proposes even to extend them, up to the highest pre-University classes. The Minister of Public Education said recently in Parliament: "It must not happen that our children should be informed of Caesar but ignorant of Jesus!" — and his statement was not contradicted by a single member of the House. The new attitude found expression last year, in a Moravian town where the corner-stone of an Orthodox Church was being laid. The first official representative to speak words of goodwill was the representative of the Communist party.

An analysis of the reasons for the present situation in Czechoslovakia would transgress the limits of this article. It is a fact that the U.S.S.R. respects the old spiritual traditions and the freedom of churches in Czechoslovakia and does not interfere in the least in this sphere of life. Czechoslovakia has remained a democratic country which protects religious freedom. But there is something more than official respect in the relations with Russia. The Czechoslovaks have in mind not only the necessity for their political alliance with this great power, but also the old traditions of Russia. Russia is not only the Russia of Bucharin and the Revolution, which became inevitable to that nation, but also of Chomjakov, Dostoevski, and Tolstoy, of a great and distinctive Christian culture and of the Russian Church, — a Church with an undogmatic spirit not known to other Christian bodies, a Church of saints and martyrs and of great fellowship, of unity unparalleled in other Christian bodies, which is now arising to new life.

VII

There remains one question: Is there any hope that this spiritual independence of the churches from the state will endure, or is there any danger that freedom may be restricted? Both of them — the hope as well as the danger — exist.

If political tension between West and East gives place to a mutual, peaceful understanding of the Great Powers, there is the greatest probability — speaking from the human point of view — that the liberty of the churches and their independence will not only continue but may become one of the most blessed contributions to the upbuilding of the Czechoslovak Republic in the sphere of moral and spiritual life. In this case, we do not need to fear the difference of ideologies and may cherish faith in the final victory of Christian ideals, a faith which every believing Christian must have. The churches will be able to fulfill the mission given to them in a time of materialism and of all the dangers resulting from it, and there is the greatest hope that the Czechoslovak nation will be able to take full responsibility for granting and safeguarding those liberties essential to the spread and the realization of Christian principles. It is the duty of all churches over the world to help in destroying mutual distrust and lack of information: this is necessary for a peaceful solution of the political problems of the world.

But on the other hand, if international tensions should continue, increase, or even lead to a new conflict, the separation of nations may endanger the whole position of the churches, and create new conditions for which neither the churches nor Czechoslovakia, nor any other small nation, could be held responsible. At a time of international tension or conflict, everything becomes a matter of political importance and judgement: today the freedom of the press and of economic activity and tomorrow religious freedom could be in jeopardy. But this could happen not only in Czechoslovakia, but to churches all over the world.

This eventuality must all those keep in mind who are able to influence public opinion and even world policy. Christian public opinion could become a gigantic power among all nations. Today it seems that the spirit of war is reappearing. It is easy to evoke it, but it is often beyond human power to draw back when the nations have to decide for peace or bloodshed. These last years should have taught us that lesson.

QUEST FOR A WORD

By WILLIAM BERTRAND STEVENS

FROM time to time the *Federal Council Bulletin* and other periodicals have raised the question of the need of a word to describe the family of churches represented by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America or the group that will ultimately constitute the membership of the World Council of Churches.

To the general public, unversed in distinctions, "Protestant" is still a convenient blanket word. There are those within the membership of many of the churches themselves who would not only prefer it as a descriptive term, but would rally to it as to a battle cry. But in ecumenical circles, it is giving way to the awkward, negative phrase "non-Roman." No one likes "non-Roman," and yet it is the only term that seems to serve.

The designation "Protestant" is being discarded for at least three reasons. Perhaps the first in time is the insistence of many Anglicans that they do not wish to be lumped together in a "Protestant" alignment. In the United States, Episcopalians who are the only remaining major group to carry the word Protestant in their official title, are exceedingly sensitive about being considered so. Many "Protestant Episcopalians" object to being called Protestant except as the word may be interpreted as non-Roman. They are not Protestants, they contend, as Baptists or Congregationalists, for example, are Protestants. There are many within the Episcopal Church who would disagree with them and who would accept the term "Protestant" without objection or rancor. But it is probably true that there are large numbers of Anglicans throughout the Anglican Communion, even among those who disclaim the title "Anglo Catholic" or "Catholic," who object to being classified as "Protestant." One finds it in local Church Federations even, and many an inter-church project has been obliged to avoid any suggestion of a "Protestant" combination in order to secure the co-operation and good will of the local Episcopal church. Whether the consideration given Anglicans in this respect has brought the expected co-operation is often doubtful. In many cases it has been wasted effort.

The second reason for the use of non-Roman rather than Protestant is the obvious fact that in the Federal Council and in the World Coun-

cil of Churches there are the ancient Churches of the East, which are not Protestant in any accepted definition of the term. The Orthodox Churches and the autocephalous Eastern Churches will, we hope, play an increasing role in the ecumenical negotiations of the future, and accuracy and courtesy suggest the avoidance of "Protestant."

The third reason why a new word seems desirable is that there is an increasing dissatisfaction with the word Protestant among those who, in their own church, have always used it with pride. They may still treasure it as a description of their own ecclesiastical pattern, but they are dubious of its value in federated and consultative grouping of churches. All this seems to point to the need of a new word or phrase for the ecumenical churches.

Some would say that we are straining at a gnat. We should take the word "Protestant," re-examine it, and give it a new content. The meaning of words, they say, is determined by usage more than by mere logomachy and "Protestant" is not a negative word, anyway. It has historic associations, vigor, and focus that should be preserved. It is elastic and can be accepted by those who think of it as non-Roman, as well as by those to whom it suggests a definite tradition and a complete theology.

The obvious objections to this are that you cannot change the meaning of a word at will, and if you could get a general agreement as to its use, you would be approaching the whole question of unity with what historically some consider a "fighting word." Furthermore, the Orthodox Churches of the East would be extremely hesitant about accepting a re-interpretation of a word which has carried so definite a connotation for many centuries of Christian history. And if our concept of unity is broad enough to include ultimately the Roman Church, Protestant is definitely out as an ecumenical term.

The word we seek must be descriptive of the character of the group as a whole. It must be acceptable to each group as an appropriate (though not necessarily complete) designation of itself. It must be accepted by each group as not inappropriate for all the others.

One turns naturally to the traditional "notes" of the church — *One, Holy, Catholic,* and *Apostolic.* Oneness or unity is a quality we can hardly claim for a group of separated co-operating churches. To call us "United Churches" would cause confusion to say the least. Unity and union are used in too many different ways. "Holy" is open to the same objection. Like unity it suggests an ideal to the average man

rather than a condition. "Holiness," too, has become in many parts of the country a sectarian label.

There is the possibility of calling all churches of the ecumenical group the "Holy Catholic Church." On devoutly hopes that that will be the designation of the united fellowship; but it would be presumptuous to claim it now, and it is probably open to practical objections as is "Catholic" by itself.

"Apostolic" has real merit. There may be queries as to how far individual members of the ecumenical fellowship possess the quality of apostolicity. Whatever else may be said of us, we all continue in one way or another in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers. Whether the Orthodox and other Eastern Churches would grant that Protestants have the same measure of apostolicity that they themselves possess, would be hard to predict. But "the Apostolic Churches" as a generic classification has a ring to it that will commend it to some even though it is not what is vulgarly called a "natural."

There are many who would be willing to agree on the old term "Evangelical." Its obvious disadvantage is that it is now associated with groups that have no interest in the ecumenical movement as such. Also in Anglican circles it has been almost a synonym for Protestant. "Catholic" and "Evangelical" are traditionally opposite poles in churchmanship. Perhaps the combination of "Evangelical Catholics" will work. It is said that some members of the World Council of Churches are already describing themselves as such. This again is a forcing of language and the term will not meet the test of general acceptability within the group.

It may be that we are working too hard to resurrect or create a word. Why not accept "Ecumenical" or perhaps "Ecumenic" as the word we need? The only objection to it is that it is difficult to say. That is only a matter of familiarity. Have we forgotten that "Methodist Episcopal" was once used as a sobriety test? The term "Ecumenical" or "Ecumenic" has these advantages: (1) It has no "entangling alliances" that will embarrass any group — Catholic or Protestant. (2) It expresses the ideals and purposes of the groups that are thinking together. (3) Since the Roman Catholic Church is not in the ecumenical movement, the word will serve adequately as the equivalent of "non-Roman." (4) It can be cheerfully abandoned when Pentecostal wisdom reveals to us the perfect word.

AN INTERVIEW WITH JACQUES MARITAIN

By DAVID WESLEY SOPER

IT had not been easy for M. Maritain to arrange to see me, for his mornings were devoted to his own research and writing, out of which have come his very great contributions to Christian Humanism, and his evenings to crowded appointments. The calls upon a French Ambassador to the Vatican are numerous. But, with the assistance of his gracious personal secretary, Mlle. Sylvain, the hour of our interview was set for four-fifteen.

A special room was designated for our conversation at Rome's old-world Palazzo Taverna, and an obsequious butler seated me in comfort beside a great vase of flowers. A moment later His Excellency, M. Jacques Maritain, was at my side, and with the kindliest grace considered and answered my queries. He seemed particularly pleased that his friend, Nicholas Berdiaeff, had urged upon me the importance of seeing him.

M. Maritain's work had long fascinated me. His name had been often mentioned at Lynn Harold Hough's graduate seminar at Drew University, and in pursuing my own later studies I had frequently consulted his penetrating volumes, profoundly Catholic in their ideas, yet broadly and deeply humanistic as well.

On many occasions the apparently irreconcilable philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Kierkegaard had awakened in me a desire to find some basis for their reconciliation. At once therefore I asked whether these two structures of philosophy, the one characteristic of Roman Catholicism, the other of Protestantism, might not be harmonized. M. Maritain immediately declared that, in his estimation, Kierkegaard was not a philosopher at all but a hero of faith, a true mystic. Yet there was not on this account sufficient reason to consider the apparently opposed positions irreconcilable. Between Thomism and the Existentialism of Heidigger and Sartre there was an unbridgeable chasm, for Thomism could not be peacefully wedded to irrationalism. Yet between the Existentialism of Kierkegaard and Gabrielle Marcel and the philosophy of Thomas there was far greater common ground than had usually been recognized.

Jacques Maritain said that a new book of his was in process of publication in French dealing precisely with what he regarded as a strong element of Existentialism in Thomas Aquinas. It was often assumed by various writers that the Scholasticism of Thomas was focused, in true Greek fashion, not upon existence but upon essence or being. After careful research M. Maritain had come to the conclusion that this popular assumption was false. The whole mood in which Thomas presented his ideas was one of preoccupation with the problems of existing individuals. It was existence, not essence, with which Thomas was primarily concerned, and therefore the possible ground for community of thought between Thomism and Existentialism already existed in the former.

We might have pressed this issue much further. In particular I should have liked to raise the issue of the specific divergence of view between the two conceptions of living Christianity. Thomism seems preoccupied with the objective, Kierkegaardian Existentialism with the subjective Church. In the one the structure of Christian thought and faith are *there,* so to speak, for anyone to take or leave. In the other only the subjective crisis of repentance and trust, the passion of total inward consecration and obedient faith, are of chief significance. It was not possible to carry further this part of our conversation, for I had promised that I would not trespass upon later appointments previously scheduled. Had our discussion of this issue been extended, I can imagine that the Kierkegaardian subjective passion of faith would, in M. Maritain's opinion, have been classifiable as the Thomist doctrine of personal discipleship, only one important idea within the total cluster of Christian truths, and that the essential priority of the objective in Roman Catholicism would have prevailed. However, M. Maritain must in no way be held responsible for this projection of my own imagination. His conclusion might have been the exact reverse, that Kierkegaardian subjectivism was but the rediscovery of the existential subjectivity of Catholic Christian experience.

It is to be recognized that in M. Maritain's rejection of the Existentialism of Heidigger and Sartre as "irrational," the standpoint of rationalism was, by inference, assumed, and with a pure rationalism Kierkegaardian Existentialism would be equally at war. It is possible that the problem is unsolvable, since the fundamental presuppositions of Thomas and Kierkegaard were so distinct. Perhaps Protestantism must forever remain subjectivism, or lose any reason for separate existence from Rome.

It must be borne in mind, however, that subjectivism is by no means the whole of Protestantism, for classical Protestantism at least had also an objective Faith, the Word of Christ as God and Saviour, and an objective Church, governed not by papal decree but by parliamentary agreement, not by letter, but by spirit.

As the second subject for discussion I quoted Arnold J. Toynbee's assertion, particularly emphasized in the last three of his six volume *Study of History,* that Christendom might well still be a unity, and the ensuing agonies of nationalism through the deification of parochial sovereign states have been avoided, had the Popes of the fifteenth century been wise enough to accept the parliamentary limitation upon their absolute authority offered by the conciliar movement of that epoch. M. Maritain had not known of this idea of Toynbee, and gave it some consideration before he replied. He could understand perfectly that, from the viewpoint of an historian, the assertion in question must indeed be true. However the statement of Toynbee failed to take into account the nature of the Catholic Church, viewed from within. Only recently the Pope had characterized all civil governments as legitimately receiving their authority from men, but the government of the Church as receiving its authority from God. The two kinds of government were therefore basically distinct, and no proper analogy could be drawn between them. The root difficulty in the fifteenth and subsequent centuries lay in the erroneous idea held by the mediaeval dynasties that they ruled by "divine right," as the Pope ruled. The fact was otherwise, for the monarchs had in no case received their authority from God; they had rather seized it by force out of the hands of the people. The Pope, as the representative of Christ, had not received his authority from men, but from God. It was not possible therefore for him to abdicate this power by bestowing it upon an ecclesiastical parliament. To a limited degree, the parliamentary principle, however, did exist in practice within the Roman Church through the Pope's appointed College of Cardinals, serving as a president's cabinet or board of counsellors.

From this admirable and pointed summary of the characteristic Roman position on a moot question, the discussion led to a related problem. Exactly what would be necessary for the reunion of Christendom? I suggested that the idea had been advanced here and there among Evangelical Protestants, who by virtue of their faith in Christ as God and Saviour recognized a basic common ground with Rome, and who at times felt themselves as isolated islands in a vast sea of

unitarian Protestantism, that classically Christian Protestant denominations might be received into the Roman Church, but permitted, like the Franciscans, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits, to retain their own Regula and their characteristic emphases in faith, while making common acceptance of the Pope the symbol of Christian unity. M. Maritain indicated in his reply that the reunion of Christendom could not occur except on the basis of complete agreement at two major points: there would have to be unanimity on the essentials of the Creed; there would have to be an accompanying unanimity on the authority of the Pope to decide issues of faith and order. If the Pope were to become merely Christendom's permanent presiding officer, Rome would no longer be Rome, and the Christian Faith itself could conceivably be voted out of existence by a parliamentary majority.

As I write these paragraphs, the Basilica of San Paolo on the Ostian Road south of Rome is before me. Near this spot St. Paul was beheaded; under the high altar of this great Church, it is believed, his body lies buried. One cannot but remember that St. Paul received his call directly from Christ, not from St. Peter, as he began and ended his great ministry "outside Rome." Verily if Roman Catholicism is the Church of St. Peter, Protestantism is the Church of St. Paul.

With these three discussions serving as an introduction, we came at last to the topic of my own immediate interest. It might at first seem that the question of how best to resurrect Evangelical Protestantism ought to be presented only to non-Catholics, but a voice from the outside is always needed to offer criticism from the perspective of distance. M. Maritain could see two outstanding needs in contemporary Protestantism: one for the recovery of what the Quakers used to call "The Inner Light" — a rediscovery of living inward prayer and faith and devotion of a determinative kind, a true Life in the Holy Spirit; the other for an escape from the common contemporary sentimentality — Protestantism's tendency toward an all-embracing, and all-dissolving, pseudo-social gospel — through an intellectual revival. In America, M. Maritain asserted, Drew University offered an excellent example of exactly such an intellectual revival, a reaction against the surrounding and merely humanitarian emotionalism. On the one side, the recovery of an authentic inner life, a personal living companionship with God, which, as a matter of history, was the great emphasis of classical Protestantism; on the other side, the recovery of the intellectual seriousness of the great Reformers.

Think for a moment how challenging these two suggestions for

Protestantism really are! They constitute nothing less than a summons to Protestantism to recover its own historic identity, its spiritual intensity and its intellectual vigor. The very fact that so eminent a mind as M. Maritain's indicates these needs for a revival of Evangelical Protestantism is itself significant. W. A. Visser 't Hooft's emphasis upon the necessity of a recovery of original Protestantism is similar to Jacques Maritain's, though distinct in its ascription of final authority to the Word of God simply. Similar also is the demand from Emil Brunner that the first necessity for Protestant renewal is the recovery of "a live theology."

At length we came to the arena of practical politics. Exactly how far to the political left might or must a man go who found himself at the theological right? There was no identity whatever, in M. Maritain's opinion, between a theological and a political right. He had sought to point out in all his writings, particularly in his volume *True Humanism,* which he recommended as the strongest presentation of his ethical and political stand, that in itself classical Christianity is neutral concerning political mechanics, seeking only a responsible solution to social problems. His own position on this matter, he asserted, was virtually identical with that of Reinhold Niebuhr and Nicholas Berdiaeff. Christianity commanded group-mobilization of resources and energies to meet group needs, not on the basis of totalitarianism's coercive collectivism, — annihilating the spirit and the identity of the individual, ruling by irresponsible caprice, a government by brigands, — nor on the opposite basis of laissez-faire anarchy, — turning of necessity also into the rule of force and fraud, of violence and hypocrisy, — but rather on the basis of community — the human, the natural, and the mechanical best rallied for a common assault on common obstacles to external and internal well-being.

Insofar as Protestantism has had no articulate philosophy of politics, except the questionable one of regarding the political world as beyond the claims of the Gospel, the essential anarchy of this alien area of life, disavowed by the Church, has brought forth many things, but none of them notably based on Christian charity. Christianity, to obey its Lord and its own true nature, must move back into the political world, claiming all for Christ, demanding the execution of the divine will in a society which has been allowed to become secular, as in the Church and in the soul.

CONTEMPORARY BOOKS

AN "APPROACH" THAT ARRIVES

AN APPROACH TO THE TEACHING OF JESUS, *by* ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL. *Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, $1.25.*

THIS is a really fresh and untrodden "approach" and is a most welcome addition to the multitude of books on the teaching of Jesus. It may seem impossible that at this late hour anything new can be said on the subject: but such is the vitality of the theme that new insights are bound to come — only let the student and expounder be utterly honest, and say what he sees, not what he is expected to say. President Colwell's book is utterly honest. He begins by recognizing the radical nature of Jesus' teaching: "The words of Jesus have the rugged fiber of the cypress tree and the jagged edge of the crosscut saw. . . . His language is extreme — extravagant. . . . A tremendous vigor, an exuberant vitality, surges through his words." As Chesterton said, Jesus' words are "gigantesque" — they are hardly to be explained as examples of peasant humor (say of the Paul Bunyan type), nor can they fairly be explained away as "Oriental rhetoric" or crude renderings of Aramaic idiom. The words are extravagant, but are meant in entire seriousness. Jesus was no systematic teacher: his usual method was to answer a question, make a comment, or tell a very short story (p. 24); and there is nothing abstract about it. He was a preacher, and his teaching was closer to poetry than to philosophy. The brevity of the period of oral transmission of his sayings forbids us to assume that much was contributed by the early Christian communities in the way of polishing and repolishing the tradition; hence the sayings have come down to us almost in the form in which they were delivered. And although it is recognized that selectivity has been at work, it must also be recognized that on some subjects Jesus was silent — he simply took for granted the great basic principles of the religion of his people, for example the existence of God, the divine nature, God's justice, mercy and forgiveness, the divine rule, the purpose of God for mankind, the coming Kingdom, the resurrection and the judgment. It is where he is silent as well as where he speaks, and where his words differ from those of contemporary Jewish teachers, that the distinctive element in his teaching is to be sought.

The chapter on the originality of Jesus is one of the best. By means of brilliant parallels from literary criticism (Dickens and Shakespeare) Dr. Colwell shows that what is important is not the sources of ideas or themes or even of language used, but the use made of them — a few slight turns in the hand of a genius can remould an idea or a trait and leave it an imperish-

able *ktêma es aei*. This principle is illustrated in the two chapters that follow, where Jesus' teaching on humility (which is certainly fundamental and characteristic, and yet was not unique — Jewish religion had much to say on the subject: *vide* the Psalms, not to mention later Jewish literature) is unfolded in detail, and where the source and meaning of his humility are studied. The source lies in his response to God: it was no trait of abnegation or psychological nihilism, but the fullest kind of abandonment to the will, the purpose, the wisdom and love of God. And this feature carries a long way, even a long way in exegesis. "It is not unreal to say that Jesus' own response to God was a devotion so complete that he did not have time to worry about making clear to men what Jesus' role was, or what Jesus' title should be, or just what Jesus thought about himself" (p. 72). The source of his humility is God — but not God as power, or as the absolute, or even the righteous, the moral, the holy, but the God of grace. This principle is finely elaborated in what follows, and is set forth in a beautiful poem by the author himself, in which the spirit of Jesus and the spirit of St. Francis are mutually illuminating. He will come again —

> But should he come in a steel mill —
> ("I am come to bring fire,"
> Said the Lamb of God, Jesus)
> ("Fire is my brother,"
> Said the gentlest one, Francis),
> Would kings give ear to his message?
> Or priests find in him their comfort?

The last two chapters deal with the coming Kingdom and the present Kingdom. Here it is recognized that the rigor of Jesus' teaching is not to be explained by the fact that the kingdom is coming — the "interim ethic" theory is completely inadequate. Although not sharing the "realized eschatology" view of Dodd, Colwell insists that Jesus saw the beginnings of the final realization of God's purposes in the world about him: "In some sense the Kingdom was present in Jesus' work and the response which it won" (p. 110). The hope that lies at the heart of Jesus' teaching is a social hope, through and through, since all of history is in the hands of God and cannot be abandoned to chaos or the devil. At the same time, men believed that the will of God was perfectly known by Jesus, and this faith was destined to be central in later Christianity and to be vastly fortified and deepened. The notable fact is that it began, not after the resurrection but before: "without it the resurrection experiences would not have been possible."

The size of this volume and its price are no indication of its importance. I wish every minister and theological student in America, and in the world — and every Bible-reading layman — would read and reread it!

FREDERICK C. GRANT

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MAJORITY

RENDER UNTO THE PEOPLE (The Cole Lectures for 1946), *by* UMPHREY LEE. *Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, $1.50.*

THE author, who is president of Southern Methodist University, begins this lecture series with a surprising reference to the now all but forgotten Scopes trial in Tennessee. Few people, he says, have realized that the central issue there was not the teaching of evolution in the schools but the right of the legislature to determine what shall be taught. Dr. Lee is one of the few writers who have seen this. If the legislature had decreed that no religious interpretation of man's origin be taught, the defenders of civil liberty would undoubtedly have been *amici curiae* on the other side. The decision against evolution was, the author shows, in line with a succession of judicial decisions in fortifying the majority, whatever its will may be.

Dr. Lee accepts the principle of majority rule even though he sees that, with the present secularist trend, it makes the position of Christianity in our culture increasingly precarious. The clock cannot be turned back. He recognizes also, as many do not, that the separation of church and state has been far from an absolute principle in American history, and that the areas of common concern are due to increase rather than decrease.

What then is the indicated course? As Dr. Lee sees it, the only sound strategy for the church is to bend every effort toward making the "majority" Christian in temper and outlook. The fate of Christianity in America "rests ultimately — so far as human affairs go — with the majority." This is a statesmanly view of the problem.

Turning his attention to education — both formal, through the schools, and informal, through such agencies as the screen and the radio — the author avers that "the present generation is exposed to influences more powerful than any that affected their fathers, and the weight of influence is undoubtedly on the secular side." Yet he thinks that efforts to counteract the trend by introducing religious teaching into the schools are ill-advised and contrary to sound public policy. So far as specific indoctrination is concerned this reviewer thinks he is entirely right about this, though he seems to underestimate the possibility and importance of the study of religious institutions and literature in the appropriate disciplines. There is a body of experience here to which all too little attention has been given.

Yet even here Dr. Lee's main thesis holds, for what use is made of acquired knowledge depends upon the mind-set given to growing persons through the impact of the entire culture. We can surely do something to correct the aggressively secularistic and anti-religious indoctrination going on in our higher educational institutions, to which the author calls attention. Our Protestant scholars are at fault too. Honesty compels the author's

judgment, "that in this country Catholic scholars, when writing of Western culture, are much more likely to understand the place of religion than are those of Protestant backgrounds."

On the political front the pulpit must be free, but not, says Dr. Lee, obsessed with its own political wisdom. There must be education as well as prophecy, and laymen's deliberate judgments are more significant than ministerial proclamations.

It is right to expect that the church will have something to say. It will not help if the word that comes is immature, doctrinaire, the parroting of some party line. Happy is the church whose leaders have courage equal to their convictions and intelligence equal to their courage.

F. Ernest Johnson

HOLDING THE WORLD TOGETHER

World Christianity, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, *by* Henry P. Van Dusen. *Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, $2.50.*

MANKIND in our time has rediscovered the nature of the Christian Church. It is, although imperfect, the "embodiment" of the spirit of Jesus Christ — the "community of the Sons of God across the world" — and as such is alive, vital and growing. While secular foundations disintegrated during the war with its moral and spiritual aftermath, the Christian Church stands forth today as the "invincible champion of human rights," the "dauntless ministrant to human need," the one "indestructible world-wide community."

The author's perception of spiritual meanings matches the accuracy of his analysis of both the historical and contemporary facts of church life and thought. The thesis of the book is: "To an age destined to survive, if at all, as 'one world,' we bring a world church and the beginnings of a united church."

The author traces the expansion and penetration of Christianity throughout the world *yesterday* in Christian missions and the beginnings of Christian unity. Yesterday stretches from the dawn of Christian history to 1914.

In World Christianity *today* he considers the Christian world mission from 1914 to the present and sets forth the growing appreciation of the significance of the World Christian community, both co-operative and organic.

The issues which World Christianity faces in the *future* are presented in "The Imperative to Christian Unity," "The Authority of Christian Faith" and "The Issues of Christian Unity." World Christianity is not to be so much concerned with measuring up to the requirements of a global age as it is to fulfill Christ's intention for his Church. The community of Christ's re-

united Church has begun to be a foretaste of the world unity among the nations which "could be and must be." The Church's major task is to declare and demonstrate by word and act the glorious good news of Jesus Christ. The strength and power of the Church are measured by the degree in which it is world-wide and united.

A chronology of Christian co-operation and union from 1795 to 1946, as set forth in the appendix, will be a valuable reference for all students of Christian unity. This chronology exemplifies the truly comprehensive and universal sweep of this volume. The ecumenical perspective afforded World Christianity will impress every CHRISTENDOM reader, as it has the reviewer, with its vision, courage and hope.

J. QUINTER MILLER

EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTISM

PRIMER FOR PROTESTANTS, *by* JAMES HASTINGS NICHOLS. *Association Press, 151 pages, $1.00.*

IF a primer is a simple book for beginners, this is no primer. It is rather a profound and stimulating book, obviously not directed to the novice. It is crowded with judgments — sometimes refreshingly novel ones — on much debated matters, and disposes of whole chapters of Christian history in a phrase or two. Not only does it shuttle back and forth between periods, somewhat bewilderingly at points, but its sketchiness is a real hazard in so vast a treatment. Apparently in the effort to overcome obscurities due to overcompression of subject matter, and to emphasize the relevance of the past to the present, the author interposes many analogies, often brilliant but not always convincing; as for example that "For three centuries Christians had been segregated in the [Roman] Empire as Negroes are in the United States"; that church members, after Christianity became safe under Constantine, became like the "rice Christians" in the Younger Churches of today; that "We might take the Anabaptist communities of South Dakota as the best living expression of the radical wing of the Reformation or of the pre-Constantine church." But even a valid analogy can illuminate only a small adjacent area, and the book leaves much for the amateur reader to wrestle with before he can assimilate it.

Professor Nichols finds warrant for treating Protestantism as a unity in the fact that four-fifths of all Protestants belong to six great families of denominations: the Baptist-Disciples, Congregational-Christian, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian-Reformed, and Anglican; and, that, as he later shows, the concept "denomination," as it has developed under American democracy at least, means membership in a family with a common outlook and loyalty, co-operating with other denominations "in freedom and respect for the same truth and the same obedience" (p. 71).

What happened in the second century, involving, on the one hand, consolidations in the church necessary to overcome divisive tendencies, but, on the other, the cooling of the spiritual climate, is explained by the generalization: "Every creative awakening of Christian life has passed after about two generations into a period of lowered inspiration, organization and codification (p. 25). Moralism and institutionalism got substituted for the personal awareness of God in action, and this lapse has affected Protestantism and Catholicism alike throughout the centuries. In general, what Professor Nichols fears and condemns is institutionalization rather than the divisions of the church.

The author's exposition of Roman Catholicism is clear-cut and well documented, but packs considerable asperity into its brief compass, perhaps reflecting current quarrels as well as historical antagonisms. It is not Protestantism, he insists, which has departed from the central trend of Christian history but the new-fangled "Trent religion" of modern Rome, with its doctrine of papal infallibility and the trimmings.

The actually basic division in Protestantism, as the book sees it, is that between two groups, "a conservative group which retained medieval concept of a uniform church-dominated state and culture, and a liberal wing . . . which continued rather the medieval traditions of the separatist congregational life, or of individualist humanists or mystics" (pp. 17, 18). To the former or authoritarian group belong "three great ecclesiastical systems of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" — Lutheran, Anglican and Reformed; to the latter, humanists and Anabaptists. "We may thus distinguish in the first two centuries following the Reformation, three varieties of authoritarian Protestantism and two general tendencies of non-authoritarian Protestantism" (p. 15). But as ever-increasing mutual borrowings have gone on the minor and suppressed strains of the Reformation have come to be those most characteristic of modern Protestantism (p. 19).

As the matter has worked out within the American scene one finds the Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed or Presbyterian churches "penetrated in many ways by elements of left-wing thought and practice" to the extent that "American Protestantism is now dominated by" the left-wing tendency. About half of its churches are congregational in character (p. 86). This interpretation is not likely to win immediate universal assent.

In the second major section of his book, the restatement of Protestant principles, Professor Nichols, in moving terms, translates the "right of private judgment" (that least defensible of alleged Protestant principles as generally stated), into a response of an adoring discipleship to a self-revealing Lord; and the often pedantically stated "justification by faith" into humble trust accepting the revealing love of God. In brief, he turns these

watchwords from theological into religious principles. Similarly the individualistically biased "priesthood of all believers" is restated in the terms of an evangelical fellowship implying a common life, mutual ministries, "social religion" and the Church as the Body of Christ. In keeping, however, with the author's dread of institutionalization, the book's chief stress is on the church as a leaven, a "hidden fifth column" of the faithful: "We do not know who they are, save as we hear of an individual here or a couple there, but we know that they are there and everywhere as the chosen of God" (p. 118). This identifies the *ecclesiola* as the soul of *ecclesia,* and is far enough from one objectively Holy Catholic Church, the same throughout all the ages. The historical churches, however, are necessary; "they represent the culture, so to speak, of the Holy Spirit, and preserve an infinitely precious tradition" (p. 119).

The Bible, as Professor Nichols' Protestantism conceives it, is neither a book of verbatim revelation nor a theologically directed allegory, but a disclosure of God in *action,* interpreted out of "the shared experience of the believing community" (p. 134). Finally, the layman's daily work is holy, like the priest's.

All told, Professor Nichols' book goes far toward restoring church history to its high role of evangelical witness and prime source of guidance for the church today.

H. Paul Douglass

THE ORIGINS OF ISRAEL'S RELIGION

Revelation and Response in the Old Testament, *by* Cuthbert A. Simpson. *Columbia University Press, $3.00.*

THE origins of religion are notoriously obscure, for at the time of origin men are seldom aware of the seminal forces at work among them. Later ages reflect imaginatively upon the beginnings and endow them with epic amplitude and pageantry. This is particularly true of the beginnings of Israel's religion. The materials in the Old Testament are peculiarly rich, but the problem of attempting to discern the actual course of events is surrounded by profound difficulties. The major portion of Professor Simpson's fresh and stimulating discussion is devoted to the origins of Israel's religion, and it is this portion which will hold the greatest interest for scholar and layman alike.

Originally Jahveh was a god of the thunderstorm. In this phenomenon of nature he revealed himself, and through it Israel came to know herself to be a chosen people, an elect race. To interpret the religious meaning of this experience Simpson invokes Otto's interpretation of the "holy," the

sense of the numinous. The first major vicissitude of the religion was the coalescence of the god of the storm with the volcanic god of Sinai. Charles Doughty's descriptions of volcanic eruptions in *Arabia Deserta* are quoted with telling effect. In an unforgettable experience of a volcanic eruption Israel came to know Jahveh as her Redeemer and Deliverer. Jahveh is the God of the armies of Israel.

An event destined to influence the development of Hebrew religion profoundly was the arrival of the Israelites at the oasis of Kadesh. The God of Kadesh was first of all a god of justice and creativity, responsive to human need, both material and moral. The Israelites took over the local sanctuary together with its priesthood, identifying its god with Jahveh, the God of the volcano and the storm. It was from the Kadesh oasis that a small number left to go to Egypt. This relatively insignificant event is the origin of the representation which dominates our present Book of Exodus. Moses, the priest of the sanctuary, did not accompany the clans, but it was he who was responsible for interpreting the significance of the events associated with the escape from Egypt. The association of his name with the Exodus is a later accretion, as indeed is the association of the Israelites with the event.

The invasion of Kadesh aroused the strong resentment of certain elements, notably the Amalekites, and as a result the Jahvist groups were forced to penetrate to the north as far as Hebron, where they encountered the pre-Yahwist religion of Hebron. Here the name of Abraham was associated with a great theophany, which had given the sanctuary its origin. Residence in Palestine encouraged the assimilation with other groups, notably, those who revered the name of Isaac at Beersheba and the Transjordan tribes associated with the name of Jacob.

One of the most fascinating chapters of the book is devoted to the Jahvist stratum. The forces lying behind the document are interestingly explained. The work of the later writer (J^2) raises the composition to a level of greatness. Scholars will have many questions to raise about the source analysis here, above all the relations of J^2 to the Elohist, the northern document. That so early a writer was preoccupied with creation in the lofty terms of Professor Simpson seems hard to believe. There is much pure speculation in this section, which will no doubt be dispelled by another volume devoted exclusively to the subject. The chapters on the rise of the monarchy and the prophets are less original, but they are admirably drawn and integrated into the theological pattern which dominates the book.

No summary can do justice to the ingenuity and skill which Professor Simpson has shown in his reconstruction of Israel's beginnings. His account is characterized by critical acumen and also by a profound religious interest. The theme of the unification of Israel dominates the whole book. The author believes that the movement towards monotheism dates from the

very beginning in the experience of the storm. The motif of "challenge and response" is sounded throughout.

The weakness (what seems to the reviewer the fatal weakness) of the book is the treatment of the tradition of the exodus from Egypt. So much importance is attached to the experiences of *nature* that the evaluation that Simpson gives of the *event* of deliverance from Egypt loses much of its force, and certainly the dominant picture of the Old Testament is greatly qualified. That monotheism, even though momentary, had its beginnings in an animistic milieu is hard to believe. The theological vocabulary employed to interpret the significance of exceedingly primitive elements seems strangely out of harmony, and the constant emphasis upon the very gradualness of the development is more modern in its mentality than Biblical. Nevertheless, Professor Simpson has made a real contribution to one of the most difficult as it is one of the most fascinating portions of the Scripture.

JAMES MUILENBURG

A MORALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF A RELIGIOUSLY BASED ETHICS

THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS, *by* L. H. MARSHALL. *The Macmillan Company, $3.50.*

THIS study of the moral principles of Jesus and of Paul is written in the context and spirit of Protestant liberalism. Its author blends careful exegetical scholarship with commendable social urgency and passion. His mood is optimistic or at least melioristic; he is proud of the degree to which Christian principles have modified human behavior in the past and sanguine about their wider and deeper application in the future. He finds it difficult to separate ethical ideal from moral fact, as when he quotes pronouncements of the early Fathers and concludes, in the first pages of the book, that such statements were descriptive of the lives Christians actually led. His approach is also non-theological; important theological issues are either ignored or reinterpreted in terms of their moral suggestiveness. Moreover, it is what today would rightly be called moralistic, for the author lays great stress on man's competence to see and follow the moral leading of the Christian faith.

The book gives a certain impression of being provincial and dated. Mr. Marshall often calls upon the Victorian poets Browning and Tennyson to underscore his views. Writers such as Niebuhr, Berdyaev, and Nygren (even on the question of *agape*) are not mentioned, and Brunner is quoted once briefly. Illustrations of Christian virtue in action are drawn from the area of good sportsmanship, fair play, and clean fighting. There is little if any sense of the austerity and rigor of the Biblical demands, or of the inability

of man because of sin to perform them. Humility or gentleness is regarded as a social, not a religious relation. Under the author's touch drastic demands have a way of turning into decorous maxims. How, for instance, can he possibly assert the view that to do good to one's enemies is a superhuman demand merely by citing the case of a British soldier who offers a cigarette to a captured German?

The book lacks consistency of outlook as well. Jesus' ethical imperatives are called "laws," but we are assured that he never "legislated." When defending the validity of Jesus' ethic the author argues that man is much the same always so that the same principles apply, but when he discusses Paul's doctrine of the new creation in Christ he stresses quite as warmly the changeability of human nature. He tells us that the motive for being honest is not that it is the "best policy," yet when he comes to speak of Christianity in business he appeals to the very motive which he has rejected earlier.

The fact is that the book moves on two very different planes. One is the exegetical. In this realm the author is most successful; he is cautious, stays close to fact, and makes some fresh, crisp translations like that of 2 Corinthians 3:6 given on page 229: "For the Code kills, but the Spirit makes alive." The other plane is the theoretical and ethical. On this level the author is apparently not at home; his writing is prolix and diffuse; he does not come to grips with the burning problems of law and gospel, love and justice, or sin and redemption. Perhaps this is the reason why the Fourth Gospel, where such matters receive the fullest Christian treatment, is omitted from his discussion. At any rate, Protestant liberalism must offer stronger and more nourishing ethical food than this.

ROGER HAZELTON

IS LIBERALISM LOST, STRAYED, OR STOLEN?

FAITH AND FREEDOM, *by* RUSSELL J. CLINCHY. *The Macmillan Co., $1.75.*

THE four chapters of this little book comprise the Enoch Pond Lectures on Applied Christianity delivered at Bangor Theological Seminary in 1947 by the well-known Congregational minister of the First Church of Christ of Hartford, Conn. The chapter headings indicate clearly enough what Dr. Clinchy has in mind by his title: "The Status of Liberalism," "The Nature of Liberalism," "The Liberal Idea and Program," "The Sustaining Faith of Liberalism." This, obviously, is a book about liberalism; it is more than that, it is an apologia for liberalism.

The Preface announces that "the word, liberalism, today has been lost, strayed and stolen." It is the author's contention that far from being defunct liberalism is very much alive, and while ailing here and there and in need of chastisement and purgation liberalism *rightly interpreted* is our

only hope in a distracted and confused world. The italicized phrase is what distinguishes Dr. Clinchy's book from numerous other critiques and analyses of contemporary liberalism.

It is not an easy matter, however, to know exactly just what the liberalism is that emerges from this very readable study. There is a good deal of negative definition which helps to clear away certain ambiguities, but one can imagine a semanticist writhing under the promiscuous use of abstractions. Take this, for example. "It is quite often thought that there are three categories of action – the reactionary, the liberal and the radical, but in truth there are only two, the liberal and the reactionary, for the tory and the radical both aim to destroy the essential freedoms of the mass of the people." All this raises a question of some importance which the author might have examined to good effect. Does liberalism (in theology if not in political or social thinking) exist in its own right as something *sui generis,* or is it essentially a parasite, a derivative, in a word "reactionary"? One thinks of Barth's discussion of natural theology, in his Gifford Lectures, existing only as a reaction to revealed theology. In other words, can you define the liberal without also defining the reactionary?

As a matter of fact, Dr. Clinchy's liberalism is of a very chastened and modest variety. Some indeed will wonder if it deserves the name at all. Others may feel that the word as used here neither helps nor hinders the discussion for the simple reason that it has become neutral – its sting pulled and its edge dulled. One of our American theologians has done much to plead for evangelical humanism; Dr. Clinchy, I think, is interested in evangelical liberalism. In any event, something has happened to liberalism, as this author sees it, and if his position is at all typical, we can well believe that liberalism's best days are not all in the past.

HUGH THOMSON KERR, JR.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORMS OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LITURGY, *by* J. H. SRAWLEY. 2d ed. (The Cambridge Handbooks of Liturgical Study). *Cambridge University Press, $3.00.*

THE first edition of Canon Srawley's handbook, published in 1913, has been out of print for some years. Meanwhile there has been a remarkable growth of interest in liturgical studies, combined with fresh discoveries of primary sources – all of which has necessitated revision of basic manuals of introduction to the subject. Dom Gregory Dix was not wide of the mark when he noted Canon Srawley's book as "still the best technical introduction to liturgical studies available in English" (*The Shape of the Liturgy,* p. 208). This new edition of a recognized standard should therefore be all the

more welcome to students embarking upon the fascinating exploration of the origin and development of the historic forms of Christian worship. The great value of Canon Srawley's manual is that it furnishes the student with facts rather than theories. On controversial points the book leaves the student with the relevant references and lets him make up his own mind regarding the evidence.

The changes in the new edition are not extensive. Less space is devoted to the controversies which interested an older generation, such as the occasion of the institution of the Eucharist and the relation of Agape to Eucharist in the earliest times. Recent discussions regarding the Didache are noted. Ratcliff's theory about the primitive core of the Liturgy of Addai and Mari, accepted by Dom Gregory Dix, is taken over without question, and Dom Connolly's interpretation of the famous letter of Pope Innocent I to Decentius is approved. But Canon Srawley refuses to go along with Dix in the latter's views about the Anaphora of Cyril of Jerusalem, and a long note is added defending the position taken in Srawley's first edition with respect to Pope Gregory the Great's arrangement of the Lord's Prayer in the Roman rite. The most noteworthy re-writing of the new edition is the result of Canon Srawley's acceptance of the *De Sacramentis* as a genuine work of St. Ambrose. Fuller references are also given to other liturgical notices in the works of Ambrose. One problem is given particular attention and revision, namely the development of the Invocation in the eucharistic rite. The modifications of the author's views on this subject are perhaps a reflection of the debate over Prayer Book revision in England in the 1920s.

Two serious defects in the presentation seem to me to be regrettable. One is the way in which Hippolytus' *Apostolic Tradition* (known in 1913 as the Egyptian Church Order) is handled. While Canon Srawley recognizes the "supreme importance" of the document for the history of the liturgy in Ante-Nicene times, he does not rearrange his presentation to bring this out. His discussion of the work is still appended to the chapter on the Egyptian liturgy, after he has dealt with fourth and even fifth century evidence. It would have been far more to the point to have concluded his chapter on the second century with the material of Hippolytus. Otherwise its crucial importance for later developments not only in Egypt and Syria, but even in the West cannot be adequately presented. In a way, Hippolytus is the key to the whole liturgical development of the ancient Church, but Canon Srawley has failed to make this clear.

It is almost unbelievable that the author should have neglected even to mention the important additions to our knowledge of the liturgy in Syria at the close of the fourth century made available by Mingana's publication in 1932–33 of Theodore of Mopsuestia's catechetical lectures. Yet there is not the slightest hint of their existence. The able study of F. J. Reine, pub-

lished by the Catholic University of America in 1942, comparing Theodore's rite with Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, and the *Apostolic Constitutions* would have contributed much of value to Srawley's chapter on the Syrian liturgy, which, as it stands, is an inadequate introduction to the subject.

Finally, one might say that the concluding chapter on "early conceptions of the Eucharist" should have taken occasion to present some of the weighty theological and devotional characteristics of the ancient rites brought to the fore in Dix's monumental *Shape of the Liturgy* — e.g., the transformation from an eschatological to an historical foundation and expression of the liturgy as a result of the transformation in the Church's fortunes wrought by Constantine and his successors.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

CAUTIOUS PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY

NERVOUS DISORDERS AND CHARACTER, *by* JOHN G. MCKENZIE. *Harper & Brothers, $1.50.*

SINCE the publication of his *Souls in the Making* in 1929, it has been clear that the author has been among the leading British pastoral psychologists. In this new volume containing four lectures, he sets forth a theory of nervous disorders or personality disturbances which regards them as expressions of "moral and religious character" and not due to some "external factor." He acknowledges particular indebtedness to Karen Horney and Erich Fromm.

As the author admits, the theory of personality disorders as being expressions of character structure is not original with him. He has, however, attempted to set it forth within a specifically Christian framework and setting. The task undertaken is important, and Dr. McKenzie clearly writes out of wide experience. One may regret his failure to refer to Karen Horney's *Our Inner Conflicts,* published in 1945, which modified and deepened her theory of neurosis and character, and which would probably have deepened the considerations in this book. No doubt the recent difficulties of transoceanic transmission have been responsible.

But in this book implications for the pastor in any practical sense are difficult to find, apart from the important point that the pastor should have psychological knowledge of unconscious mental processes. On the one hand, in reference to persons with neurotic tendencies, "the pastor or the gospel cannot deal with such people." Yet Dr. McKenzie plainly deals with them all the time and draws all his illustrations from that experience. He says further that people with psychoses "should be left entirely alone so far as pastoral psychology is concerned." Does this mean no mental hospital

chaplains, no calls in mental hospitals to visit their own parishioners there? And if not, why is this excluded from the field of "pastoral psychology"?

If the pastor is to have no contact with psychotics, and is to avoid dealing with neurotics, then what does he do? The author writes, "One does not need to be an expert in psychotherapy to help people with conflicts which are not repressed; they are the same conflicts which afflict our own souls." But are these the true distinctions? Are not the various degrees of awareness and unawareness more significant than such categorical distinctions? And does the pastor have a radically different conception of pastoral ministry to people, as over against helping them through counseling?

Dr. McKenzie is certainly on the side of the angels. His discussion of the prohibitive conscience, for example, was never more needed than now. But he leaves obscure not only the practical points of how he works, from what professional point of view, how he utilizes psychological knowledge in helping people — but also the "middle axioms" area of counseling which lies between basic theory and actual procedures. To write, "My observations incline me to the view . . ." is not to tell us how he works and from what point of view, in what role, how he observes, and how he links theory with practice.

Being an unreconstructed American, I am disposed to observe that the British consider any discussion of "how to" as distinctly American in character. But, British character structure or no, the mere comparison of generalized conclusions from observations whose provenance and specific nature are not disclosed seems to me to limit the value of any such writing. Dr. McKenzie's British answer to our American question would be valuable, and we may hope it may be given in the next series of lectures he here promises.

SEWARD HILTNER

AN EPISCOPALIAN SYMPOSIUM ON PROPERTY

CHRISTIANITY AND PROPERTY, *edited by* JOSEPH F. FLETCHER. *Westminster Press, $2.50.*

THE theme of this volume is certainly at the center of modern interest. In a rough-edged way Capitalism and Communism face each other in mortal conflict throughout the world. Though each, naturally, is a concrete compromise of its full ideal, yet some sort of showdown between them seems to be in the making, and that soon. Where, then, does Christianity come in as far as this aspect of the world-struggle goes?

This volume by a group of Episcopal thinkers serves well both as a stimulus to thought and to some extent as a clarifier of problems. The content of the book, in general, starts with the Biblical interpretation of property,

goes on to a study of its treatment throughout Christian history, and continues with a consideration of the application of Christian principles to modern economic questions.

As to particular content, — the first chapter is written by Dean Charles Taylor on the Old Testament approach, and is a model of clarity and competent grasp. The next chapter on the New Testament by Bishop Emrich contains six main stresses which I feel are expressed with laudable restraint for a book which obviously aims at social reform. That is followed by a chapter on "The Way of the Early Church" by Professor Edward Hardy which is the outcome of genuine scholarship. Next Frederic Hastings Smyth writes an informative and thought-provoking chapter on the Church's attitude toward property during the Middles Ages, followed in turn by an important wrestling by Professor Paul Lehmann with the teachings of the Reformers on the subject. That great social prophet, Vida Scudder, to whom the book is dedicated by her colleagues in its writing, next takes up the topic of "Anglican Thought on Property," a subject in which she rightly finds much satisfaction, particularly for the latest period of that Church's history. She has the faculty of selecting high-spots of historic thought and presenting them with a verve and grace that make reading a delight. In line with his previous searching writings on the subject, Charles Duell Kean then analyzes "The Significance of Capitalism." In some ways the editor's last chapter on "A Theological Perspective" stands out as the most relevant and most economically searching, even though he seems caught between conflicting Christian and Stoic perspectives.

Certainly the book should be widely read and discussed by both laymen and ministers of all communions. It is informative, directive, and opens up many lines for further thought and work. We owe a debt to all the contributors. From the Christian point of view, however, it seems to me to leave much to be desired, both Biblically and historically, as to what constitutes a *genuine Christian perspective*. The volume consequently lacks systematic unity and sharpness. The general requirements and implications of religious socialism seem rather to constitute the actual common outlook and drive of the writing. For that reason the sharp problem of the relevance of radical Christianity to this sin-ridden world, the problems of continuity and discontinuity between this world and the ultimate world of Christian reality, the intensely important question of the nature and function of the Church in its direct or indirect relations to the social order, are neither deeply and comprehensively conceived nor vigorously attacked. Nor, for that matter, are the genuine problems of actual socialism in this kind of world adequately recognized and probed. I am in general sympathy with the author's point of view and am genuinely thankful for it. It is a book for general purposes with valuable information in brief and

readable form. While not a scholar's wide and deep probing of the underlying presuppositions and the whole range of relevant problems, it is a book with a message for the urgent needs of our times.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

THE CRUX OF CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

FREEDOM AND ORDER. LESSONS FROM THE WAR, *by* EDUARD HEIMANN. *Charles Scribner's Sons, $3.00.*

MUCH learning and much thought have gone into the making of this book by Professor Heimann who had been teaching in Germany before coming into this country where he joined the faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. It presents an analysis of Western civilization on the road to World War II and in its travail during the cataclysm. Professor Heimann regards the contemporary crisis primarily as a moral one and in that he is certainly right, though he also deals with the economic and political issues involved and does not neglect them. His framework of reference is the antithesis of freedom and order which can be reconciled in the higher concept of justice. The present reviewer believes that Professor Heimann overemphasizes the lack of order in democracy.

On the whole, his book will be read with profit. There are many wise statements in the book, like his rejection of pacifism which might easily lead to a policy of appeasement of Fascist or Communist totalitarians, or the just remark that the vices of the oppressed have as ruinous an effect in history as the vices of the oppressors. He reminds us that civilization, being a tension, can never be without strain and is not refuted by strain — something often overlooked by utopian reformers. Many of Professor Heimann's judgments on contemporary affairs show a penerating insight, a striving for objectivity and fairness, a grasp of historical reality and a deep sense of responsibility and charity. Yet the present reviewer cannot accept Professor Heimann's hopeful attitude towards the Soviets and their system.

Though Professor Heimann sees clearly the totalitarian and anti-democratic character of the Soviet regime, he interprets, in the reviewer's opinion wrongly, some inconclusive measures of the Soviet government as establishing the foundations of a peasant democracy and the equal lack of liberty in Russia of all races as an "ethnic democracy." On the basis of such meagre premises he hopes that fifty or one hundred years from now these permanent achievements will outweigh by far the memory of tyrannical lawlessness and persecution. This seems to the reviewer to overlook the very foundations of the present Russian regime. Perhaps the Russian chapters were written in 1944. They contain no hint of the essential antagonism of Soviet and Western society in the international field. Professor Heimann

rightly warns in other fields against an easy optimism. Willkie's "one world" optimism seems to have got the better of Professor Heimann's usual discernment in the field of Soviet relations.

Professor Heimann is by training an economist but he has been for very many years a close and earnest student of theology, and the chapters on religion with which he concludes the book belong to its best. He rightly warns that Christianity cannot be equated with democracy. He rejects the demand that Christianity should prescribe democracy in order to qualify for the modern world. Professor Heimann believes that Christianity alone can make democracy possible, and that democracy must transmute itself so as to be open to Christianity. Yet in a remarkable essay on "The Crisis of Man" in the April 1947 issue of the English quarterly *The Adelphi,* which is easily the best analysis of the present world crisis the reviewer has recently seen, Mr. John Middleton Murry maintained that democracy does not so much depend on Christianity as the continued existence of the Christian Church depends upon the existence of the free society.

HANS KOHN

INTERPRETING THE VOW OF TRUTH

IT SO HAPPENED, *by* MURIEL LESTER. *Harper & Brothers, $2.00.*

THE Introduction tells of Miss Lester's new home (one room in a cottage in the middle of Epping Forest, near London, complete with nightingales, honeysuckle, wild roses and yellow iris by a lake — all this after being bombed out of four successive homes in Old Bow); and gives her own clue to the book:

> Now I feel complete again. Yet as soon as I look at the words I know I never can be. For I can't forget the pain of the world. One mustn't forget. It's as necessary to keep aware and sensitive to it all, as it was for the narcotic drink on Calvary to be refused. So the rhythm emerges: the tension between the beauty God put into the world for the human race to enjoy, and the torments we invent for one another. . . . The obligation to think internationally is implied in the first two words of the Lord's Prayer. It is incumbent on the travelling secretary of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, and that is now my official and salaried position.

Miss Lester's travels and observations form the book. They are almost too brief in certain places (Japan, Palestine) and highly interesting about others (China, India, Europe). She shows a warm kinship with Gandhi and interprets his Vow of Truth:

> which does not merely mean "Tell no lie." It implies speaking out the truth publicly as the prophets did of old, who were imprisoned or killed for their pains. It means telling it to people who do not want to hear it, and in quarters where

it may mean losing your job. It means that if you have suffered some wrong at the hands of an official you may seek no redress nor publish the facts until you have seen him personally and given him the chance either of putting it right or proving that you have misjudged his action.

Miss Lester has taken this to heart; and the book shows her courageously taking shrapnel found in China to show an American firm which had just dispatched its biggest consignment of scrap-iron ever to cross the Pacific; investigating both sides of the Palestine discord on the spot; being firm and frank with those who interned her, with members of Parliament, with herself. And always with a touch of mingled mysticism and nonchalance, as of one who knows that the invisible life is the real one.

MARGARET T. APPLEGARTH

THE LIFE OF SENSIBILITY AND THE LIFE OF POWER

SEEDS OF REDEMPTION, *by* BERNARD E. MELAND. *The Macmillan Company, $2.50.*

THE author, who holds the title of professor of constructive theology at University of Chicago, has here constructed some provocative thoughts on the nature of God and the destiny of man. God is defined as "a Sensitive Nature within Nature." Man's goal is said to be to gain in likeness to him by embracing the sensitive life. A sharp contrast is set up between "the life of sensibility" and "the life of power." Churches are exhorted to re-educate their people to embrace the sensitive life as "a social value" and to "designate the thirst for power and sheer abundance as a social evil." It is argued that our times have achieved "the quintessence of power fulfillment," with the result that we stand on the brink of cultural suicide. To save ourselves we must seek achievement in some other category — not that of power but of sensitivity and imagination; not that of mere "well-being" but of "significance." For only as man becomes aware of possibilities of fulfillment "beyond requirements for sheer creature existence" is his spiritual capacity furthered.

I must say that I do not quite see the validity of this contrast. The prospect of being "more than" a creature, or of achieving something "better than" well-being does not strike me as a Christian hope — it is too much like the hope ascribed to Satan in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Nor am I convinced that the real issue we face is one of sensitivity *versus* power. Is it not a question, rather, of different kinds of power? Certainly the Bible does not speak disparagingly of power, though it warns us continually of the actual powerlessness of certain pretended forms of power. In the light of the Bible's use of language I would have to deny that our age has achieved "the quintessence of power." I would suggest, rather, that what we really need is not "imagina-

tion" instead of "power" but the ability to conceive of power with an imagination born of Scripture.

At the basis of Professor Meland's discontent with power is his belief that "sheer dynamism" is "activity without form and value." Here we touch on a theory of Creation which should draw our close scrutiny. It begins with an important distinction between the divine working, on the one hand, and what Meland calls "the brute process of creativity," the ceaseless ongoing of coming-into-being and perishing. This latter aspect of nature is said to have no meaning, no purpose, and no end in view; it is "gushing out like a stream of turbulent water" and is "without form and void." (This statement reads to me like a contradiction in terms – Aristotle would certainly insist that a stream of water has "form.") But brooding over the waters, says Meland, is an immensely sensitive nature within nature – *this* is God. He is working upon the torrent of creativity with the dexterous hands of a creative artist. He is pressing the world's stuff with a gentle and sensitive hand, "patiently shaping the world toward value."

It follows then that religion on man's part consists in being sensitive to this molding activity. "We become Godlike in our response to the world and to the events of the world when we bring to it that same kind of hunger for significance that is in God's nature and which we, with Him, hope might emerge from its circumstances." Following after God means furthering the "refinement" of our beings, achieving "more and more sensitiveness of structure." Sin is whatever obstructs this. The "sleeping devil" that does us most harm is "mediocrity." Hence "the most damnable thing the enlightened and sensitive mind can say about the Christian church is that it is mediocre." These last remarks remind me of the estheticism of Walter Pater, who dreaded any lapse from sensibility as a temptation "to sleep before evening."

Professor Meland repeatedly backs up his speculations with references to the views of H. M. Wieman and A. N. Whitehead. Meland's theory of God as artist has an obvious similarity also to Plato's theory of creation, though it is here given a new turn by drawing upon modern evolutionary naturalism. That the resulting view departs from the traditional Christian view is implied in Professor Meland's complaint that theologies influenced by a "supernatural metaphysics" have failed to understand the historical process realistically. I must leave to the reader to judge of the improvement offered in this book. But I cannot refrain from wondering just how the clergy of the Pastors' Institute, to whom these chapters were originally addressed as lectures, managed to harmonize the ideas given them with the old Christian words "redemption" and "ransom" which Professor Meland insists on retaining in his vocabulary.

ROY W. BATTENHOUSE

ANGLO-CATHOLIC IRENIC IDEALS AND ACTIVITIES

THE OECUMENICAL IDEALS OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT, *by* HENRY R. T. BRANDRETH. *London: S.P.C.K., 7/6 net.*

THE author is a priest of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd. With a minimum of subjective interpretation, the history of the Oxford Movement (usually dated as beginning in 1833) is set forth objectively. The years from the Reformation under Henry VIII are briefly examined and the instances when Anglo-Catholic ideals were held or realized are presented in chronological order down to the Malines Conversations of 1921.

The non-objectivity of the treatise appears not in what is presented but in the numerous and very important activities and expressed ideals of the Church of England which the author omits altogether. It is further stated, e.g., that in the twentieth century there has been "intense reunion activity" but much of this "has been of the kind of which the followers of the Oxford Movement can [not] approve." One wonders who is qualified to speak with authority as to just what the Anglo-Catholics as a whole do or do not approve.

To be ecumenical from the angle of the Christian meaning of this term as developed in the last century and a half ideals must be sufficiently inclusive to take cognizance of the convictions and teachings of all the churches whose "ministries have been owned and blessed of God." St. Cyril's famous definition of the Catholic Church demands such inclusiveness. Mr. Brandreth's selection of historical events to illustrate his theme would seem to indicate that the title of this book should begin with the words, "Irenic Activities" rather than "Oecumenical Ideals." Only convictions and attitudes which might receive the sanction of the Old Catholics, the Roman Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox are historically noticed. Of these the Roman Catholic, reformed as desired by Dr. E. B. Pusey's *Eirenicon,* seem to have had priority in the mind of the Oxford Movement as interpreted by the author of the book.

This review cannot indicate the numerous events, personages and pronouncements touched upon. For the most part, all led to frustration and defeat except for the fact that the Anglican Church is now in communion with the Old Catholics and in partial communion with the Eastern Orthodox.

The chapters on "The Background," "Dr. Pusey and the 'Eirenicon'" and "Leo XIII and Anglican Orders" are especially informative and interesting. With reference to the very effective answer to the Roman Catholic condemnation of Anglican Orders, made in Latin by Bishops Wordsworth, Stubbs and Creighton, assisted principally by Archbishop Temple, why does not the author give his readers the substance, if not the complete translation of that reply?

However the Anglo-Catholic movement's chief contribution to the furtherance of ecumenical ideals lies not in its frustrations but in what certain of its greater leaders like Dr. Pusey and Bishop Gore have done to revive an intelligent interest in the ideals of the catholic church as set forth in the patristic texts. By their efforts they have helped us all to become catholic-minded as over against individualistic opportunists, who know little and care less about essential catholicity as this really appears in the history of the Church.

GAIUS JACKSON SLOSSER

EXPLAINING THE JAPANESE

MODERN JAPAN AND SHINTO NATIONALISM, *by* DANIEL C. HOLTOM. *University of Chicago Press, $2.75.*

IN the spate of wartime books on Japan, many of them based upon superficial knowledge or distorted by the natural bias of the period, it was a relief to have in this brief book a condensation of the larger work by Dr. Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan,* in which is compressed a lifetime of careful observation at first hand, and of the competent scholarship which has made him our foremost American living authority in this field. It is safe to say that the policies now being carried out by the Allied Occupation rest solidly upon the data and findings of Dr. Holtom's books. His competence through direct access to the sources in Japan, his conscientious research, and painstaking handling of the data, are widely recognized.

Yet there may be a danger in a too-complete objectivity in dealing with a living faith of actual people such as Shinto has for centuries been in Japan. If there is to be any profound comprehension, or a view that maintains perspective, there must be on our part a recognition of our interwoven complicity in this strange world-situation which produces a nation like Japan with its cult of dynastic animism or like the United States with its worship of comfort and power. To the outsider these things spell lunacy (or a hypnotic state according to the publisher's jacket), but to those within they make tragic sense. It was altogether inevitable that in her day of crisis Japan should reach back into her past and down into the religious faith of her common people for laying the foundations of her modern society.

Two perfectly familiar streams flowed together. One was an animistic faith such as is shared under differing symbols by hundreds of millions of people in the world today. The other was the modern nation-state which we ourselves have helped to pattern. Japan in modern times has tried with desperate earnestness to find a formula for combining the two. The result has been State Shinto, a dynamic, formidable force, however eccentric it may appear to us. Culminating in the devotion to the Emperor, it had a

deep relevance to the life of the ordinary man in Japan, and was in no sense merely foisted on him by the machinations of a military clique.

Now in defeat Shinto has been disestablished. Dr. Holtom's treatment of the present situation is factually ample and complete, furnishing one with all necessary information regarding Occupation policies. He rightly recognizes that Shinto is still very much alive and may again be a powerful element for good or evil in the East. The closing chapter gives the needed warning that only in a peaceful, healthy Japan can we expect a normal development of Shinto as a valid religious faith, and that such a Japan may be hoped for only upon condition that we see through to accomplishment the creation of an international order in Asia and the world.

CHARLES L. IGLEHART

THE NEGRO RURAL CHURCH

DARK GLORY, *by* HARRY V. RICHARDSON. *The Friendship Press, $2.00.*

DOCTOR RICHARDSON has done a good job and has rendered us a real service in writing *Dark Glory*. It is both factual and interpretative. And his cautious interpretation of the facts impresses this reviewer as sound. We are obligated to the author for Chapter I, a good historical statement, and for Chapter II, where the general setting for the study is given. The book is indispensable to an understanding of the Negro rural church. It covers a survey of the Negro rural church in Dallas County, Alabama; Calhoun County, South Carolina; Mississippi County, Arkansas; and Northumberland County, Virginia.

One gets a clear picture of the physical plant of the rural church, its membership, church finance, the adult program, the young people's program, ministerial preparation, the church and social problems, race relations, the influence the Negro minister exerts in the rural community, with a final chapter under the caption "A Trained Ministry – A Greater Church."

Despite the title *Dark Glory,* the picture of the Negro rural church is not bright. Even the hopeful challenge in the last chapter is not too hopeful. This is very significant coming from one who loves the rural church and who has worked ardently with it and its ministers for many years. But a careful, honest student must tell the truth, be it bright or dark.

Here are some of the reasons why the picture is not so bright. What Mays and Nicholson discovered more than a decade ago is again confirmed in this study. By and large the pastors of Negro rural churches do not live in the community. They are absentee pastors. Most of the Negroes in rural areas are tenant farmers, renters and share croppers. Although there are notable exceptions, the Negro rural farmer is exceptionally poor. And his plight on the farm seems to be becoming more and more precarious as farming be-

comes more mechanized and as large land owners turn from cotton to cattle raising, thus tending to eliminate the Negro. Still another factor that makes the picture dark is the constant migration of Negroes from the country to the city. There is no sign that this is to stop. Although there is a slight improvement, the Negro rural minister is poorly trained. This fact limits the quality and quantity of his leadership. Poorly trained ministers almost invariably mean a poorly planned program or no program at all save preaching. The author makes it most emphatic that the rural minister is ineffective in helping to improve social conditions. Even if the Negro rural minister was more effective in this respect, he would have to be exceedingly wise and careful not to arouse racial antipathy. This is probably one reason why the Negro rural minister does so little along social lines.

The author closes by voicing the conviction "that in spite of difficulties of agriculture and race and politics and all the rest, the rural minister can lift the life of his people if he has proper training and is dedicated to the task." The author is also convinced that the rural church should be "the central force around which the life of a community should move." The book should be widely read.

BENJAMIN E. MAYS

A RESOLUTELY SECULAR METHOD OF ETHICS

ETHICS, *by* RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. *Harper and Brothers, $3.50.*

THE book here to be reviewed is rather unusual in that the meaning of action is considered more important than the meaning of words, unusual also in its modest but firm contentment with the subject matter of ethics. The author, professor of philosophy in Rice Institute, Houston, Texas, brings to the writing of this systematic study of the principles of morality a rich background of distinguished works, including an exhaustive historical survey of *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization* (Dutton, 1942).

The first part of the book gives a concise account of four "main types of ethical theory," formalism or the ethics of the upright will, hedonism, evolutionary ethics, and perfectionism or self-realization ethics — with an evaluation of each. The main defect of all these ethical doctrines, according to the author, is their common tendency to "select some notably important element of value in human life, and then to judge the moral worth of conduct in terms of that one element alone." This defect is found least of all in self-realization ethics. Its characteristic "integrating of our moral activities and reflection" Professor Tsanoff makes more explicit in a suggested table or hierarchy of "values," where "the highest value is the one manifesting the greatest expression and fulfillment of personality." What status values have in reality, whether they are subjective or objective, Tsanoff answers by a relational view: "All value is revealed and realized in the personal response

to experience." This means that all values have a personal or subjective connotation, yet there can be a science of values which is "the study of some field of experience or nature in a personal perspective."

The middle division of the book discusses "problems of personal morality": virtues and vices of personal character, the validity of conscience, and egoism and altruism. For a solution of the latter problem Tsanoff finds a "guiding idea" in T. H. Green's doctrine of shareable goods: "Some values cannot be shared; others can be shared; and still others must be shared and are attained only in community." To be really experienced and possessed the achievements of creative intelligence in science, art, and religion have to be shared. In this discussion too little consideration is given to the fact that the prestige-value attached to these shareable goods, truth, beauty, and goodness, is itself essentially unshareable, and indeed that men battle over them fully as much as over the possession of physically unshareable goods.

A final section on "social ethics" comprises more than half the total number of pages. The author is to be commended for maintaining a distinctively ethical point of view when he comes to the analysis of social problems. As he himself writes, "Our standpoint is and remains ethical; we enter here the field of economics because human life enters it." Without denying the autonomy of social science and the laws it may discover in these areas, ethics must say the last word as to the meaning of family life ("the most thoroughgoing example of human perfection through creative interpenetration of individual lives"), education, recreation, vocational ethics, our economic system, citizenship and government, and international relations.

The reader may object to the inclusion of theological ethics as a variety of traditionalism or "Decalogue morality." He may wonder whether a "resolutely secular method of ethics, which must consistently regard and estimate religion as one of the fields of value realization," gives an entirely adequate account of religion even when it is ranked highest among the value-fields by an author who does not hesitate to explore, in his concluding chapters, the "ultimate problems of moral philosophy" and religious doctrine. The reader, who also is persuaded that God or the neighbor are the only proper objects of Christian love, may perhaps demur at the definition of love as "the utter self-possession of personality by the values with which it is identified," or reject its elaboration in mutualistic if not subjective terms as "the perfect instance of intrinsic value. The best that love yields is more of itself." He will want to supplement the brief treatment, which however is better than most short accounts, of Kant as a formalist by a study of H. J. Paton's *The Categorical Imperative*. He will be amused at the comic ambiguity of the expression, "the traditional virtues and vices of ethical discussion."

But everywhere he reads he will find stimulus and illumination. Two samples may here be cited. A case of professional inconsistency:

Here is a not very edifying scene; a materialistic lecturer has argued his doctrine, that all human behavior is only some sort of physiological reaction, part of the causal mechanism and nothing more. And now after the students have been thus described and tabulated, they are asked to take a test on all this wisdom, and to testify "on their honor" that they have not cheated during the examination!

And this for a tract in times of intolerance:

The only idea that is really dangerous is the idea that is denied a fair chance and so is apt to seek an unfair chance. Are you in favor of making it hard for the radical? By all means make it hard for him, for he is advocating far-reaching changes that might prove hazardous in our society. But make it really hard for him: compel him to prove his case, meet idea with idea. There should be something more to the point with which to answer his speech than a threat of trouble if he continues with it. The more firmly we believe in our institutions the less willing we should be to have the impression prevail that the critic of them can only be silenced, not answered.

PAUL RAMSEY

GOD FOUND IN PERSONAL RELIGIOUS LIVING

THE SKEPTICS SEARCH FOR GOD, *by* BARBARA SPOFFORD MORGAN. *Harper & Brothers, $3.00.*

MRS. MORGAN'S book is a brief philosophical treatise on the Christian religion as a relationship, an experience, and a formulated faith. The treatment shows erudition in philosophy, and contains significant insights and at points a fresh approach. Basically the author is not at variance with the best in current conventional thought about the nature of God and of the Christian religion.

The book as a whole is a discussion of God and his Nature in relation to man's need. The emphasis is neither Christological nor doctrinal, although "towering above all, the supreme example of human spirit in conscious relation to God, is the figure of Jesus Christ, whose life and words, transformed western civilization and echo with mounting authority through the centuries" (p. 126).

A helpful preface discusses the healthiness of recurrent re-examination of one's religious presuppositions, indicates the futility of the rational approach to the understanding of God if it is to be the only approach, and hints at the rise of secular religions as the anti-Christ. The author describes her book as "an independent inquiry into man's relation to the unknowable," dealing not with institutional but with personal religion. One of the best chapters is entitled "The Barrier of Words" and discusses the

shortcomings and the assets of words in their attempt to set forth experience, which is by nature highly unique, and known only person by person.

In so brief a review, it is possible only to list all too inadequately the central ideas of the volume: (1) the shortcomings of materialism as a religion and its woeful adequacy as a symptom of modernity; (2) the necessity of the intuitional as well as the rational approach to an understanding of the nature of God, both of which are carefully and intelligently treated; (3) the power and nature of Christian mysticism, and (4) the meaning of morality as understood in the Hebrew-Christian tradition.

The book contains many strong paragraphs and cogent statements. It is not new material in the main and this reviewer questions whether the issues of "public religious living" (not Mrs. Morgan's phrase) have been as clearly grasped and dealt with as those of "private religious living." The title intimates a skepticism not found in the pages of the book and may have been chosen to suggest honesty of search and treatment, which undoubtedly characterize the writing, and also to indicate the independence of the quest so far as conventional creeds are concerned. As a supplementary reading for theological students, and as reading for those laymen and seekers who long for a discussion of authentic mysticism, this book will be of genuine interest.

WINNIFRED WYGAL

A PHASE OF CHRISTIAN DUALISM

THE MEDIEVAL MANICHEE, *by* STEVEN RUNCIMAN. *The Cambridge University Press, $4.50.*

IN the *Medieval Manichee,* Dr. Steven Runciman makes his way through sporadic and generally hostile documents to reconstruct the development of the organized religious expression of medieval dualism. As in the case of many other religious movements, dualism had a westward drift. "The heart of [Manichaeanism] was in Western Asia, in Syria and in Mesopotamia," and the cycle of its development ranged from the third to the sixth centuries. The Paulicians centered in Armenia, the Bogomils and Patarenes in the Balkans, and finally the Cathars in the South of France.

Each of these groups in their successive heydays enjoyed considerable material as well as spiritual power. But each in its generation expressed a vigorous dissent and secession from the rest of society. Both the Manichees and the Bogomils were pacifist and prone to civil disobedience. A hostile contemporary wrote that the Bogomils "denounce the wealthy, . . . condemn the nobles, regard as hateful in the eyes of God those who serve the Tsar, and they forbid all slaves to do their masters' bidding." The Thonraki and the Paulicians, both in the iconoclast tradition, carried on their civil disobedience by more conventional military means.

These dualist movements were apparently strong enough to warrant determined clerical and secular persecution. "The fiercest and most bloodthirsty persecutions have taken place when the heretics have seemed more seriously dangerous, when their teachings have run counter to the welfare of society, when, were they tolerated, the State itself might collapse." But certainly some of the social ethics of the Bogomils raise the question whether the "welfare of society" was better served by the persecutors or the persecuted.

Dr. Runciman is careful to point out the hiatus between the contemporary Cathars and the Waldenses. "The Waldenses were Protestant Christians, striving to return to the purity of the early Church. They had no concern with the Dualism of the Cathars." Yet it is difficult not to see psychological, if not theological, parallels between the medieval dualists and the modern Shakers, Dukohobors, Jehovah's Witnesses and other groups that have sought to cleanse themselves of the world's dust and blood.

WALLACE HAMILTON

BRIDGING CULTURAL GAPS

APPROACHES TO GROUP UNDERSTANDING — A SYMPOSIUM, *edited by* LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, *and* R. W. MACIVER. *Harper & Brothers, $5.00.*

HERE are well over 800 pages of text, including sixty-seven papers presented at the Sixth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, in August, 1945, together with significant comments on many of them. "Bridges for cultural understanding" were projected in education, economics, government, letters, art, music, natural and social sciences, philosophy and religion. Hard but rewarding reading, inevitably uneven in merit, the best portions of this volume deserve repeated re-reading and careful study. For reference purposes here is genuine encyclopedic quality as well as quantity.

Because initial reactions to the release of atomic energy are now "old stuff," and events have moved so fast, some of these 1945 papers now seem academic and remote. Part of the problem of communication, which is basic to the whole discussion, is illustrated by the sheer physical task of the prompt editing and publishing of such an array of papers under present conditions. Three such able editors, however, could hardly have produced an ephemeral volume out of such material. If thousands of years from now some archaeologist should discover a buried copy of this book, he would find remarkable contemporary evidence of the intellectual orientation of a large segment of American thought at the very beginning of the atomic age.

So overwhelming an assembly of technical specialists was bound to in-

dulge in some polysyllabic obfuscation of ideas that really great teachers are able to put forth in short words. On the other hand, diligently to study such a book is to be greatly humbled. There is so much to know about so many things, and most of us know so little about so few subjects, that the problem of learning to live together on our shrunken planet, while there is time, becomes an awesome one, in size as well as urgency.

Religion is here represented not only by competent religionists, but also in the manifest seriousness of leaders in other fields who might deny that they were religious, either in the popular or the ecclesiastical sense. In times like these, words like salvation and redemption once again come alive, to challenge all organized religion; and long-range values again come into their own.

What chasms do we want to bridge? Are there any that we do not want to bridge? Are there any that we ought not to try to bridge? How can people who are sure they are right build bridges between themselves and people who are "wrong"? Is not common knowledge of the terrain on both sides of the gulf to be bridged essential to all bridge building? Religion, it appears, just because it involves such deep convictions, digs also the deepest ravines between its adherents. "Bridges for cultural understanding cannot be permanently suspended from the balloons of sheer good will." (Fritz Marti, p. 771 — one of many quotable passages.)

Evidently the increasing number of us who feel that religion should become a unitive rather than a divisive force in the human community, local and world-wide, have got to do a lot of slow, difficult spadework. We shall have to try patiently to discover why the other religionist is as sure that he has the truth as we are that we have it, and then to see whether together we can discover some transcending truth more important than the temper of our separate enthusiasms. Apply this on a planetary scale, or even in Everytown, U.S.A., and the task becomes prodigious. It will require knowledge, skill, and imagination, as well as good will. But volumes like this help to lay scholarly foundations for all such effort.

Ross W. Sanderson

PARTISANSHIP MATCHES PARTISANSHIP

American Communism, A Critical Analysis of its Origins, Development and Programs, *by* James Oneal and G. A. Werner. *E. P. Dutton & Co., $5.00.*

COMMUNISM being a going concern, though less vigorously in America than elsewhere, any book published in 1927 to describe its American manifestations is sure by this time to need revision and supplementing. *American Communism* was first published twenty years ago by Oneal who was then editor of "The New Leader," a brilliant and extremely partisan

weekly of right-wing socialists. Retirement and ill health forced him to seek assistance with the new edition, and he found a collaborator in Professor Werner of the College of the Pacific. In this edition the first thirteen chapters are the original book, with nothing much changed except the tense of narrative verbs and a few phrases such as the "Neurosis of Communism" for "current tendencies." There are nine additional chapters dealing with developments since 1927.

Any experienced student of social trends in America knows how bitterly partisan Communists are, and that they are equalled in this trait only by the Socialists. The present volume is an interesting example of their mutual antagonism. It is, of course, a mistake to suppose that nothing may be gained from reading biased writers. Often we are more easily misled by writers who pretend to have no bias at all. This latter form of deception, however, is notably lacking in both Communists and Socialists when they discuss each other!

The first chapters trace the confused and complicated beginnings of the Communist Party as a revolt of "foreigners" in the left wing of the Socialist Party after the First World War. Sectarianism, reflecting the aftermath of the war and the impact of the Russian Revolution, riddled the Socialist parties, and their divisions are described in documentary detail. Several chapters are devoted to Communism's united-front policies, the rise of Trotskyism, the shift from opposition to the late war to support after Germany invaded Russia, the dissolution of the Comintern (revived again after the book appeared), and the episode of Browder's "revisionism" and its denunciation. Chapter XIX, "More Fronts and Splits," is a rather long one (and not too well documented to support its interpretations), showing Communist "front" activities in ten important political and labor organizations. The closing chapters are more "sermonic" and less disciplined in their treatment of the subject. The final chapter, "Alternatives," is a very interesting and suggestive account of the collective trend in modern American economy but hardly a necessary part of the book's theme. Four of the five appendices are useful Communist Party documents; the fifth offers somewhat debatable "parallels" to show that Communism and Nazism are the same thing.

The method the writers have employed might be compared with Bishop Stubbs' "constitutional" approach to history; their material is mainly an analysis and commentary on legal documents and manifestoes, while the people involved and the "matrix of history" surrounding these documents remain vague and shadowy. This reviewer is frank to say that the book's unqualified surrender to *Tendenz* makes it an unreliable or at least misleading piece of work for the uninitiated student, but of great interest to the "old hand" student of doctrinaire left movements.

There is plenty of evidence throughout that it was hastily prepared for the press, no doubt in order to take advantage of the current wave of anti-Communist literature. The book is poorly edited in matters like paragraphing and badly proof-read for punctuation and spelling. Daniel Bell at the University of Chicago is painstakingly collecting material for a history of the Socialist Party, and he should be able to correct many of the perspectives of the Oneal-Werner treatment.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

THE UNITED CHURCH IN ITS COMMUNITY

HOW THE CHURCH GROWS, *by* ROY A. BURKHART. *Harper & Brothers, $2.00.*

THE author writes out of a great experience. The First Community Church of Columbus, Ohio, of which Dr. Burkhart is the minister, is an outstanding demonstration of the possibility of uniting people of all shades of denominational background into one church. It is also a demonstration of what a united church can do in the community in contrast to the competing denominations that are often too weak to make the necessary impact upon society.

But the author is not pleading for the organization of community churches alone. He is trying to sense the meaning of real Christianity. In the Master's prayer for unity in the seventeenth chapter of John, Jesus was not concerned that his believers should be one just for the sake of bigness. There was a more fundamental spiritual reason; it was, "That the world might believe, that Thou hast sent me." This is the basic reason for seeking unity of the church today. The world does not believe. In spite of all the claims of increasing church membership, of increasing church school enrollment, and enlarged programs of Christian education, the facts are that the world is more pagan today than it was fifty years ago; that a secularism has taken root in American life that is threatening the very foundations of Christian society; that organized evil is more entrenched in the community life of America than at any time in our recent history. The task of creating the Christian community is imperative if many individual sinners are to be saved. Thousands of communities are in the grip of organized evil, and it will require organized righteousness to cope with organized evil. This calls for greater co-operation and united effort among the Protestant churches.

This volume also points attention to the developing needs that require special services along the lines of education, social action, and humanitarian effort — not that the churches will themselves undertake these services but rather will co-operate with the Government and other agencies to achieve the desired ends. Again this will require the co-operative effort of all the churches.

The question of youth and activity programs for youth is given consider-

able attention, and rightly so. There is probably no man better equipped by experience in young people's work than Dr. Burkhart. While he is concerned to help any and every church improve its program to meet the needs of youth, he is concerned also about the fact that many churches as now divided are too small and do not have the resources to meet these special needs of modern youth. Federation or some form of consolidation is necessary in order to serve adequately the youth in the community.

The true church, about which this volume is concerned, is one that is seeking to establish the Kingdom of God in society — to create a fellowship of all those who believe in the practical application of Christian principles to every walk of life, a church that will unite people in love and service and not divide them.

A word should be said about the Foreword written by Henry R. Luce. In this attention is called to "the decline in the effectiveness of the Protestant church or churches." It suggests that if "this authority that secularism wields over the thought and feeling and imagination of America" is to be overcome it can only be by an increase "in the authority of the Nazarene and His Eternal Gospel over our social, as well as our private, thinking and living." This in turn will necessitate the uniting of the Protestant forces on every level of life. We can no longer expect the things of the Kingdom to be achieved by the weakness and waste of a divided Protestantism.

The leaders of the Protestant churches will be wise to take the contents of this book seriously. Individual Christians will be inspired and stimulated to greater Christian effort by reading this volume; it is another milestone on the road to a United Church in the United States.

MARK A. DAWBER

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES OF OUR FATHERS

CONFLICT IN CHRISTOLOGY, A STUDY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN CHRISTOLOGY, FROM 1889–1914, *by* JOHN STEWART LAWTON, *London, S.P.C.K., 20s.*

HISTORY is always written from some particular point of view. The author of this important study apparently assumes that the Formula of Chalcedon was the definitive statement of Christology. The "liberal" attempts at restatement were not inadequate gropings toward a better Christology but sad deviations from the truth.

The book is strictly limited to the Anglo-Saxon field, and the dates cover the twenty-five year period between the appearance of *Lux Mundi* and W. G. Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology* and the outbreak of the first World War. More than that length of time has elapsed since. The book does not cover our history but that of our fathers. Those of us of the older generation recall

these distant controversies, but the discussions definitely concern issues of the past.

Germany appears constantly in the background, but only as the ultimate source of error, fortunately diluted by the time it was expressed by Anglo-Saxons. No reader would ever dream that men like von Hofman, Zahn, Schlatter, and others had maintained a very different tradition in Germany. Germany is only the land of "higher criticism," and this is seen not in the historical values which it made possible but only in its negative phases.

Lawton begins with an outline of the reputed assumptions of liberalism as these are now so frequently pilloried. He shows the causes of dissatisfaction with the traditional Christology at the time that men undertook the historical study of the gospels. "Like the Antiochenes they felt bound to insist upon Christ's true and complete humanity; from the Alexandrines came the necessity of his personal unity" (p. 39).

The debates which the author covers contain much dreary reading. What could be more futile than the defense of Christ's omniscience, and yet "Conservatives urged that error was no more possible to Christ than sin." The review of the exegesis of Philippians 2:5–11 only shows how little the debaters on either side of the kenotic controversy thought that Paul should be studied in relation to his own ideas rather than the issues discussed at Nicaea.

Naturally Lawton has little difficulty in showing up the inadequacies of the kenotic theories of Gore and the others. I hope no one will want to debate his point that Garvie's *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus* is entirely obsolete. He rightfully pours scorn on the older discussions of "the messianic consciousness of Jesus." Fairbairn's *Christ in Modern Theology* is as dated as, may I say, Athanasius.

Not only are the left-wing liberals, like Percy Gardner, Richard Roberts, J. M. Thompson, J. Warschauer, and R. J. Campbell castigated. The author also levels his attack on men like Rashdall, William Sanday and William Temple. The kindest words are reserved for Frank Weston, and W. P. DuBose. My guess is that for most Americans they will be the least familiar names in the list.

It seems to this reviewer that the author is operating with a fundamentally erroneous conception of what belief in the Incarnation implies. He still wants to describe it in terms of a divinity masquerading in flesh. The Gospels are for him not the deposit of early Christian faith, but an arsenal of proof-texts from which "the claims of Christ" are to be discussed. His final court of appeal is really to the Chalcedon formula. Apparently one should start from the conclusions of the fourth and fifth centuries and then see how these are to be substantiated from the New Testament. But this method assumes a doctrine which bears no relationship to the apostolic

message as set forth in the early church and developed by Paul and John. It imposes problems which never existed for the New Testament. We thank the author for exposing so many of the inadequacies of the "liberal period," but he does not point to a goal which has any hopefulness for tomorrow.

CLARENCE T. CRAIG

THE CHURCH IN TOWN AND COUNTRY

THE RURAL CHURCH IN THESE MOVING TIMES, *by the* COMMITTEE ON TOWN AND COUNTRY, *The Home Missions Council of North America, 25 cents.*

THE *Rural Church in These Moving Times* is a report of the National Convocation on the Church in Town and Country held at Des Moines, Iowa, in November, 1946, and attended by 896 registered delegates and many visitors, from many denominations, together with administrators and directors of rural work, government employees and rural sociologists and economists.

This booklet presents in full most of the addresses and commission's findings. The twenty separate commissions of the Convocation considered subjects such as the church and agricultural reconstruction, the church and land tenure, church co-operation, the theological seminary and the rural church, the Christian family and rural life, worship in the rural church and the function of denominational regional directors of rural work. The range of interest is too broad to permit summarization. In total, the report gives a perspective of current thinking and interest in rural church work.

The addresses provide thought-provoking reading. Dr. Carl C. Taylor, head of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare in the United States Department of Agriculture, points out that there are four long-time constant trends in American rural life; first, a steadily diminishing percentage of American people live on farms; second, a steadily increasing intermingling of agriculture and other occupations; third, a decline in the operation of the "agricultural ladder" as a method of gaining farm ownership and as a means of insuring economic and social security; and, fourth, a constant shift from dependence on local, simple face-to-face (neighborhood) types of association to non-local, complex, relatively impersonal type of organizations and contacts.

The booklet also includes a brief report of the Iowa religious survey completed during the year under the leadership of Dr. H. Paul Douglass. Dr. Calvin Schnuker, director of the Iowa religious census, reported that 62 percent of all Iowans are church members; 53 percent of all Iowans attend church; 25 percent of all Iowans attend Sunday school; 21 percent who are not church members have a "preference," and 17 percent of all Iowans are neither church members nor have a preference.

Summarizing in the closing address, Dr. Herman N. Morse said:

After all, in the end the church must stand or fall by our belief that in the local community, as in the world at large, the supreme values of life are spiritual, not material, not scientific, not cultural, but spiritual. It is ours to give the community a motive that life cannot outgrow; a purpose that progress cannot overrun; a standard that success cannot cheapen; a goal that is no lower than the Kingdom of God; a power that suffices for all things.

The 119 pages of this pamphlet make excellent reading. Seldom can one buy so much for so little.

MARK RICH

THE CHARACTER AND POLICIES OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

DIE RÖMISCH-KATHOLISCHE KIRCHE, *by* KURT GUGGISBERG. *Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1946. Swiss Fr. 15.50.*

THE author of this book, a professor in the University of Bern, has sought to depict the essential dogmatic and organizational character of the Roman Catholic Church by allowing it to speak for itself. Accordingly, the book consists of two parts: an Introduction, comprising the author's own summary treatment of the subject (pp. 9–146); and a selection from sources, comprising documents illustrative of the various items under discussion (pp. 149–343). In the Introduction, the author summarizes the material presented in the sources — the latter being drawn from official documents, dogmatic and canonical pronouncements of the Councils, papal encyclicals and other official deliverances, excerpts from Church Fathers, quotations from outstanding theologians, etc. Since the author has the Swiss readers primarily in mind, Swiss Catholic writers are quoted to a larger degree than would undoubtedly have been the case had he envisaged a wider circle of readers.

But even such apparently fair and objective treatment of the subject could easily be subverted, by a clever selection of one-sided and unrepresentative sources, had the author an apologetic or polemic purpose in mind. Such, however, does not appear to be case in this instance. He has aimed to present in a fair and representative way the essential character and declared policies of the Church. The book's main sections deal with the essential character and constitution of the Church, its dogmatic system, sacraments, and the cultus, and the relation of the Church to the world. The last mentioned section includes a treatment of the relation of Church and state, the ethical system, the Jesuit Order, social principles, and relation to the non-Catholics. The illustrative sources, as has already been mentioned, are taken from authoritative documents generally acknowledged by the Church and commonly accepted as such by others.

But the Introduction affords more than a mere summary of the source material of the second part of the book. The author subjects the Roman Catholic doctrinal system and organizational aims to a scrutiny and criticism which are often as penetrating as they are pertinent and devastating. Thus, for instance, the papal claim to jurisdictional supremacy over the entire Christendom on the ground of the supposed Petrine Roman episcopacy and primacy is not merely stated, but is likewise critically evaluated, with results not likely to prove acceptable to the Catholics (pp. 59–61). The dogma of papal infallibility is likewise subjected to a similar critique, many instances of an evident fallibility of the Popes being cited. The author depicts the character and role of the Society of Jesus in the Catholic Church, and warns against the latter's purpose to win recognition of its claims over civil society and governments. Furthermore, the Church's attitude toward Protestants, toward modern culture, toward education, and many other topics are critically but fairly examined.

The author has succeeded well in presenting Protestants with an objectively fair and at the same time critically evaluated study of the Roman Catholic Church. For an elementary, comprehensive study of the subject this is an eminently useful work.

MATTHEW SPINKA

ANNALS OF A GREAT CAREER

ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF JOHN R. MOTT. Six Volumes. *Associated Press, $6.00 per volume.*

THE literary record of John R. Mott's career is a stupendous collection of 3,538 pages, in keeping with a life unparalleled in the annals of American religious movements. Obviously this offers no easy afternoon's task for a reviewer. Five volumes summarize the chief movements in which Dr. Mott exercised long and distinguished leadership — the Student Volunteer Movement, the World Student Christian Federation, the Y.M.C.A. (two volumes), and the International Missionary Council. The sixth volume is a rich miscellany of factual material and addresses, throwing light over the whole spectrum of Dr. Mott's services.

With some variation the contents of the successive volumes follow a pattern: (1) the history and exposition of the particular movement being related, (2) the official records (sometimes dreary reading but priceless as a source of material), (3) the narratives of prodigious apostolic travels, often with deputations, (4) select addresses, illustrating the particular phase of Dr. Mott's career under discussion. The whole collection has an encyclopedic character which will send many students to consult it, along with the special histories. Dr. Mott's career steadily followed a single pattern, always

moving from the narrower to the larger interests, and from the narrower to the broader field of responsibility. At no time was the scope of his imagination less than global, and his steady advance in responsibility was marked by single-minded devotion to an ideal matched by capacity for infinite detail.

As the field of his services enlarged the immediate focus of attention changed, and with it came a different set of specific issues. Yet Dr. Mott's career has been essentially of one piece. Its core was always a rather simple personal discipleship, finding vent in relentless travel, linked throughout to exceptional administrative thoroughness. The essential unity of his life is notably evidenced in sections of the record which are presented topically or territorially rather than chronologically. The narrative takes great leaps in time as in space, but in any epoch reveals always the same man.

One wonders, however, whether even the 3,500 and more pages of the record have yielded a balanced view of the whole man. The reviewer notes a single humorous story openly arrived at, though the fairly frequent reminiscences are choice, thoroughly human, and not devoid of humor. One of Dr. Mott's most impressive self-revelations is the catalogue of men who have influenced him and to whom he looks up with humble reverence and gratitude. No pages of the tomes under review are more eloquent than two facing pages — one reproducing the careful, almost minute-by-minute time-schedule for one of Dr. Mott's characteristic world trips; the other the schedule of objectives for which prayers and supplications are to be made during the period of the journey. These two strands always belong together throughout the entire record.

In 1935 Dr. Mott asked himself, "What would I like to occupy myself in for the next ten years?" and answered, "I would rather live in those ten years than in any period I have read about in history." The ten years and more have been granted — terrible and fateful ones and the end is not yet! But one man at least among us has earned his respite, the right to lie down in green pastures and beside still waters.

H. Paul Douglass

NOTE AND COMMENT

(*Continued from page* xv)

Committee was discussed at length. The appointment of a special committee was authorized to wrestle with and bring in recommendations on this subject. Reports were made from the great variety of ecumenical gatherings which have occurred during the past summer, including the world gatherings of the Baptist, Lutheran and Methodist Churches. Principal David G. Moses of Hislop College, Nagpur, spoke on the spiritual significance of the new united Church of South India, and Bishop Otto Debelius, of Berlin, spoke informingly and discriminatingly on The Ecumenical Church in Germany.

A BIG PROGRAM

ADDRESSING the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America on September 16, Dr. A. Livingston Warnshuis made an exceptionally challenging presentation of the achievements and future needs of Church World Service, the agency of relief and reconstruction of the American churches. He reported that the value of cash and goods channeled directly through this agency, together with the direct gifts of churches co-ordinated by it, reached the enormous aggregate of $41,000,000 in 1946. He went on to show that the program cannot diminish, since the devastations of war and the sufferings of the people were far greater than previously known, and that recovery is taking much longer than could have been foreseen. Summarizing first-hand reports from all parts of the earth, Dr. Warnshuis drove home his points relentlessly. Quoting Dr. J. Hutchison Cockburn, of the Geneva headquarters, he continued: "The situation is threatening, and the outlook grim; for what is at stake is not only the civilization of Europe, but, in the long run, the civilization of the world, and that, because something deeper is at stake, namely the Lordship of Christ Himself over the ways of men."

NEW ZEALAND CHURCHES CONSIDER UNION

A PROPOSAL for a union of the Prebyterian, Methodist and Congregational Churches is now under active consideration in New Zealand.

The pressure of frontier conditions is a major factor in their move toward church unity. The present Presbyterian Church of New Zealand is a united church, containing all the strands of historic Presbyterianism in a single body which stands second only to the Anglican Church in numerical strength in the country. Similarly the present Methodist Church of New Zealand, by a series of unions finally consummated in 1913, contains the

united strands of the Wesleyan Methodist, Primitive Methodist, Free Methodist and Bible Christian Churches.

The members of these two bodies are familiar with the atmosphere of union. They know something of its problems, dangers and benefits. In each denomination there is a group both of ministers and laymen who feel the evils of disunity especially in a young new country, and who have worked and prayed for a more comprehensive union of Christ's church. Consequently at different times in the past, overtures have been made for union of Methodist and Presbyterian Churches. On each occasion the higher courts have been favorable, and the Methodist people in the lower courts have expressed a majority vote in favor of union, but it has not carried the approval of the lower courts of the Presbyterian Church.

The matter could not rest there however. Six or seven years ago the Methodist Conference again went on record, reaffirming its historic position of willingness to consider union proposals with either or both the Presbyterian Church and the Churches of the Congregational union. This resolution was forwarded to the assemblies of the other two bodies and received a cordial and ready response.

Steps were taken to form a union committeee representing the three churches, empowered to discuss the whole question of a possible basis of union and statement of faith. Naturally some time had to be spent in feeling around to sense the relative significance of positions of faith and polity set forward by the different representatives. As the work progressed, it became evident to the members of the union committee that union should be possible. A large measure of agreement was reached and a definite enrichment of fellowship was discovered among the members.

The draft "Basis of Union and Statement of Faith" was submitted to the central bodies of the three churches for an expression of the mind of the lower courts. An opportunity was given for suggestion of amendments, and for a vote on the question of general approval of union. The result of the voting was generally favorable to union, subject to a number of proposed amendments, many of which were tantamount to negation of the "Basis." Most, however, were structural suggestions made in the hope that progress would be achieved.

Again the "Basis," with the many suggested amendments, went to the union committee who were now eager to make all necessary concessions short of disloyalty to principle, to produce an agreement on which union could be achieved.

Wherever possible, amendments were adopted in a fine spirit of give-and-take. Finally the members of the union committee looked at their handiwork and unanimously agreed that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit they had produced a broad outline of church polity and doctrine for a

church within which each member could exercise a ministry with satisfaction and freedom of movement as in their present separate denominations.

This "Basis" has now gone to the three legislative bodies and has been approved by each for submission to the lower courts for their decision. The voting in the lower courts is to take place by 1948 after due time has been given for exposition and study of the plan, and if possible for a visit by a member of the union committee. Very wisely the matter is not being hurried, but it is hoped to carry a sufficiently large majority of the membership of all three churches to ensure a stable structure, if and when union is accomplished.

It is proposed to have one governing General Assembly. There will be area Synods carrying largely the powers of Presbyteries. Parishes within the Synods will have Sessions consisting of Elders ordained either for a term or for life, Boards of Management handling the property affairs, and a Parish Council which will be representative of every section of the church life, and which will appoint its representatives to the higher church courts from within the membership of the Session. The call system for the appointment of ministers will apply to self-supporting charges, and a settlement committee will act to fulfil the intention that every charge should have a minister and every effective minister a charge. Existing charges will be permitted to continue for a reasonable period their present usages and procedure for the election of their local officials and conducting of local affairs, but all new churches or amalgamations will be expected to adopt the full procedure of the basis of union.

GEORGE A. LAURENSON

THE CRUSADE FOR A UNITED CHURCH

THE recent campaign in the interests of a United Church, in some thirty cities in the United States, under the leadership of Dr. E. Stanley Jones, resulted in a magnificent response in every city that he visited.

It would seem that this series of meetings was well timed in view of the several significant developments that confront us at present. First and foremost is the rising conflict in world affairs and the necessity of a united voice and action on the part of the church which can challenge the titanic forces of evil and destruction now imperilling western society.

Second, we face organized evil in every community in the United States, and it will require organized righteousness in order to make any impact upon it.

Third, overtures have been made to the Federal Council by some of its constituent bodies, requesting it to arrange for a national conference of

church leaders in 1948 to explore next steps toward a United Church in the United States.

The recent crusade by Dr. Jones has without doubt created a groundswell of interest on the part of the ministers and lay people of America that will have a profound bearing upon the plans for a national conference in 1948. Denominational leaders dare not ignore this witness and desire of the people to achieve greater unity among the churches. While the crusade gave special emphasis to what is known as the Federal Union Plan, the main purpose of the meetings was to awaken the churches to the need of some immediate action. About 100,000 attended the meetings; some 75,000 cards were signed by which individuals pledged themselves to work for a United Church. Another 100,000 cards have been requested, to be used in follow-up programs in several states.

The laity are becoming alive and will be heard from. It is to be hoped that the ministry and denominational leadership will become equally concerned to achieve a United Church in the United States.

MARK A. DAWBER

TOO MANY INEFFECTIVES

NO matter how big or brave an army may be it cannot successfully fight if it includes too many ineffectives.

The Protestant denominations have manipulated themselves into sponsoring and trying to maintain a lot of local churches which are ineffective as units of organization and action. They have too many too small churches. Not by design, of course. Someone had dreamed that each would be big — at least big enough. The fact remains: the Protestant church has a multitude of congregations which are structurally inadequate to perform the ministries of a unit of the Church Universal. They haven't what it takes.

Those who make ecclesiastical ideals and standards keep turning them out for churches which cannot possibly use them. A distinguished theological president wrote an excellent book on worship. "But, Doctor," said his critics, "you've written for the big city church. Write another book on worship for the rural church." So he wrote it, and it still called for a vested choir of more members than the probable entire rural audience.

Protestantism need not repeat the error of setting up new ineffective units if the denominations will jointly plan the adequate occupancy of growing communities and avoid competition. Protestantism has before it the long hard job of re-churching America with effective local churches through the blood, sweat and tears of elimination, merger, federation or other reorganization necessary to make the system work. In typical cities the average Catholic church has five times the membership of the average Protestant church. It has its deficiencies, but it is much less often too small as an operating unit.

A CALL TO THE CHURCHES

CONCERNING THE FIRST ASSEMBLY OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

Amsterdam, 1948

I

IN August 1948 the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches will take place at Amsterdam, and all the member Churches will send their delegates. We are profoundly thankful that after long years of separation, and so soon after the most devastating war in human history, the Christian Churches throughout the world will thus be able to express and to manifest their spiritual unity.

We know that this is due to no merit of our own, but is a gift, granted to the Christian Churches by our Lord Himself against and beyond any human hope. Through the trials and persecutions of these last years, a new consciousness of fellowship has been awakened and made effective, and a flood of prayer has been released, overflowing all ecclesiastical barriers and national antagonisms. We have learned in a new way that "where one member suffers, all the members suffer with it." And we have been richly blessed by this experience. Thus we have every reason to thank and praise God, "Who only doeth wondrous things."

But this graciousness of God reminds us all both of our responsibility and of our shortcomings. The main theme before the Assembly — "Man's Disorder and God's Design" — itself shows that the Churches of Christ have failed in preventing man's disorder, and will fail again, if we try to overcome it without God's grace, and without a renewal of our own lives. We have failed both in speaking the Word of Christ and in doing His healing and saving work.

II

With the blessing of God, this Assembly can make a great advance in affirming the responsibility of Christians and Christian Churches to seek continually that the whole of human life and relations shall be brought under the Kingship of Christ. But before attempting to make a new start, we ought to understand why we failed, and recognizing the cause of our failure, plead that the goodness of God may lead us to true repentance. The design of God declares itself in the new environment for our lives that has been created by the acts of God in Christ. In His life, death, and resurrection, and in the coming of the Church, a new beginning has been made in human history. "What is old has gone, the new has come." But at this crisis in the existence of mankind, we are compelled to confess that the contrast between the high calling of the Church and the visible institutions called Churches

is only too evident. We have failed because we ourselves have fallen victims to man's disorder. Our first and deepest need is not new organization, but the renewal, or rather the rebirth, of the actual Churches. May God grant that we may hear the call of the Spirit.

III

We confess that because of the dividedness of the Churches, also, we have fallen short in the witness we should have borne to Christ. Our Churches are divided, and by their divisions the whole work of the Church, both in speech and in action, suffers most grievous harm. We long for the day when the Lord Jesus Christ shall recapture the Churches and, manifesting His glory, lead them to speak with one clear voice and to act as those who serve Him only as their Lord. In that unity we desire to join our forces to do His work of feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, visiting the prisoner and healing the sick, to learn and to preach His truth and grace, and thus to proclaim His kingdom.

IV

The World Council of Churches is itself both a declaration of the spiritual unity of its member Churches and a means through which they may express that unity in action. Already more than a hundred Churches have joined it from the Old and New Worlds, from the East and the West — a clear sign of the longing of the Churches for deeper fellowship in Christ. The Council stands on faith in our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Savior and is a fellowship of Churches which accept that faith. It serves the Churches, and in no way seeks to legislate for them or control them. It aspires after an expression of unity in which Christians and Christian Churches, joyously aware of their oneness in Jesus Christ their Lord, and pursuing an ever fuller realization of union, shall in time of need give help and comfort to one another, and at all times inspire and exhort one another to live worthily of their common membership in the Body of Christ. It also seeks increasingly to enable the Churches to take united action for the furtherance of Christ's Kingdom. We trust that, by God's grace, through the meetings at Amsterdam, the World Council may be recognized by the whole membership of the constituent Churches as a clear expression and a powerful instrument of their fellowship.

We therefore call upon all Christians to join us in earnest prayer that the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches may be used of God for a rebirth of the Churches, and for their re-dedication in the unity of the faith to the common task of proclaiming His Word and doing His work among all nations.

Issued by the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches
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